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Abstract
This research aims at improving the robustness of electronic systems used-in high level
radiation environments by combining with radiation-hardened (rad-hardened) design and
fault-tolerant techniques based on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. A specific
of the research is to use such systems for wireless post-accident monitoring in nuclear power
plants (NPPs). More specifically, the following methods and systems are developed and
investigated to accomplish expected research objectives: analysis of radiation responses,
design of a radiation-tolerant system, implementation of a wireless post-accident monitoring
system for NPPs, performance evaluation without repeat physical tests, and experimental
validation in a radiation environment.
A method is developed to analyze ionizing radiation responses of COTS-based devices and
circuits in various radiation conditions, which can be applied to design circuits robust to
ionizing radiation effects without repeated destructive tests in a physical radiation
environment. Some mathematical models of semiconductor devices for post-irradiation
conditions are investigated, and their radiation responses are analyzed using Technology
Computer Aided Design (TCAD) simulator. Those models are then used in the analysis of
circuits and systems under radiation condition. Based on the simulation results, method of
rapid power off may be effectively to protect electronic systems under ionizing radiation. It
can be a potential solution to mitigate damages of electronic components caused by radiation.
With simulation studies of photocurrent responses of semiconductor devices, two methods
are presented to mitigate the damages of total ionizing dose: component selection and
radiation shielding protection. According to the investigation of radiation-tolerance of regular
COTS components, most COTS-based semiconductor components may experience
performance degradation and radiation damages when the total dose is greater than 20 K Rad
(Si). A principle of component selection is given to obtain the suitable components, as well
as a method is proposed to assess the component reliability under radiation environments,
which uses radiation degradation factors, instead of the usual failure rate data in the
reliability model. Radiation degradation factor is as the input to describe the radiation
response of a component under a total radiation dose. In addition, a number of typical
i

semiconductor components are also selected as the candidate components for the application
of wireless monitoring in nuclear power plants.
On the other hand, a multi-layer shielding protection is used to reduce the total dose to be
less than 20 K Rad (Si) for a given radiation condition; the selected semiconductor devices
can then survive in the radiation condition with the reduced total dose. The calculation
method of required shielding thickness is also proposed to achieve the design objectives.
Several shielding solutions are also developed and compared for applications in wireless
monitoring system in nuclear power plants.
A radiation-tolerant architecture is proposed to allow COTS-based electronic systems to be
used in high-level radiation environments without using rad-hardened components. Regular
COTS components are used with some fault-tolerant techniques to mitigate damages of the
system through redundancy, online fault detection, real-time preventive remedial actions, and
rapid power off. The functions of measurement, processing, communication, and faulttolerance are integrated locally within all channels without additional detection units. A
hardware emulation bench with redundant channels is constructed to verify the effectiveness
of the developed radiation-tolerant architecture. Experimental results have shown that the
developed architecture works effectively and redundant channels can switch smoothly in 500
milliseconds or less when a single fault or multiple faults occur.
An online mechanism is also investigated to timely detect and diagnose radiation damages in
the developed redundant architecture for its radiation tolerance enhancement. This is
implemented by the built-in-test technique. A number of tests by using fault injection
techniques have been carried out in the developed hardware emulation bench to validate the
proposed detection mechanism. The test results have shown that faults and errors can be
effectively detected and diagnosed. For the developed redundant wireless devices under
given radiation dose (20 K Rad (Si)), the fault detection coverage is about 62.11%. This
level of protection could be improved further by putting more resources (CPU consumption,
etc.) into the function of fault detection, but the cost will increase.
To apply the above investigated techniques and systems, under a severe accident condition in
a nuclear power plant, a prototype of wireless post-accident monitoring system (WPAMS) is
designed and constructed. Specifically, the radiation-tolerant wireless device is implemented

with redundant and diversified channels. The developed system operates effectively to
measure up-to-date information from a specific area/process and to transmit that information
to remote monitoring station wirelessly. Hence, the correctness of the proposed architecture
and approaches in this research has been successfully validated.
In the design phase, an assessment method without performing repeated destructive physical
tests is investigated to evaluate the radiation-tolerance of electronic systems by combining
the evaluation of radiation protection and the analysis of the system reliability under the
given radiation conditions. The results of the assessment studies have shown that, under
given radiation conditions, the reliability of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless system
can be much higher than those of non-redundant channels; and it can work in high-level
radiation environments with total dose up to 1 M Rad (Si).
Finally, a number of total dose tests are performed to investigate radiation effects induced by
gamma radiation on distinct modern wireless monitoring devices. An experimental setup is
developed to monitor the performance of signal measurement online and transmission of the
developed distinct wireless electronic devices directly under gamma radiator at The Ohio
State University Nuclear Reactor Lab (OSU-NRL). The gamma irradiator generates dose
rates of 20 K Rad/h and 200 Rad/h on the samples, respectively. It was found that both
measurement and transmission functions of distinct wireless measurement and transmission
devices work well under gamma radiation conditions before the devices permanently damage.
The experimental results have also shown that the developed radiation-tolerant design can be
applied to effectively extend the lifespan of COTS-based electronic systems in the high-level
radiation environment, as well as to improve the performance of wireless communication
systems. According to testing results, the developed radiation-tolerant wireless device with a
shielding protection can work at least 21 hours under the highest dose rate (20 K Rad/h).
In summary, this research has addressed important issues on the design of radiation-tolerant
systems without using rad-hardened electronic components. The proposed methods and
systems provide an effective and economical solution to implement monitoring systems for
obtaining up-to-date information in high-level radiation environments. The reported
contributions are of significance both academically and in practice.
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Chapter 1
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Introduction

1.1 Background
In 2011, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was triggered by a 9.0 magnitude earthquake
and subsequent tsunami; and released a large quantity of radioactive substances to the
environment because of multiple hydrogen explosions and fire damage to the
containments of the facilities. One of the lessons learnt from the Fukushima disaster is
the difficulty to obtain up-to-date information about the plant after the accident due to
lack of monitoring systems, harsh radiation environment, and lose of on-site power. In the
event of an accident in nuclear power plants (NPPs), essential information about the
status of the plant is crucial to plant operators and emergency response teams to
effectively manage and mitigate the effects of accident. The important variables of
interests are temperature, humidity, hydrogen concentration, and radiation levels in the
environment. It is also important to gather information about the conditions of protection
systems, such as water level in a spent fuel pool, and coolant inventory, etc. However, it
is very difficult and unsafe for plant operators to get such information manually since a
high level of nuclear radiation can ionize molecules, interact with matter, and cause
severe biological damage to humans. Moreover, conventional accident monitoring
systems (AMSs) in nuclear power plants usually use wired networks, which may no
longer be available after the accident, or require rewiring or reconfiguration. After
Fukushima disaster, some military robots, such as PackBot, T-Hawk, and Moni-Robo,
were eventually used to measure radiation levels, temperature, levels of radioactive
material, and also to take some photographs to inspect the damage, but they cannot be for
multipurpose use because of issues from radiation effects, mobility, and communication
(Nagatani et al., 2012). The damage from Fukushima disaster is so severe that the special
equipment and new technologies have to be developed to deal with the harsh
environment conditions during decommissioning processes of the plant.
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As an integral part of Severe Accident Management (SAM) systems, nuclear power plant
regulatory bodies now request NPPs to have some forms of Post-Accident Monitoring
Systems (PAMSs) available on-site. Considering scenarios of potentially losing on-site
power and other wired communication channels, during a severe accident, a potential
approach to deal with similar situations is to use wireless technologies to implement postaccident monitoring system (PAMS), as shown in Figure 1-1, which can provide much
needed information about the plant conditions, reactor integrity, and environment in the
vicinity of the NPP without relying on likely damaged communication infrastructure.
However, wireless systems are often made of semiconductor devices, which are
particularly sensitive to high level ionizing radiation. A high level radiation can modify
electrical parameters of a semiconductor device, and worsen its electrical characteristics,
which may lead to functional failure and physical damage. Therefore, the operating
environment has posed severe challenges for WPAMSs. Radiation-hardened (radhardened) techniques have to be used to design and to protect electronic devices inside
WPAMSs to make them more resistant to high level of radiation.

Satellite

Portable Monitoring
Device

Cellular Network
Ethernet

WSN
Low Radiation Area

Gateway2

Remote
Monitoring Station
Repeater
Repeater Gateway1

D

2

D

1

Strong Radiation Area

Figure 1-1: A potential wireless monitoring system for high level radiation
environments in a nuclear power plant
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One approach to alleviate such a problem is to employ rad-hardened components in such
systems. Preliminary investigation reveals, however, that this approach can be
prohibitively expensive due to special semiconductor materials used, complexity in
manufacturing processes, and most of all, small size of the market supporting such
devices. Furthermore, these rad-hardened devices may not be able to meet the modern
requirements for high speed processing, large memory storage, and ultra-low power
consumption. Another approach is to rely on regular commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
devices, but to utilize rad-hardened techniques to reduce the vulnerability of radiation
effects on electronics and to prolong the life of the system during the mission of the
deployment. Despite tremendous progress of rad-hardened design techniques in the past
few decades, to implement an effective wireless monitoring systems for a severe accident
in a NPP can still face several issues, such as:
(1) Analysis of radiation responses of devices and circuits is important also necessary
to design circuits to be robust to ionizing radiation effects and to accurately
analyze their behavior under high level radiation fields. However, modeling
techniques may suffer from accuracy issues in those applications with a wide
range of ionizing radiation intensities. On the other hand, numerical modeling
techniques is too complicated extremely time consuming, and requires a large
amount of engineering works to obtain sufficient information of technological
features.
(2) With simulation studies of photocurrent responses of semiconductor devices
under different levels of ionizing radiation, if the power on the junction can be
removed quickly in an event of radiation exposure, a semiconductor device might
not be damaged permanently by the accumulated photocurrent. Fault-tolerant
techniques, combined with error detection, timely fault detection, and rapid
recovery/repair, have been used to protect safety-critical systems and applied to a
range of situations. However, existing fault-tolerant techniques and systems
usually have three redundant modules and/or the duplication of important circuits
and subsystems to realize majority voters, or use additional detectors to diagnose
faults. These additional units and voters not only increase system complexity, but
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are themselves usually non-redundant and subject to damage by ionizing radiation
also. Hence they represent a major weakness in the system and as such should
also be protected. A radiation-tolerant architecture with independent redundancy,
online fault detection, real-time preventive remedial actions, and rapid power loss
/ recovery, as well as avoid the common-mode damage, is not only important, but
also necessary for the design of COTS-based rad-hardened systems. Key issues to
achieve this objective include:
•

How to protect the device against potential damages as a result of total
ionizing dose;

•

How to achieve completely independent redundant architecture without
additional detection units and/or hardware voters;

•

How to avoid common-mode damages and/or multi-damages on redundant
channels;

•

How to implement mechanisms of online fault detection, real-time
preventive remedial actions, and mechanisms of rapid power removal;

•

How to detect radiation damages in redundant systems timely without
addition measurement units and hardware voters;

(3) Radiation-tolerance assessment of the developed electronic system is a critical
part in the design phase of rad-hardened electronic systems. In general, the
performance of rad-hardened systems can be evaluated in two ways: physical tests
and simulation with analysis. However, physical test is very precise but could be
excessively complicated and expensive. On the other hand, limitations of
simulation with analysis are that it is difficult to assess the radiation-tolerance of
the whole system precisely.
Therefore, it is not only important but also necessary to investigate new rad-hardened
analysis and design methodologies to achieve rad-hardened electronic systems by using
regular COTS components. It is also beneficial to use these new approaches to design

5

self-powered and rad-hardened wireless monitoring systems for high level radiation
environments after an accident in NPPs.

1.2 Objectives
The objectives of this research are listed as follows:
(1) To investigate alternative ways to analyze, design, evaluate, and validate
radiation-tolerant electronic systems by using commercial off-the-shelf
components; and
(2) To apply the proposed methodologies to design, implement, and validate a
wireless monitoring system for high level of radiation environments in nuclear
power plants after a severe accident.
An overview of major aspects dealt with in this research is given in Figure 1-2, which
starts with top-level estimations of the radiation condition, and then after the considered
radiation-level is defined, related defense techniques are proposed and designed,
radiation-tolerance is assessed in order to validate the potential of the developed system.

6

System Requirements

Candidate Parts
Radiation Sensitivity

Description of the
Mission Radiation
Environment

Analysis & Design of
Defense Techniques
Experiment &
Simulation
Acceptable

Not Acceptable

Definition of the
Considered Radiation
Levels

Radiation Failure Level

Evaluation without a
Radiation Environment

Acceptable

Radiation-Tolerance
Assessment
Not Acceptable
System or Subsystem Level
Countermeasure

Radiation Validation

Component Reject

Figure 1-2: An overview of major aspects in this research

1.3 Investigated Methods and Systems
Based on major aspects in this research as illustrated in Figure 1-2, a possible framework
of investigated methods and systems is illustrated in Figure 1-3, which includes literature
survey, analysis of radiation responses, design of radiation-tolerant systems,
implementation of wireless post-accident monitoring systems, performance evaluation of
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the developed radiation-tolerant devices, and irradiation experimental validation. It can
be seen in Figure 1-3 that the framework has covered the previously discussed issues.
Modeling and
Emulation
Techniques
RadiationTolerance
Assessment

Literature
Survey

Analysis of
Radiation
Responses

RadiationTolerant
Design

Total Ionizing Dose Mitigation
RadiationTolerant by
Component
Selection

RadiationTolerant by
Shielding
Design

System
Implementation

Performance
Evaluation

Irradiation
Experimental
Validation

Single Event Effect Mitigation
RadiationTolerant
Architecture
Design

Detection &
Diagnosis of
Radiation
Damages

Figure 1-3: The framework of investigated methods and systems in this research
The following methods and systems are studied in this research to achieve the proposed
objectives:
(1) Survey: A great variety of radiation-hardened methods have been studied for a
wide range of applications, such as in the aeronautics and space sectors, accident
conditions in nuclear power plants, and military scenarios. Some techniques and
methods related to this research have been investigated, which include radiation
effects on electronics; rad-hardened design techniques from device-level, circuitlevel, and system-level; as well as modeling techniques and computer simulation
methods.
(2) Analysis: combining a semi-empirical technique and a numerical technique, a
method is investigated to analyze ionizing radiation responses of devices and
circuits, which can be separated into three steps: models of semiconductor devices
for post-irradiation are established; and then photocurrents of semiconductor
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devices are calculated by using Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD)
simulator; radiation-induced circuit responses can be analyzed through the
modified nodal analysis (MNA) circuit equations.
(3) Design: several defense techniques are investigated to protect against radiation
effects and to prolong the lifespan of electronic systems in this research. They are:
•

(Total ionizing dose hardening) A multi-layer protection and a method of
component selection are designed to reduce the level of total dose and to
allow regular commercial components to be used in high level radiation
environments.

•

(Single event effect hardening) A radiation-tolerant architecture is
investigated to mitigate damages of single event effects and to allow
COTS components to be used in high level radiation environments.
Redundancy, radiation-tolerant design techniques, and diversify
techniques are also investigated.

•

(Single event effect hardening) An online detection mechanism is
investigated to timely identify/locate radiation damages in redundant
systems.

(4) Implementation: using the proposed defense techniques, a monitoring system for
radiation conditions in a nuclear power plant is developed to obtain up-to-date
environment information. The system includes radiation-tolerant wireless
detectors, gateway device, portable monitoring device, and remote monitoring
station.
(5) Evaluation: several emulation methods have been built to evaluate the correctness
of the proposed radiation-tolerant methods and techniques through the techniques
of fault injection. A hardware emulation test bench is developed to validate the
proposed redundant architecture and the developed fault detection method
through hardware- and software-implemented fault injection techniques. On the
other hand, an assessment method is investigated to evaluate radiation-tolerance
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of electronic systems without repeated physical tests. This can be separated to two
parts: evaluation of radiation protection and reliability assessment. This method
uses radiation degradation factors(∆), instead of the usual failure rate data of an
item in the reliability model, as input to describe the radiation response of this
item under a total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 .
(6) Validation: a number of total dose tests are performed to investigate the radiation
resistance of the developed wireless devices and to evaluate the performance of
the developed wireless monitoring systems with 60Co gamma irradiator, as well as
to validate the proposed radiation-tolerant design.

1.4 Research Scope
As previously mentioned, unlike other industrial accidents, accidents in a nuclear power
plant can be associated with potential release of radioactive substances, which can cause
severe damages to electronic devices at nearby site. One critical issue is therefore how to
design wireless monitoring devices that can tolerate the strong radiation. In generally, a
radioactive environment after a severe accident in a nuclear power plant can be
characterized as follows:
(1) Radiation environments: Alpha particles, Beta particles, Gamma rays, x-rays, and
neutron particles (Adalja et al., 2011; Sharp and Decreton, 1996);
(2) Radiation effects on electronics: total ionizing dose, single event effects, and
displacement damage.
The total dose is an important aspect consideration for electronic systems in radiation
environments. Considering short-term radioactive release (less than 24 hours) in each
stage of a nuclear accident (CODIRPA, 2012), it is assumed that the proposed WPAMS
has to survive the first 24 hours of the accident. Taking the highest dose rate of radiation
in the Fukushima accident (530 Sv/h) as the radiation rate (theguardian, 2017), the total
radiation dose after the first 24 hours can be obtained as follows:
R = 530 Sv / h  24 h = 12720 Sv = 1272.0 K Rad ( Si ).
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In the field of radiation protection, Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) is often used to
determinate the design specifications of electronics and materials of a space system,
whose categories are presented on Table 1-1 (Hash et al., 1997). The RHA is an important
reference as radiation level considered, which is also used in the current research.
Table 1-1: Radiation hardness assurance categories for space systems
RHA category

M

D

P

L

R

F

G

H

TID (K Rad(Si))

3

10

30

50

100

300

500

1000

Combing with the estimation total dose (1.272 M Rad (Si)) in 24 hours and RHA
specification, total radiation dose (1 M Rad (Si)) – Class H is therefore considered as the
upper limit of radiation in this work. Those cases whose total radiation doses are more
than 1 M Rad (Si) are not considered in this work.
Investigations of rad-hardened design techniques in this research are limited within the
following scopes:
(1) This research only deals with damages by ionizing radiation, displacement
damages are beyond of this research.
(2) Total dose is limited as 1 M Rad (Si), those applications whose total doses are
more than 1 M Rad (Si) are not considered.
(3) This research focuses on rad-hardened by design by using regular COTS
components. Using rad-hardened components (device-level) to achieve high
radiation-tolerance is not considered.
With knowledge of damage mechanisms, the current approach combines techniques of
rad-tolerant design, multi-layer shielding, and diversified component selection to achieve
a radiation-tolerant design. The overall approaches are summarized in Figure 1-4.
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Single Event Effects

Cumulative Effects

Non-destructive Effects

Beyond the
scope of this
research
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diversified hardware

Redundancy, system reset,
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Destructive Effects

Rapid power-off, redundancy, fault
detection, prognostic for the component
lifespan
Rapid power-off, redundancy, fault-

Figure 1-4: The investigated radiation-tolerant techniques in this research

1.5 Contributions
The contributions of this research can be summarized as follows:
(1) Investigation of a method to analyze and to emulate responses of semiconductor
devices and circuit in high level radiation fields.
(2) Development of a multi-layer radiation protection technique, which can reduce
the given total dose from 1 M Rad (Si) to be less than 20 K Rad (Si).
(3) Development of a radiation-tolerant architecture, which can be used to mitigate
single event effects on electronic systems through redundancy, online fault
detection, real-time preventive remedial actions, and rapid power off.
(4) Development of an online detection and diagnostic approach to identify/locate
damages in redundant systems timely in radiation environments.
(5) Proposed method to assess the radiation-tolerance of electronic systems without
going through repeated destructive physical tests.
(6) Design and commissioning of a wireless monitoring system to obtain up-to-date
information from a simulated NPP environment under radiation environments.
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(7) Development of an irradiation test to validate the investigated radiation-tolerant
methods and the designed systems.

1.6 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
•

A literature survey on radiation effects on electronics, rad-hardened design
techniques, and modeling and simulation techniques, is carried out in Chapter 2.

•

The method to analyze and emulate radiation responses of semiconductor devices
and circuits is presented in Chapter 3.

•

The investigation of radiation-tolerance of regular COTS components and the
principles of component selection used in this work are explained in Chapter 4.

•

The developed multi-layer radiation protection is described in Chapter 5, which is
to reduce the level of total dose and to avoid the common-mode damage in
redundant systems.

•

The proposed radiation-tolerant architecture is analyzed in Chapter 6 to mitigate
damages of single event effects and to prolong the lifespan of the system.

•

The online method to detect and to diagnose radiation damages in devices and
circuits is investigated in Chapter 7.

•

The implementation of a wireless monitoring system for radiation environments
comparable to that of Fukushima accident is given in Chapter 8, which includes
the development of wireless detectors, gateway device, portable monitoring
device, remote monitoring station, and monitoring software.

•

An analysis method to evaluate the radiation resistance of electronic systems
without going through physical tests is provided in Chapter 9.
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•

A number of total dose tests to investigate radiation tolerance of the developed
wireless monitoring devices are carried out in Chapter 10, as well as to validate
the proposed radiation-tolerant methods.

•

Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 11, alone with some directions for future
works.

•

Details about the implementation of the hardware emulation bench are
summarized in Appendix.
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Chapter 2

2

Literature Survey

In the past several decades, a great variety of radiation-hardened methods have been
studied for a wide range of applications, such as in aeronautics and deep space sector
exploration, nuclear warfare, nuclear power plants in the event of an accident. Following
the review of radiation-hardened methods and techniques, a survey of radiation effects on
electronic devices is presented in this Chapter. Furthermore, rad-hardened design and
analysis techniques are also discussed for enhancing in the survivability of electronic
systems in strong radiation environments. More specifically, post-accident environments
in nuclear power plants (NPPs) and industry standards and related regulatory guides for
wireless post-accident monitoring system (PAMS) are also reviewed in this Chapter.

2.1 Background of Severe Accidents in NPPs
2.1.1 Industry Standards for PAMS in NPPs
After the Three Mile Island accident, the following three main standards for accident
monitoring systems have been developed in the United States:
(1) ANSI/ANS-4.5-1980 “Criteria for accident monitoring functions in light-watercooled reactors”, which provides requirements on the selection and measurement
variables (ANSI, 1980);
(2) IEEE Std. 497-1981 “IEEE standard criteria for accident monitoring
instrumentation for nuclear power generating stations”, which provides the design
criteria for the relevant instrumentation (IEEE, 1981);
and (3) Regulatory Guide 1.97 (rev. 3, May 1983) “Instrumentation for light-watercooled nuclear power plants to assess plant and environs conditions during and
following an accident”, which prescribes a detailed list of measurement variables and
provides a comprehensive list of design and qualification criteria (NRC, 1983).
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The integration of the above three standards is done in IEEE Std. 497-2002 with more
functions and the criteria for variable selections (IEEE, 2002). Subsequently, variable
selection, design, performance, and qualification and display criteria for accident
monitoring instrumentation in NPPs are established in IEEE Std. 497-2010 (IEEE, 2010).
IEEE Std. 497-2016 is considered to be the most recent standard and it provides more
current guidance by enhancing existing standards and guidance (IEEE, 2016).

2.1.2 Design Issues of Wireless Monitoring Systems for Severe
Accidents in NPPs
The mission of the wireless post-accident monitoring system is to obtain essential
information about the status of the plant, which is crucial to plant operators and
emergency response teams to effectively manage and mitigate the effects of accident. To
achieve this mission, the following issues may need to be considered and investigated:
(1)

EMI/RFI issues

Under a normal condition, applications of wireless technologies have been restricted in
existing NPPs partially because of the vulnerability of existing I&C systems to
electromagnetic interference and radio frequency interferences (EMI/RFI) emitted
wireless devices (Ko and Lee, 2013). On the other hand, in the event of a severe
accident, the plant is shut down; EMI/RFI is therefore no longer an issue.
(2)

Radiation hardness

Unlike other industrial accidents, the levels of radiation after a severe accident can be
high enough to cause severe damages to electronic devices. Therefore, the radiationtolerance of such monitoring devices needs to be considered (Nagatani et al., 2012).
(3)

Communication issues

The reactor buildings constructed by concrete walls to shield radiation particles will also
block wireless communication signals. Therefore, the quality of signal reception inside
reactor buildings needs to be investigated and to ensure reliable communication
(Nagatani et al., 2012).
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(4)

Variables of Interests

The variables of interests under a severe accident are temperature, humidity, hydrogen
concentration, and radiation levels of the environment, etc. It is also important to gather
information about the conditions of protection systems, such as water level in a spent fuel
pool, and coolant inventory, etc. Therefore, measurement variables need to be
investigated according to IEEE 497 standard, as well as desirable locations of the related
sensors (IEEE, 2016).
(5)

Other issues

There are also several other crucial issues to considered in a harsh post-accident
environment, such as high temperature, water damage, etc. Since this research mainly
focuses on radiation-induced issues on electronic components used in wireless
monitoring systems, their impacts will not be further explained.

2.1.3 Radiation Environment under a Severe Accident
In the event of a nuclear accident, a significant amount of radiation from the reactor core
can be released due to failure of protection layers. Historically, there are three major
nuclear accidents associated with nuclear power plants, Three Mile Island (1979),
Chernobyl accident (1986) and Fukushima accident (2011). Luckily, there were no
significant radioactive materials released to the environment in Three Mile Island
accident, but the other two are very different. Chernobyl disaster exposed a significant
fraction of core material into the environment. The total estimated release of radioactivity
from the destroyed reactor is about 1018 Bq (Saenko et al., 2011). The exposed reactor
created γ-radiation and the highest dose level was about 300 Sv/h (Kortov and
Ustyantsev, 2013). Similarly, Fukushima disaster also released a large amount of
radioactive substances to the environment due to hydrogen explosions and fire damage to
the containment structures (Takahashi, 2014). On June 6th, 2011, the radiation released to
the atmosphere was estimated to be about 700,000 trillion Bq (Eisler, 2012). In March
2012, the level of radiation particles was estimated to be up to 73 Sv/h inside the
containment of No.2 reactor (Eisler, 2012), and in Feb. 2017, it was up even further to
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530 Sv/h (The Guardian, 2017). Under such post-accident conditions, electronic devices
in the monitoring systems will not survive long time, if no special protection measures
against radiation are taken. Radiation-hardened (rad-hardened) design methodologies, as
well as rad-hardened analysis techniques in such cases are not luxury, but necessary, to
ensure their reliable operation.
The principal types of radiation observed after a nuclear accident include alpha (α)
particles, beta (β) particles, gamma (γ) rays, x-rays, and neutron particles (Adalja et al.,
2011; Sharp and Decreton, 1996). In general, neutrons are not a concern outside the
reactor unless enough fissionable radioactive material is present to sustain a chain
reaction. At Fukushima accident site, this has not happened and only alpha, beta, and
gamma radiations have been detected outside the reactor (Adalja et al., 2011).

2.2 Radiation Effects on Electronics
2.2.1 Composition of Monitoring Systems in Post-Accident
Applications
Online monitoring systems (OLMs) have been used in nuclear power plants around the
world to monitor several key plant conditions, such as detecting sensing-line blockages,
testing the response time of pressure transmitters, monitoring the calibration of pressure
transmitters, cross-calibrating temperature sensors in situ, assessing equipment condition,
performing predictive maintenance of reactor internals, monitoring fluid flow, and
extending the life of neutron detectors (Hashemian, 2011). The composition of those
systems can be separated to several categories: sensors, electronic parts, other nonelectronic components, etc. In general, semiconductor-based electronic parts are more
sensitive to radiation than other components (Holmes-Siedle and Adams, 2002). The type
of semiconductor electronic parts used in those systems varies widely, e.g.,
microcontrollers/microprocessors, memory chips (RAM/ROM), analog-to-digital
converters (ADC), digital-to-analog converters (DAC), operational amplifiers,
multiplexers, logic chips (TTL or CMOS), voltage references, transistors, diodes, etc.
Moreover, these electronic components may be built with various different
semiconductor technologies and different materials. Radiation effects on those
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components and materials can be therefore different. The understanding of their
responses to radiation is a significant part in the design of radiation-hardened system,
which will be further discussed in the following Sections.

2.2.2 Mechanism of Radiation Interaction with Matters
The nature of interactions between radiation particles and target materials
(semiconductors in this case) depends on properties of the particles (mass, charge, and
kinetic energy) and the target (mass, charge, and density) (Srour, 1982). Radiation
particles can be classified into three categories according to the way they interact with the
materials: (1) photons, which interact through photoelectric effect, Compton scattering, or
pair production; (2) charged particles, which interact through Rutherford scattering and
nuclear interactions; and (3) neutrons, which interact through elastic scattering, inelastic
scattering, and transmutation reactions (Srour, 1982; McLean and Oldham, 1987).
In general, radiation particles lose their energy through non-ionization processes
(displacement) and/or ionization processes when they interact with semiconductor
materials. Non-ionization processes are associated with neutrons, protons, alpha particles,
heavy ions, and very high-energy photons. They can cause displacements in atoms in the
target materials and/or change the arrangement of the crystal lattice’s target atoms,
resulting in adverse (often catastrophic) effects to electronic devices (Srour and
McGarrity, 1988). On the other hand, ionization processes are primarily associated with
charged particle interactions, such as electrons, protons, x-rays, and γ-rays (Gregory and
Gwyn, 1974). They generate electron-hole pairs (ehps) when they pass through a
semiconductor device. They usually cause glitches, abrupt changes, transient behavior,
and soft errors (Gregory and Gwyn, 1974) in the device. Ionization processes can also
result in permanent damages and destructive effects to devices if the accumulated dose or
particle fluence has exceeded certain tolerance limits of particular device. Furthermore,
all these two type of interactions can coexist. For example, a neutron can first collide
with a nucleus to generate displacement damage, and then create secondary charged
particles that can further impose ionization related damage (Makowski, 2006). The
probability of component damage depends on radiation type, radiation energy, radiation
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flux, and exposure duration. A list of existing publications on energy-loss processes as
radiation interacting with matter is summarized in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1: Energy-loss process as radiation interacting with matter
Energy-loss processes
Basic mechanisms
Ionization processes
Non-ionization processes

References
Barbottin and Vapaille, 1999; Srour, 1982; McLean and
Oldham, 1987; Robinson, 1994
Foster, 2003; McLean and Oldham, 1987; Oldham, 2011;
Srour and McGarrity, 1988
Foster, 2003; Gergory and Gwyn, 1974; McLean and
Oldham, 1987; Oldham, 2011; Srour and McGarrity, 1988

Radiation effects on electronics can generally be categorized as: displacement damage
(DD), total ionizing dose (TID), and single event effect (SEE) (Foster, 2003).
Displacement damage and total ionizing dose exposure are long term cumulative effects,
while single event effect, as its name implies, is short-term one-time event. Those effects
can be illustrated in Figure 2-1.

α-particles,
neutron, protons,
heavy ions

electrons, β-particles, x-rays,
γ-rays, protons, heavy ions

Cumulative

electrons, β-particles, x-rays,
γ-rays, protons, heavy ions

Single Event

Figure 2-1: Radiation effects on electronics devices.
A list of representative publications above radiation effects on semiconductor devices is
provided in Table 2-2. Details of different radiation effects are discussed further in
Sections to follow.
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Table 2-2: Radiation effects on semiconductor devices
Radiation effects

References

Displacement damage

Arutt et al., 2015; Barnaby et al., 2017. Fernandez-Martinez
et al., 2013; Foster, 2003; George, 1992; Messenger and
Spratt, 1958; Oldham, 2011; Srour et al., 2003; Srour and
Palko, 2013; Summers et al., 1998; Wigner, 1946

Total ionizing dose effect

Barnaby, 2006; Cellere and Paccagnella, 2004; Chen et al.,
2017; Fleetwood, 2013; Foster, 2003; Galloway and
Schrimpf, 1990; Hughes and Benedetto, 2003; Johnston et
al., 1994; Nichols, 1980; Oldham, 2011; Oldham and
McLean, 2003; Pease, 2003; Re et al., 2006; Re et al., 2008;
Schwank, 1994

Single event effects

Baumann, 2005; Buchner and McMorrow, 2006; Cellere and
Paccagnella, 2004; Dodd, 2005; Dodd et al., 2007; Dodd and
Massengill, 2003; Ferlet-Cavrois, 2013; Gadlage et al., 2004;
Koga et al., 1997; Munteanu and Autran, 2008; Sexton,
2003; Soliman and Nichols, 1983; Titus, 2013; Troutman,
1986; Veronique et al., 2013

Displacement damage &
Total ionizing dose effect
& Single event effects

Adell and Scheick, 2013; Bagatin and Gerardin, 2015;
Barbottin and Vapaille, 1999; Chen et al., 2017; Claeys and
Simoen, 2013; Cressler, 2013; Gregory and Gwyn, 1974;
Gover, 1984; Holmes-Siedle and Adams, 2002; Hughes and
Benedetto, 2003; Iniewski, 2010; Lv et al., 2017; Makowshi,
2006; Messenger and Ash, 1986; Oldham, 2011; Pearton et
al., 2016; Polyakov et al., 2013; Raoul, 2007; Schrimpf,
1994; Schrimpf and Fleetwood, 2004; Rathod et al., 2011;
Schwank et al., 2008; Schwank et al., 2013; Sexton, 1996;
Simoen et al., 2013; Srour and McGarrity, 1988

2.2.3 Displacement Damage
Displacement damage to an electronic device is caused by a long-term non-ionizing
effect, and it occurs when an incident particle has enough energy to knock an atom free
from its normal lattice site in the semiconductor and onto an interstitial site (Foster,
2003). As a result, it will change the properties of the electronic device due to minority
carrier lifetime reduction, decreased carrier mobility, carrier transport, increased leakage
current, and thermal charge generation (Srour et al., 2003).

21

Ever since Wigner and his collaborators performed theoretical analysis and experimental
verification of displacement damage in irradiated materials in the early 1940s (Wigner,
1946), numerous researchers have studied various aspects of displacement damage and its
effects on various semiconductor devices and materials. A comprehensive review of
displacement damage can be found in (Srour and Palko, 2013), as well as several review
papers, books, and short course notes about its various aspects and effects. Srour and
Palko also summarized the research history on investigation of displacement damage: (1)
the first decade of the NSREC (1963-1972), focusing mainly on its effects in various
semiconductor materials and devices; (2) the second decade (1973-1982), investigating
its effects on more advanced devices and circuits, integrated-injection logic circuits, and
charge-coupled devices (CCDs); (3) the third decade (1983-1992), concentrating on
studies its effects on MOS devices and circuit technologies, as well as solar cells, GaAs
devices, particle detectors, photodiodes, and bipolar transistors; (4) the fourth decade
(1993-2002), addressing a broad variety of semiconductor devices and materials, as well
as the nonionizing energy loss (NIEL), damage correlation, and synergistic effects; and
(5) the most recent decade (2003-2012), continuously addressing the similar topics of
previous decades and examining its effects in SDRAMs and memory devices, as well as
conducting computational analysis of the process and the effects (Srour and Palko, 2013).

2.2.4 Total Ionizing Dose
Total ionizing dose refers to the total amount of energy deposited by radiation particles
passing through a semiconductor material. It is an important consideration for strong
radiation environments, where the dose is typically in the range of 104-108 rad (Si)
(Foster, 2003). When ionizing particles strike silicon oxide, interactions at the physical
level can be described in four steps, as illustrated in Figure 2-2 (1) electron-hole-pairs
(ehps) are formed by energy deposited in the semiconductor material and a fraction of the
generated electron-hole-pairs recombine; (2) free carriers which escape the
recombination are transported into the oxide; (3) hole trapping at the SiO2/Si interface;
and (4) the interface traps (or interface states) are produced at the SiO2/Si interface (Adell
and Scheick, 2013; Srour and McGarrity, 1988). Considering an example of a MOSFET
exposed to ionizing radiation, the positive charges are trapped at the Si/SiO2 interface or
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at the metal/SiQ2 interface, which is illustrated in Figure 2-3. As a result, a shift in the
threshold voltage is generated and the device could not be turned off if this voltage shift
is high enough for turn-off threshold value (Oldham and McLean, 2003).
(4) Radiation-induced
interface traps formation
within bandgap

(3) Deep hole trapping
near Si/SiO2 interface

SiO2

GATE

(2) Hopping transport of
holes through localized
states in SiO2 bulk

(1) Electron-hole pairs
generated by ionizing
radiation

Figure 2-2: The effects of ionizing radiation in SiO2 (Adell and Scheick, 2013; Srour
and McGarrity, 1988)
Gate oxide
Source

Gate

Field oxide

Drain

VG=0
n+

n+

Positive oxide
trapped charge

Channel turned
on with VG=0
P-type silicon
Substrate

Figure 2-3: The effect of ionizing radiation on the gate oxide in an n-channel
MOSFET (Oldham and McLean, 2003)
For MOS devices, such as transistors and integrated circuits (ICs), ionizing radiation will
affect their functionalities and performance characteristics, which include threshold
voltage shifts, mobility degradation, increased leakage currents, enlarged on-resistance,
high-level of gate charge, and reduction in breakdown voltage (Adell and Scheick, 2013;
Hughes and Benedetto, 2003). On the other hand, for bipolar devices, the recombination
current will be increased and common-emitter current gain will be reduced due to
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probably two reasons: increased density of interface traps at the surface of the extrinsic
base region; and positive charge buildup (Johnston et al., 1994). A list of publications for
total ionizing dose effects on various semiconductor technologies and devices is provided
in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3: Total ionizing dose effects on semiconductor technologies and devices
Semiconductor
technologies &
Devices
Semiconductor technologies
MOS
Bipolar
SOI

References

Adell and Scheick, 2013; Cardoso et al., 2014; Hughes and
Benedetto, 2003; Re et al., 2006; Re et al., 2008
Adell et al., 2012; Johnston et al., 1994
Alles et al., 2015; Simoen et al., 2004

Semiconductor devices
AD
HBT
HEMT
BJT
FET

Lee et al., 1994; Pease et al., 2007; Lee and Johnston, 1998
Inanlou et al., 2014; Praveen et al., 2012; Sutton et al., 2006;
Zhang et al., 2016
Hu et al., 2004; Ives et al., 2015; Kalavagunta et al., 2008;
O’Loughlin, 1987; Sun et al., 2013
Adell et al., 2012; Kosier et al., 1995; Schmidt et al., 1995;
Schmidt et al., 1996
Cardoso et al., 2013; Gaillardin et al., 2006

NOR

Duan et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2017
Flament et al., 1996; McGarrity et al., 1992; Zuleeg et al., 1977;
Zuleeg and Lehovec, 1980
Cellere et al., 2007; Bagatin et al., 2011; Kay et al., 2012;
Gerardin et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 1999; Oldham et al., 2006
Hao et al., 2017; Park et al., 2008; Pizanoa et al., 1998; Ren et
al., 2017; Schrimpf et al., 1988; Simoen et al., 2004; Zhang, et
al., 2013
Cellere et al., 2007; Gerardin et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 1999

RAM

Bernacki, et al., 2000; Massengill et al., 1986

FinFET
JFET
NAND
MOSFET

Voltage regulator
FPGA

Adell et al., 2004; Beaucour et al., 1994; Kelly et al., 2007; Pease
et al., 1998; Ramachandran et al., 2006
Citterio et al., 2016
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2.2.5 Single Event Effect
The physical mechanisms of a single event effect can be divided into three steps, as
illustrated in Figure 2-4. The first step involves two types of charge deposition: (1) direct
ionization caused by inelastic interactions that transmit a large amount of energy to the
struck atoms and generates electron-hole-pairs; and (2) indirect ionization caused by
secondary particles between the incident particles and the atoms of materials that the
microelectronic devices are made of. The second step is charge transport, where the
released carriers are quickly transported and collected by elementary structures (e.g., p-n
junctions). The third step is charge collection, where the parasitic current will create
disturbances in the semiconductor devices and can cause permanent damage to the gate
insulators or a latch-up of the device if the current is sufficiently high (Munteanu and
Autran, 2008).

Figure 2-4: The physical mechanism of single event effects (Baumann, 2005)
Furthermore, depending on how the semiconductor reacts charge deposition leading to a
failure, single event effects can further be separated into two types: non-destructive effect
and destructive effect, which are explained in the following Sections.
➢

Non-destructive effects
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If the semiconductor can be recovered from a failure caused by a single event effect
through a system reset and/or data re-initialization, those effects are called nondestructive effects. They could include one of the following scenarios.
(1)

Single Event Transient (SET)

A single event transient can be triggered by a short-term current caused by the generated
electron-hole pairs, which may change the logic state of a circuit (Ferlet-Cavrois et al.,
2013). The short-term pulse can be eliminated if the deposited charges are removed by
providing an alternative conducting path. The pulse may also propagate through
subsequent circuit stages and induce a voltage transient (leading to reverse in logic states)
(Ferlet-Cavrois et al., 2013).
(2)

Single Event Upset (SEU)

A single event upset can be triggered by the generated transient current and the charge
collected at the struck electric node when a charged particle passes through a reversebiased junction (Dodd and Massengill, 2003). Such effects on several circuits have been
summarized (Dodd and Massengill, 2003). In case of a storage cell, this may lead to a
cell upset. For an SRAM cell or a flip-flop, the state of the memory can be inverted. For
a DRAM cell, the charge stored can be modified and interpreted as an invalid value.
Furthermore, in logic circuits, SEUs can occur when a SET propagates through a
combinational logic, and is then captured by a latch or a flip-flop.
(3)

Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI)

A single event functional interrupt is a complex failure mode when a heavy ion particle
strike triggers an abnormal mode, such as test mode, or reset mode, which can cause ICs
to lose their intended functionalities temporarily (Koga et al., 1997). Complex devices
are more likely to exhibit SEFIs. For example, SDRAM has a built-in self-test (BIST)
mode and a self-repairing boot sequence, which could be triggered inadvertently after a
heavy ion strike leading to an unintended reset or idle state (Dodd and Massengill, 2003).
➢

Destructive effects
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As the name implies, failures induced by destructive effects are catastrophic and the
devices are permanently damaged. Such situations can be due to one of the following
events.
(1)

Single Event Latchup (SEL)

A single event latchup may be triggered in ICs by a pnpn four layer structure when any
sources with excess carriers could turn on a thyristor-like device. A latchup creates a low
resistance path between the power supply and the ground. Consequently, destructive
current of a high magnitude may be produced in such a path, which can damage the
device permanently (Sexton, 2003).
(2)

Single Event Snapback (SES)

A single event snapback is caused by drain-to-source breakdown in NMOS transistors.
Their effect is similar to SEL, but a pnpn four layer structure is not necessary. When
heavy ions strike a semiconductor near the drain junction, the induced current can be high
enough to cause an avalanche multiplication. If this condition stays long enough, a
sufficiently high amplitude current pulse will be produced and the transistor will be
turned ON inadvertently. The resulting high amplitude current can cause permanent
damage to the device (Sexton, 2003).
(3)

Single Event Burnout (SEB)

A single event burnout may occur if the drain-to-source voltage is higher than the second
breakdown voltage due to high current caused by large volume of ionizing particles
passing through a bipolar power transistor or an MOSFET. The device will suffer from
overheat locally, and failure can occur if the current is not removed quickly (Sexton,
2003).
(4)

Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR)

A single event gate rupture is usually caused by SEB in power MOSFETs when heavy
ions hit the gate region simultaneously. A SEGR can cause a short circuit between the
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drain and the gate, which results in local overheating and causes irreversible damage in
the gate region (Sexton, 2003).
A list of available publications for single event effects on semiconductor devices is
provided in Table 2-4.
Table 2-4: Single event effects on modern electronics
Single event effects

References

Non-destructive effects
Single event transient

Buchner and McMorrow, 2006; Dodd et al., 2004; FerletCavrois et al., 2013; Gadlage et al., 2004; Wang, 2011; Wirth
et al., 2008

Single event upset

Dodd and Massengill, 2003; Dodd et al., 2007; Karnik et al.,
2004

Single event functional
interrupt

Dodd and Massengill, 2003; Koga et al., 1997; Koga et al.,
2001

Destructive effects
Single event latchup

Becher et al., 2002; Gregory and Shafer, 1973; Johnston et
al., 1990; Johnston et al., 1997; Kolasinsky et al., 1979;
Leavy and Poll, 1969; Sexton, 2003; Soliman and Nichols,
1983; Troutman, 1986

Single event snapback

Dodd et al., 2000; Koga and Kolasinski, 1989; Ochoa et al.,
1984; Sexton, 2003; Stassinopoulos et al., 1992

Single event burnout

Hohl and Galloway, 1987; Hohl and Johnson, 1989; Johnson
et al., 1992; Kuboyama et al., 1992; Liu et al., 2006; Oberg
and Wert, 1987; Sexton, 2003; Titus, 2013; Titus et al., 1991

Single event gate rupture

Allenspach et al., 1996; Brews et al., 1993; Borulta et al.,
2001; Johnson et al.,1998; Sexton, 2003; Sexton et al., 1998;
Sexton et al., 1997; Titus, 2013

2.2.6 Radiation Effects on Semiconductor Devices
Radiation effects on modern semiconductor devices are briefly described in Table 2-5
(Holmes-Siedle and Adams, 2002).
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Table 2-5: Summary of radiation effects on semiconductor devices (Homes-Siedle
and Adams, 2002)
Device types

Diodes

Low-power rectifier
diodes
High-power rectifier
Zener diodes
Microwave diodes
Phototransistors
LEDs and lasers

Optoelectronics

Opto-couplers
Charge-coupled devices
(CCDs)

Solar cells

Solar cells
Bipolar power transistors
Thyistors

Power
semiconductors

Power MOSFETs
Insulated-gate bipolar
transistor (IGBT)

Junction fieldeffect and
heterojunction
transistors

Field-effect transistor
(FET)
Heterojunction bipolar
transistor (HBT)
Capacitors
Resistors and conductors

Miscellaneous
electronic
components

Quartz crystals
Vacuum tubes
Semiconductor
microwave devices

Miscellaneous
hardware

Connectors, cables,
gaskets, O-rings, switches

Radiation effects
The mean reverse leakage current will be increased by
small radiation-induced alterations in the surface charge.
Serious degradation in the forward voltage drop.
Zener breakdown voltages do not change much, the
transient current is reduced.
Inherently ‘hard’ to both total dose and neutron irradiation.
The output current degrades.
Neutron damage reduces the minority-carrier lifetime in the
active regions; particles produce new defects to reduce the
light output efficiency.
The degradation of component parts, such as the current
transfer ratio.
Threshold voltage shift on CCD gates due to TID effects,
displacement damage reduces the CTE, increases the dark
current, produces dark current nonuniformities and
generates random telegraph noise in individual pixels.
Cell efficiency can be seriously affected by radiationinduced defects by degradation of diffusion length.
A low doping level for the collector and a high base width
which can lead to high sensitivity to neutron irradiation.
Triggering parameters degrade suddenly as the neutron dose
is increased; can suffer from single-event effects.
Parameter changes under radiation: threshold voltage shift,
transconductance degradation, reduction in breakdown
voltage, burn-out induced by transients.
BiMOS power switching device with high input impedance
and low drive requirements; can suffer from the low totaldose tolerance of the MOSEFT portion and heavy ion.
Be tolerant of the effects of heavy ionization and bulk
damage, special silicon JFET devices are even more
tolerant to neutrons.
High degree of inherent radiation hardness.
The electrical effects of total-dose do not have any effects
until a dose about 107 rad.
Discrete resistors have been irradiated at very high radiation
environments with no problems; conduction in metals is not
affected by radiation particles.
Permanent shifts in frequency and changes the responsivity;
‘swept’ quartz is less susceptible to radiation.
More desirable to use in very high neutron/gamma
environments.
Reduction in majority-carrier concentration by bulk
displacement damage; transient increase in majority carriers
generated by a burst of radiation.
Depend on the properties of the component materials, the
mechanical properties of plastics show the onset of damage
in the range 107 to 109 rad.
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As can be seen, radiation effects on semiconductor devices can be a complex process.
The outcomes depend on many factors. These include materials used, structures chosen,
manufacturing processes, domain of usages, and the surrounding environment conditions.
All these factors should be considered when selecting devices in the design and
construction of monitoring systems for severe accident monitoring systems for nuclear
power so that higher tolerance to radiation can be achieved.

2.3 Rad-Hardened Design Techniques
From a pure physical composition point of view, any electronic systems can be
decomposed bottom up in several levels: device-, circuit-, and system-levels. During
system design, both hardware design and software development, rad-hardened techniques
should be adopted at each level to minimize the impacts of potential radiation effects.
This concept can briefly be illustrated in Figure 2-5. Rad-hardened design techniques at
different levels are summarized in Figure 2-6, which will be further described in
subsequent Sections.
Hardware mitigation

Device
Process
Technologies

Circuit Level

Device level

Circuit level

Software mitigation

Architecture

Figure 2-5: Abstraction levels of electronic system

Firmware

System level

Application
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Device-level design

Circuit-level design

System-level design

Radiation shielding

Transistor sizing
Transistor layout
Insulating substrates
Guard rings
Redundancy
Guard gates
Temporal filtering
Differential charge cancellation
Dual interlocked storage cells
Self-healing circuits
Pipeline protection
Magnetic-based storage logic
Triple modular redundancy
Error detection and correction
Re-initialization recovery
Scrubbing
Shielding against γ –rays
Shielding against neutrons

Figure 2-6: Methods of rad-hardened design techniques

2.3.1 Rad-Hardened by Device-Level Design
Rad-hardened techniques at device-level typically focus on increasing the radiation
resistance of a design by fundamentally changing and improving the fabrication
processes (Garg et al., 2009). In general, the devices which have undergone such special
process are often known as rad-hardened components, which indeed have higher
resistance to ionizing radiation. However, because of the special process involved, as
well as the small volume production to feed the small market demand, these devices turn
to be excessively expensive. Nevertheless, the techniques used can be summarized as
follows:
(1)

Rad-hardened by sizing

Rad-hardening by increasing the aspect ratio (W/L) of the transistor to improve the
radiation tolerance, as a larger gate area has higher current carrying capability and higher
node capacitance than a smaller area. Moreover, increasing the size of the transistor can
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effectively lower the magnitude and shorten the duration of the transient voltage pulse. If
the transistor size is sufficiently large, such transient voltage pulse can even be eliminated
(Zhou and Mohanram, 2004).
(2)

Special layout design for transistor

One can also improve the radiation tolerance of transistors through special layout design.
For example, in annular transistors, one can enclose the source or the drain in transistors
to prevent charge buildup in isolation oxides (Wallden, 2014). It has been noted that the
lifespan of annular MOSFET with reduced drain electric field is three times more than
that of a conventional device with the same technology under radiation conditions (Mayer
et al., 2004). Using H-gate and ringed-source layouts can also increase drain leakage
current and make the threshold voltage higher, which can enhance the radiation tolerance
capability of the transistors (Liu et al., 2010).
(3)

Silicon on insulator (SOI) / Silicon on sapphire (SOS)

Insulating substrates can also be used to reduce the sensitivity of bulk devices to ionizing
radiation. This can be accomplished by using an insulator layer to separate the active
region and the inactive substrate, which is named Silicon on Insulator (SOI). This
approach results in lower parasitic capacitance and increases resistance to latchup. Silicon
on Sapphire (SOS) is a hetero-epitaxial technique of the SOI family for IC
manufacturing, which consists of a silicon film grown on a sapphire (Al2O3) substrate. It
has been found that the space grade SOI/SOS IC chips are many orders greater than those
of ordinary commercial grade IC chips (Yu et al., 2011) as far as radiation-tolerance is
concerned. For example, their sensitive volume for dose rate effects is typically two
orders of magnitude lower than that of bulk-silicon devices (Schwank et al., 2003).
(4)

Guard rings

Guard rings can be designed around p-wells and n-wells to prevent SEL and to reduce
inter-device leakage. p+ diffusion or n- diffusion ring surrounding adjacent NMOS and/or
PMOS devices will generate a higher voltage threshold and prevent leakage between
them (Camplani et al., 2014; Irani et al., 2017).
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2.3.2 Rad-Hardened by Circuit-Level Design
Special circuit design techniques can also be used at the circuit-level to improve fault
avoidance capabilities and to reduce the vulnerability to radiation damage (Garg et al.,
2009). These techniques as well as the associated references can be summarized as
follows:
(1)

Critical circuits redundancy

Within the overall system design, critical circuits in the system should be duplicated
using redundancies to enhance the reliability and fault-tolerance (Aydos and Fey, 2017;
Li et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2014; Rajaei et al., 2015; and Smith and Mostert, 2007).
Furthermore, the concepts of local space and time redundancy can be effective to prevent
soft-error latches (Nicolaidis and Zorian, 1998; Mavis and Eaton, 2002; and Hazucha et
al., 2004). As an example, a triple inter-locked latch (TILL) is presented in (Li et al.,
2014), where the irradiation tests have shown that the TILL has a SEU threshold of LET
over 42 MeV-cm2/mg, which is much higher than that of conventional latches.
Furthermore, the cross section of the TILL is at least one order of magnitude lower than
that of a conventional latches.
(2)

Guard gate

Guard gate can be used to prevent SETs from a latch. An example is presented in
(Balasubramanian et al., 2005), where a buffer circuit with two inputs and one output has
been considered. Both inputs are connected to the output of a combinational logic block;
however, one input has been delayed. If the output of the combinational logic block
encounters a SET pulse, the delayed signal will not change the logic status immediately
and will become different from the other input. Hence, the guard gate output will become
float and will maintain the previous voltage value to prevent SETs from happening.
(3)

Temporal filtering

Temporal filtering is a technique that generates multiple versions of the same signal, but
separates them by delayed elements. These elements are then put through a majority voter
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to produce the desired output. For example, a SET-hardened latch with temporal filtering
is described in (Lacoe, 2008), where the data input is connected to three separate edgetriggered D-flip-flops in parallel. If a transient signal is induced at the input, it will arrive
at all the flip-flops at the same time, but the clock signals will not arrive at the same
moment because two clock signals are delayed by Δt and 2Δt at the flip-flops separately.
Therefore, only one clock signal will arrive with the transient, and the other two inputs
will produce the correct signal (Mavis and Eaton, 2002).
(4)

Differential charge cancellation (DCC) layout

Differential charge cancellation layout leverages the inherent common-mode rejection of
differential circuits to mitigate voltage transients induced by heavy ion strikes. One
experimental verification of a circuit hardened through DCC layout technique has been
given in (Blaine et al., 2012). It has been shown that DCC layout can provide more than
an order of magnitude reduction in sensitive area across all tested energies with twophoton absorption (TPA) laser facility (Blaine et al., 2012). Another TPA testing is also
presented in (Atkinson et al., 2013) to demonstrate the effectiveness in the mitigation
SETs through DCC layout. The conclusion is that the DCC layout can significantly
mitigate SETs at low levels of charge deposition, as well as diminish charge sharing in
the baseline layout (Atkinson et al., 2013).
(5)

Dual interlocked storage cells (DICE)

Dual interlocked storage cell uses a four node redundant structure to mitigate SEUs
(Blum and Delgado-Frias, 2006; Zhao, 2015). DICE can be applied to replace latches and
flip-flops distributed within logic blocks in CMOS devices and also used to implement
SEU-hardened SRAMs. Some solutions of DICE can be found in (Calin et al., 1996;
Lacoe, 2008; Gorbunov et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015; and Hui et al., 2015). A
comparison of different radiation-hardened by design techniques for SRAM blocks
manufacture of two IC chips with similar functionalities is given in (Gorbunov et al.,
2014). It demonstrates that DICE cells can achieve about 2-3 orders of magnitude lower
than cross-sections for 6T-cells.
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(6)

Self-healing circuits

Self-healing circuits make use other circuit blocks to monitor the behaviors of the main
circuit. In a simple team, it contains some feedback to tune circuit parameters in a closedloop fashion to detect any change in the main circuit (Howard et al., 2012; Inanlou et al.,
2013; and Rajaei et al., 2013). For example, a method using chopper stabilization is
presented to improve the precision of voltage references in ionizing radiation
environments (Shetler et al., 2015). The tests have shown that adoption of the chopper
stabilization can lead to 96% reduction in radiation-induced shift. A rad-hardened sensing
circuit is also proposed to reduce the radiation-induced currents for protecting the
Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) in conventional magnetic random access memory
MRAMs (Chabi et al., 2014). The simulation results have shown that the SEU probability
can be reduced to as low as 0.01% for more than 50 fC of the injected charge.
(7)

Pipeline protection

Pipeline protection techniques use self-checking register architecture to combat both
SEUs inside a register and SETs captured by the register (Das et al., 2009; Lin et al.,
2016). For example, a radiation-hardened pipeline is proposed in (Lin et al., 2016) by
incorporating soft-error- and timing-error-tolerant flip-flop (SETTOFF)-based selfchecking cells into the sequential cells in the pipeline. The gate-level injection results
have shown that a SETTOFF-based self-checking technique requires more than 30% less
area and 80% less power overhead than the triple modular redundancy does.
(8)

Magnetic-based storage logic

Static random access memory (SRAM) is very susceptible to radiation-induced soft
errors (Rajaei et al., 2015). Due to its inherent characteristics, magnetic tunnel junction
(MTJ) will have relatively higher resistance to radiation-induced soft errors, some
radiation-hardened magnetic random access memory (MRAM)-based fieldprogrammable gate arrays (FPGAs) are proposed in (Goncalves et al., 2013; Rajaei 2016;
and Rajaei and Mamaghani, 2017) to achieve advantages of non-volatility, low power
consumption, high performance, and high tolerance to soft errors.
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2.3.3 Rad-Hardened by System-Level Design
Rad-hardening techniques at the system-level typically use fault detection approaches and
tolerance mechanisms to enhance the radiation resistance of the system (Garg et al.,
2009). Some of these techniques can be summarized as follows:
(1)

Redundant element

Redundant elements can take one of the four forms: hardware redundancy (Mahmood and
McCluskey, 1988; Mukuherjee et al., 2002), information redundancy (Samson et al.,
2001), time redundancy (Nicolaidis, 1999), and software redundancy (Lindoso et al.,
2012; Rebaudengo et al., 2004). Hardware redundancy relies on duplication of
subsystems to detect and to correct single error, and to achieve fault tolerance to single
event effects, such as dual modular redundancy (DMR), triple modular redundancy
(TMR) (Brinkley et al., 2000; Clark et al., 2011; and Li et al., 2000). Information
redundancy uses error correcting codes (ECC) techniques, and error detection and
correction (EDAC) methods by re-assigning corrected values to avoid error accumulation
(Shirvani et al., 2000). Examples of this techniques include parity checking (Tiwari and
Tomko, 2005), rectangular codes (Patel and Hong, 1974), hamming codes (MorelosZaragoza, 2002; Shooman, 2003), and reed-Solomon codes (Neuberger et al., 2005).
Time redundancy uses slack-time in the system schedule to improve transient-fault
tolerance capability by performing recovery executions whenever fault occurs (Ejali et
al., 2000). Finally, software redundancy relies on multiple versions of independently
developed software to tolerant faults in software operational environments (Eckhardt et
al., 1991), such as N-version programming (Avizienis, 1985), and recovery blocks
(Randell, 1975).
(2)

Re-initialization recovery

Re-initialization recovery utilizes an external timer circuit, acting as a watchdog, to
perform a forced reset for the system when other rad-hardening methods deemed
ineffective (Yu et al., 2011). The watchdog timer can be implemented in hardware or
software or through a combination of both at several levels, such as subsystem-to-
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subsystem, box-to-box, board-to-board, and device-to-device (LaBel and Gates, 1996).
The multiple watchdog time-out solution is demonstrated in (LaBel et al., 1992) and the
developed system has successfully been tested for SEL for BNL (LaBel and Gates, 1996).
(3)

Scrubbing

Scrubbing can be used to avoid accumulation of errors and to reduce the probability of
multiple errors (Nidhin et al., 2017). There are two different types scrubbing algorithms:
preventive and corrective. A preventive algorithm will perform scrubbing periodically
regardless whether this is an error. On the other hand, a corrective scrubbing will read
back configuration memory periodically and trigger scrubbing only when the algorithm
has detected an error (Herrera and Lopez-Vallejo, 2013).

2.3.4 Rad-Hardened by Shielding
Radiation shielding is an effective way to mitigate radiation effects and to increase the
reliability and prolong the life of electronic systems. The shielding can be applied to
package and/or relevant IC chips. The effectiveness of shielding depends on the
properties of shielding materials, and radiation type, and radiation tolerance level of
semiconductor (Shultis and Faw, 2005). The type and required thickness and mass of the
shielding material, uniformity of shielding capability, permanence and availability of
shielding depends on radiation levels to be attenuated, resilience of the devices to
radiation exposure (Shultis and Faw, 2005). Shielding characteristics can be determined
numerically based on a linear attenuation coefficient, the total mass attenuation
coefficient for γ-rays, and the effectiveness in removal of cross-section for fast neutrons
(Yilmaz et al., 2011).
Shielding properties of many materials have been investigated and reported in the
literature. For example, these include concrete (Gencel et al., 2011; Kharita et al., 2008;
Korkut et al., 2010; and Yilmaz et al., 2011), concrete mixed with mineral additives
(Akkurt et al., 2010; Damla et al., 2010; Kharita et al., 2008; Kharita et al., 2011; and
Kurudirek et al., 2009), alloys (Abdao, 2002), aluminum and tungsten (Mangeret et al.,
1996), fly-ash brick materials (Singh and Badiger, 2014), conlemanite and epoxy resin
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(Okuno, 2005), and a reusable shielding material with high density of desired nuclei
(iron, hydrogen, and boron) (Calzada et al., 2011). Even though concrete and concreate
related materials might not be suitable for protecting electronic systems directly, the
information is still very relevant when determining the plant locations for installation for
such systems. For completeness, the relevant references are also included herein. A
comparative study of radiation shielding for some shielding concretes and glass systems
can be found in (Kurudirek, 2014). Because electronic components have different
susceptibility to radiation, shielding materials have also been used directly on
components level. e.g., a depleted boron is studied in (Kern and Smeltzer, 1986) to
protect the integrated circuits directly.

2.3.5 Summary of Rad-Hardened Design Techniques
Existing rad-hardened design techniques for mitigation radiation effects are summarized
in Table 2-6 together with a list of available literature for radiation hardening design
techniques.
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Table 2-6: Potential approaches to achieve rad-hardened design at different levels
Potential approaches

Effects
mitigation

References

Device-level design
Transistor sizing

TID, SEE

Zhou and Mohanram, 2004; Zhou and Mohanram, 2006

Transistor layout

TID, SEE

Liu et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 2004; Seixas et al., 2017

Insulating substrates

TID, SEE

Schwank et al., 2003; Vizkelethy et al., 2005

Guard rings

SEL

Camplani et al., 2014; Irani et al., 2017

Redundancy

SEE

Aydos and Fey, 2017; Li et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2014; Rajaei
et al., 2015; Smith and Mostert, 2007; Yan et al., 2017

Guard gates

SET

Balasubramanian et al., 2005; Qi et al., 2015

Temporal filtering

SET

Lacoe, 2008

Differential charge
cancellation

SET

Atkinson et al., 2013; Blaine et al., 2012

Dual interlocked storage
cells

SEU

Calin et al., 1996; Hui et al., 2015; Lacoe, 2008; Gorbunov
et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015

Self-healing circuits

TID, SEE

Adell et al., 2018; Chabi et al., 2014; Howard et al., 2012;
Inanlou et al., 2013; Rajaei et al., 2013; Shetler et al., 2015

Pipeline protection

SEU, SET

Das et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2016

Magnetic-based storage
logic

SEE

Goncalves et al., 2013; Rajaei 2016; Rajaei and Mamaghani,
2017; Wang et al., 2018

Redundant elements &
Co-design approach

SEE

Brinkley et al., 2000; Ciani et al., 2014; Clark et al., 2011;
Clark et al., 2015; Cuenca-Asensi et al., 2011; Eftaxiopoulos
et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2015; Li et al., 2000; Siegle et al.,
2015; Sterpone et al., 2013

Error detection and
correction

SEU, SET

Morelos-Zaragoza, 2002; Neuberger et al., 2005; Patel and
Hong, 1974; Shirvani et al., 2000; Tiwari and Tomko, 2005;
Shooman, 2003

Re-initialization recovery

SEU, SET

Lopez-Morillo et al., 2018; Makowski, 2006

Scrubbing

TID, SEE

Herrera and Lopez-Vallejo, 2013; Nidhin et al., 2017

Shielding against γ-rays

TID

Shielding against neutrons

DD

Abdao, 2002; Akkurt et al., 2010; Calzada et al., 2011;
Damla et al., 2010; Gencel et al., 2011; Kern and Smeltzer,
1986; Kharita et al., 2008; Kharita et al., 2011; Korkut et al.,
2010; Kurudirek et al., 2009; Kurudirek, 2014; Mangeret et
al., 1996; Okuno, 2005; Shultis and Faw, 2005; Singh and
Badiger, 2014; Yilmaz et al., 2011

Circuit-level design

System-level design

Radiation shielding
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In a specific circuit design, multiple of these techniques can be used concurrently to
provide greater protection for the designed system. However, one does have to consider
the complexity of the resulting design and other practical constraints, such as size,
weight, and cost.

2.4 Modeling and Simulation Techniques
At the system design phase, it is important to develop different techniques to evaluate
various rad-hardened techniques. Of course, the most reliable technique is known as
radiation-hardness assurance (RHA) which is a physical test using radiation source. RHA
evaluate whether a system, a subsystem, or a component can operate correctly in the
given radiation environment. The radiation environment is created by using external
perturbation sources to perform natural or accelerated particle radiation, laser beam, etc.
(Quinn et al., 2013; Uznanski et al., 2014; Shaneyfelt et al., 2008). The results from these
tests are very precise, but the procedure/process can be very complicated and expensive
(Gorbunov et al., 2011). To achieve relatively quick feedback in the design iteration,
evaluation of the radiation protection can also be accomplished using modeling and
computer simulations. Modeling techniques for radiation shielding and simulation of
radiation effects (TID, DD, and SEEs) are reviewed in following Sections.

2.4.1 Simulation of Radiation Shielding
Several modeling and simulation packages have been developed to study radiation
transport problems by using the Monte Carlo method (Shultis and Faw, 2005), such as
FLUKA (Ballarini et al., 2007; Fasso et al., 2005; Fasso et al., 2003; Korkut et al., 2012;
Yue et al., 2009), GEANT4 (Allison, 2006; BAK et al., 2010; Santina et al., 2003; Titt
and Newhaser, 2005; Zeynali et al., 2012), PHITS (Iwase et al., 2002), SHIELD
(Dementyev and Sobolevsky, 1999), and MULASSIS (Lei et al., 2002). The solutions
from some of these packages have been validated with experimental data (Beskrovnaia et
al., 2008; Fernandez-Hernando et al., 2006; Tessa et al., 2009). There has been a good
match in the estimates of energy deposition for various materials between the Monte
Carlo predictions and measurements. In general, all the above packages are potential
tools for shielding simulation ((Beskrovnaia et al., 2008; Tessa et al., 2009). However,
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the verification results in (Beskrovnaia et al., 2008) show that the Monte Carlo
calculations with FLUKA can be used to estimate the beam stopper thickness in the beam
direction, GEANT4 code is better for the design of the nuclotron upper shielding,
shielding of beam transport channel and the transverse size of the beam stopper, and
SHIELD code is good for both areas but it needs the long period of calculation.

2.4.2 Simulations of Radiation Effects
1) Displacement damage simulation
Accurate prediction of displacement damage is an important step towards the prediction
of radiation effects. Several special modeling and computation methods have been
developed (Carter et al., 1975; Chang et al., 2013; Deng et al., 2003; Gittus, 1978;
Norgett et al., 1975; Marcelot et al., 2015). On the other hand, some solutions have been
developed by using simulator tools, such as SPECTER and SRIM (Lee and Farnum,
1995; Ziegler, 2004), the Monte Carlo modeling (Khorsandi, 2007), Monte Carlo
Radiative Energy Deposition (MRED) code (Reed et al., 2015), ATREE (Roig et al.,
2014b), Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD) (Wang et al., 2015), and GEANT4
(Weller et al., 2004). Those solutions are all potential candidates for displacement
damage simulation.
A summary of displacement damage simulation is presented in (Srour and Palko, 2015),
the simulation elements mainly include: particle transport, energy deposition of damage,
and material response. With respect to these simulation elements, Monte-Carlo
techniques can be used in the calculation of particle transport and energy deposition,
while BCA codes work wells for light particles and for heavier particles with energies
above a few keV; Molecular dynamics approaches are the most suitable to study the
production of damage in displacement cascades; but there have two difficulties to analyze
device responses: complex damage structures to the result change in electronic properties
of the semiconductor material, and the determination of changes in defect structures
within short time (Srour and Palko, 2015).
2) Total ionizing dose simulation
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Several simulations and models for total ionizing dose effects on different devices and
systems are investigated in (Aguirre and Wirth, 2013; Esqueda, 2007; Esqueda et al.,
2015; Huang et al., 2014; Mikkola, 2008; Schlenvogt et al., 2013; Zebrev and Gorbunov,
2009; Zebrev et al., 2014; Nasr-Storey et al., 2015; Ding et al., 2014; Marcelot et al.,
2015). Software packages are also proposed to analyze and calculate TID effects, such as
3D_SPACE software (Specialized Electronic Systems) (Akhmetov et al., 2014), TCAD
techniques (Passei et al., 2015; Patrick et al., 2015; Petrosjanc et al., 2009; Turowsky et
al., 2004; Wang et al., 2015), Analog Transient Radiation Effects on Electronics
(ATREE) (Roig et al., 2014a), Monte Carlo Radiative Energy Deposition (MRED) code
(Reed et al., 2015), and ECORCE (Etude du COmportement sous Radiation des
Composants Electroniques) ( Michez et al., 2013, and Michez et al., 2015).
These computer tools are very useful. However, to get accurate results, the simulation
tools require sufficient information about technological features of the devices and
system configurations (Gorbunov et al., 2011). Moreover, it is generally difficult to
integrate physical models to a circuit-level simulation. Several solutions of transferring
parameters between physical-level and circuit-level are presented with help of behavioral
modeling using VHSIC hardware description language (VHDL-AMS) or other AnalogHDL (Cock et al., 2009; Gorbunov et al., 2011; Jagannathan et al., 2010; Mikkola et al.,
2007a; Mikkola et al., 2007b). All those simulations are more than hundred times faster
than conventional SPICE-based method and still can achieve a good simulation accuracy.
3) Single event effects simulation
Several papers (Dodd, 1996, 2005; Dodd and Massengill, 2003; Reed et al., 2013) have
provided complete descriptions of the modeling and simulation of single event effects
and reviewed its history and the evolution. Significant amount of research has been
focused on the simulation of SEUs and SETs (Aguirre et al., 2007; Artola et al., 2015a;
Inguimbert and Duzellier, 2004; Tang and Cannon, 2004; Truscott et al., 2004; Warren et
al., 2008; Reed et al., 2015). Several models are presented for device-level and circuitlevel simulations (Munteanu and Autran, 2008; Song et al., 1988), and different tools are
applied to calculate and simulate SEEs, such as, the multi-scale single event phenomena
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predictive platform (MUSCA SEP3) from a system level down to a semiconductor target
(Artola et al., 2015b; Hubert et al., 2011; Hubert et al., 2014; Velazco et al., 2014),
TIARA transport tool (Roche et al., 2014), Intel Radiation Tool (IRT) (Seifert, 2015),
Monte Carlo Radiative Energy Deposition (MRED) code (Weller et al., 2010)and TCAD
(Huang et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2014; Michez et al., 2015; Rezzak and Wang, 2015;
Song et al., 2014). In addition, an approach named “mixed-mode” or “mixed-level”
simulation combines physical-level and circuit-level models to predict the ionizing
responses is also developed (Davinci, 2003). On the other hand, some approaches
through software fault injections have also been applied to study, simulate, and analyze
SEEs (Ruano et al., 2007; Sterpone et al., 2006, Tsiligiannis et al., 2014).
Those simulation methods can be separated to several levels for the analysis of the
interaction of ionizing particles with matter: physical-based device models,
multidimensional device simulations, circuit simulations, and mixed device/circuit
simulations (Dodd and Massengill, 2003). Physical device simulators focus on the
prediction of the response of devices to incident radiation, circuit simulators concern the
modeling of circuit response to a single event, and codes consider the error rate (Dodd
and Massengill, 2003).

2.4.3 Summary of Simulation Techniques
The software tools and modeling techniques to simulate radiation shielding and radiation
effects on electronics are summarized in Table 2-7, as well as a list of existing
publications based on modeling and simulation techniques.
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Table 2-7: Potential approaches of modeling and computer simulations
Potential approaches

References

Radiation shielding simulation
Monte Carlo method
FLUKA
GEANT4

Shultis and Faw, 2005
Ballarini et al., 2007; Fasso et al., 2005; Fasso et al., 2003; Korkut et al.,
2012; Yue et al., 2009
Allison, 2006; BAK et al., 2010; Santina et al., 2003; Titt and Newhaser,
2005; Truscott et al., 2000; Zeynali et al., 2012

PHITS

Iwase et al., 2002

SHIELD

Dementyev and Sobolevsky, 1999

MULASSIS

Lei et al., 2002

Simulation of displacement damage
Modeling and computation
methods
SPECTER & SRIM

Chang et al., 2013; Deng et al., 2003; Gittus, 1978; Norgett et al., 1975;
Marcelot et al., 2015
Lee and Farnum, 1995; Ziegler, 2004

MRED

Reed et al., 2015

ATREE

Roig et al., 2014b

TCAD

Wang et al., 2015

GEANT4

Weller et al., 2004

Simulation of total ionizing dose effects
Modeling and computation
methods

Aguirre and Wirth, 2013; Esqueda, 2007; Esqueda et al., 2015; Huang et
al., 2014; Mikkola, 2008; Schlenvogt et al., 2013; Zebrev and Gorbunov,
2009; Zebrev et al., 2014; Nasr-Storey et al., 2015; Ding et al., 2014;
Marcelot et al., 2015

3D_SPACE

Akhmetov et al., 2014

TCAD

Passeri et al., 2015; Patrick et al., 2015; Petrosjanc et al., 2009; Turowsky
et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2015
Roig et al., 2014a

ATREE
MRED
ECORCE

Reed et al., 2015
Michez et al., 2013, and Michez et al., 2015
Cock et al., 2009; Gorbunov et al., 2011; Jagannathan et al., 2010; Mikkola
Multi-level simulation
et al., 2007a; Mikkola et al., 2007b
Simulation of single event effects
Modeling and computation
Artola et al., 2015a; Baumann, 2005; Dodd, 1996, 2005; Dodd and
methods
Massengill, 2003; Reed et al., 2013
Artola et al., 2015b; Hubert et al., 2011; Hubert et al., 2014; Velazco et al.,
3
MUSCA SEP
2014
TIARA
Roche et al., 2014
IRT

Mixed-level simulation

Seifert, 2015
Huang et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2014; Michez et al., 2015; Rezzak and
Wang, 2015; Song et al., 2014
Davinci, 2003

Fault injection simulation

Ruano et al., 2007; Sterpone et al., 2006, Tsiligiannis et al., 2014

TCAD
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Even those simulation results have a good agreement with results from physical test.
However, it is important to mention that those modeling and simulation methods and
techniques cannot replace physical tests all-together. It should be viewed as a
complementary to physical tests. In addition, it can also be used to select electronic
components and to evaluate radiation-tolerance in the design phase of the system.

2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this Chapter, the background of a potential wireless post-accident monitoring system
in nuclear power plants is briefly discussed. A technical review of radiation effects on
electronics is presented and existing rad-hardened design techniques are surveyed. In
addition, Simulation techniques to investigate radiation effects and rad-hardened designs
are also explained.
The conventional approach to design electronic equipment with high radiation tolerance
is based on radiation-hardened components, which has high resistance to ionizing
radiation but could be excessively expensive. They are only applied in those applications
where the cost is not a primary concern, such as space exploration, military applications,
etc. Using ordinary commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components but utilizing radhardened design techniques can also achieve high level of radiation tolerance.
Furthermore, many new designs have the higher design requirements on speed, storage,
functions, which are only available through using COTS components.
Based on those studies, using COTS components combing with rad-hardened design
techniques and fault-tolerant techniques may provide an effective and economical
solution to design and to implement the potential wireless monitoring systems for nuclear
power plants under a severe accident condition.
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Chapter 3

3

Analysis of Radiation Responses of Devices and
Circuits

To design circuit robust ionizing radiation damages and to accurately analyze their
behavior under radiation conditions are not only important, but also necessary in the
design of rad-hardened systems. Unfortunately, conventional electronic simulators, such
as SPICE, do not consider radiation effects on electronic components so they have no
capability to simulate radiation responses of devices and circuits. On the other hand,
physical radiation tests need real radiation environments and are also extremely
expensive.
This Chapter starts with the understanding of the mechanism of radiation-induced
damages on semiconductor devices and circuits, a method is presented to analyze and to
model responses of semiconductor devices and circuits in strong radiation environments
by combining with the semi-empirical technique and the numerical technique. It can be
applied to design circuits and electronic systems against radiation effects in the design
phase and to evaluate the effectiveness of those circuits and systems without repeated
destructive tests. Some device models are also described for the post-irradiation
condition. Finally, a simulation of radiation-induced responses on an ideal p-n junction is
given as a case study by using Sentaurus Technology Computer-Aided Design (TCAD)
simulator.

3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Degradation Mechanism of Devices and Circuits
The type of semiconductor electronic components in an electronic system varies widely,
e.g., microcontroller/microprocessor, memory (RAM/ROM), transceiver, analog-todigital converter (ADC), digital-to-analog converter (DAC), operation amplifier,
multiplexer, logic chips (TTL or CMOS), voltage reference, transistor, diode, etc.
Moreover, these electronic components may be made by various semiconductor
technologies, such as Metal-oxide-semiconductor (MOS), bipolar technology, or other

46

technologies. The understanding of the mechanism of radiation effects on various devices
and circuits are a critical part in the radiation-hardened design. Degradation mechanism
and radiation effects on MOS/Bipolar devices and circuits are summarized as follows.
1) MOS devices and circuits
Due to charges are trapped between the interface and oxide when ionizing radiation
interacts with semiconductor material of the device, major degradation of MOS device
and circuit characteristics can be summarized as: (1) threshold voltage shift in MOS
transistor, then loss of on/off control; (2) mobility degradation; (3) increase in leakage
currents; and (4) reduction of breakdown voltage (Galloway and Schrimpf, 1990; Michez,
et al., 2013).
(1) Threshold voltage shift
Taken MOSFET device as an example, it usually uses a field oxide to isolate transistor
channel regions and electrically isolate adjacent transistors. As a result, MOSEFET
device is sensitive to ionizing radiation due to charge buildup in the field oxide regions.
The primary effect is a large threshold voltage shift due to radiation-induced positive
charge (Witczak et al., 2005; Wahle et al., 1990). The shift of N-MOSFETs is usually
negative due to the buildup of positive trapped charge in the gate oxide, which can be
partially compensated by the buildup of negative interface trapped charge; and the charge
in interface traps of P-MOSFETs is predominantly positive (Galloway and Schrimpf,
1990).
(2) Mobility degradation
When radiation-induced charges scatter in interface traps, except the shift of the threshold
voltage, it also significantly degrades the channel mobility in MOSFETs, and mobility
degradation can result in the significant reduction in transconductance and current-drive
capability. Then a loss of drive capability can be encountered due to increasing the
threshold voltage and/or reducing the mobility (Galloway and Schrimpf, 1990).
(3) Leakage currents
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Radiation-induced charge also has significant effects on the subthreshold characteristics
due to it decreases the sensitivity of surface potential to gate voltage and results in the
change in the gate voltage. This degradation leads to that subthreshold current increases
at a given gate voltage below threshold (Galloway and Schrimpf, 1990). For NMOSFETs, the subthreshold leakage current increases at a given gate voltage meanwhile
the threshold voltage reduces. In addition, the surface recombination velocity at SiO2-Si
interface increases, it also leads to the increasing of the junction leakage current
(Galloway and Schrimpf, 1990).
(4) Breakdown voltage
For power DMOS devices, in general, ionizing radiation leads to the reduction of its
breakdown voltage. The change of high voltage DMOS devices is much more than that of
low voltage device (Galloway and Schrimpf, 1990).
Major effects on MOS integrated circuits can be summarized as: (1) the increasing of the
static power supply current because of the increasing of the leakage current; (2) the
generation of leakage paths between circuit nodes due to the change of the surface
potential; (3) the issue of the power supply because of the increase in leakage current;
and (4) propagation delay and/or the change of circuit timing parameter which depend on
the mobility of the charge carriers and the threshold voltage (Galloway and Schrimpf,
1990).
2)

Bipolar devices and circuits

When ionizing radiations pass through bipolar device, due to an increase in the density of
interface traps at the surface of the extrinsic base region and positive charge buildup, the
degradation of bipolar transistor include two aspects: the increase of recombination
current, and the reducing the common-emitter current gain (Johnston et al., 1994).
As a result, when a device includes p-n junctions, photocurrent will be generated due to
the transport of generated carriers within the oxide when it is exposed to ionizing
radiation. The total photocurrent (𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ) is the sum of the prompt photocurrent from the
depletion region (𝐽𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙 ), the diffusion photocurrent from n region (𝐽𝑝 ), and the diffusion
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photocurrent from p region (𝐽𝑛 ). The prompt photocurrent is caused by electron-holepairs generated in the depletion region, which are immediately swept out and appear a
photocurrent flowed from n-side to p-side (Alexandr, 2003). The amplitude is determined
by the electron charge times (𝑞), the generation coefficient (𝑔0 ), the dose rate (𝛾̇ ), and the
volume of the depletion region (Wirth and Rogers, 1964; Alexandr, 2003). On the other
hand, the diffusion photocurrent is caused by excess minority carriers reached the edge of
the depletion region, which are swept across the p-n junction and generate a photocurrent
under the steady state condition. If carriers are further away than the diffusion
length (𝐿𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑝 ), they do not contribute to the photocurrent (Alexandr, 2003).
Taking a diode as an example, major radiation-induced effects are the increase of the
reverse current and the changes of the forward voltage (Aguirre and Wirth, 2013). The
radiation response is represented a linear current source (𝐼𝑝 ) in the model of diode.
Semiconductor materials, three dimensional structures, and radiation dose rate can affect
this current source.
The physical construction of BJTs consists of a pair of p-n junctions close together. When
they are exposed to ionizing radiation, the density of interface traps increases at the
surface of the extrinsic base region; and positive charges build up in the emitter-base
depletion region (Schlenvogt et al., 2013). The typical response is a large increase of base
current (𝐼𝑏 ) and a slight change of the collector current(𝐼𝑐 ). As a result, the primary
ionizing response of BJTs is the degradation of the current gain β (𝐼𝑐 /𝐼𝑏 ), particularly at
the low dose-rates (Gorbunov et al., 2009; Jagannathan et al., 2010). Generally, NPN
BJTs are more sensitive than PNP BJTs because NPN BJTs have a much lower doping
level in p-doped base region than the p-emitter region of PNP BJTs, which easily leads to
the inversion (Ruano et al., 2007). The photocurrents of ionizing radiation responses are
represented by two linear current sources in parallel with base/emitter and base/collector
in the NPN BJT model.
Due to total dose damage in bipolar devices is not self-scaling, it depends on the
perimeter-to-area ratio, and oxide properties and current density, there are therefore no
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simple parameters that can be used to characterize the general behavior of bipolar devices
with widely differing designs and geometries (Johnston et al., 1994).

3.1.2 Photocurrent Modeling of a p-n Junction
1) Overview
When a silicon device consists of one or more p-n junctions, whose geometry is
illustrated in Figure 3-1 (Alexander, 2003), photocurrents are generated due to the
transport of generated carriers in device depletion regions and/or within diffusion regions,
which are named the prompt photocurrent and the diffusion photocurrent.
Ohmic Contact
Depletion
region
Radiation
P

N
LP

Wdepl

Ln

Xn

XP

Figure 3-1: The layout of p-n geometry (Alexander, 2003)
For p-n junctions, the total photocurrent (𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ) is the sum of the prompt photocurrent
from the depletion region (𝐽𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙 ), the diffusion photocurrent from n region (𝐽𝑝 ), and the
diffusion photocurrent from p region (𝐽𝑛 ), which is indicated in Eq. (3-1) (Wirth &
Rogers, 1964).

J total = J depl + J p + J n .

(3-1)

The analytical and experimental solutions of photocurrents in semiconductor devices
have been developed since mid-1960s in (Gleason et al., 2013; Wirth & Rogers, 1964;
Wunsch & Axness, 1992; Dierking, 1969; Raymond & Willis, 1965; Enlow &
Alexander, 1988; Ishaque, et al., 1991; Alexander, 2003; Ishaque, 1989; Fjeldly et al.,
2001; Kerr et al., 2012; Gwyn et al., 1967). This section provides a summary of those
solutions and all variables used in this section are summarized in Table 3-1.
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The prompt photocurrent is caused by electron-hole-pairs generated in the depletion
region, which are immediately swept out and appear a photocurrent flowed from n-side to
p-side (Alexander, 2003). The amplitude is determined by the electron charge times (𝑞),
the generation coefficient (𝑔0 ), the dose rate (𝛾̇ ), and the volume of the depletion region
(Wirth & Rogers, 1964; Alexander, 2003). Assuming a carrier starts at a distance 𝑥0 from
the depletion edge, the velocity is a constant and can be expressed as (Wunsh & Axness,
1992).
Table 3-1: Definitions of constants and variables used for the simulation of ionizing
radiation effects on semiconductor devices (Wirth & Rogers, 1964; Alexander, 2003)
Symbol
𝑞
𝑘
𝑔0
𝑢𝑛 , 𝑢𝑝
𝜏𝑛 , 𝜏𝑝

Definition
electron charge = 1.602 × 10−19
Boltzmann constant = 1.381 × 10−23
the uniform generation term = 4.3 × 1013

Unit
𝐶
𝐽/𝐾
1/𝑐𝑚3 · 𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑆𝑖)

𝑇
𝛾̇

electron and hole mobility
electron and hole lifetime
temperature
the ionizing dose rate

𝑐𝑚2 /𝑉 · 𝑠
𝑠
𝐾
𝑟𝑎𝑑 (𝑆𝑖)/𝑠

𝐺

electron-hole generation rate 𝐺 = 𝑔0 𝛾̇

1/𝑠 · 𝑐𝑚3

𝐸𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙
𝐸𝑛 , 𝐸𝑝
𝐷𝑛 , 𝐷𝑝
𝑈𝑛 , 𝑈𝑝
∆𝑛(𝑥, 𝑡)
∆𝑝(𝑥, 𝑡)
𝑊𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙
𝐿𝑛 , 𝐿𝑝
𝑥𝑛 , 𝑥𝑝

E field in the depletion region
E field in the p-side region and in the n-side region
the electron diffusion coefficient in p-side and the
hole diffusion coefficient in n-side
∆𝑝
recombination rate 𝑈𝑛 = ∆𝑛⁄𝜏𝑛 , 𝑈𝑝 = ⁄𝜏𝑝
electrons generated by ionization per unit volume
= 𝑛(𝑥, 𝑡) − 𝑛(𝑥, 0)
holes generated by ionization per unit volume =
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑡) − 𝑝(𝑥, 0)
the depletion region width
the diffusion length in p-side silicon and n-side
silicon
the length of n-side, p-side

v=

dx

dt

= −uEdepl

𝑣/𝑐𝑚
𝑣/𝑐𝑚
(𝑘𝑇⁄𝑞 )𝑢𝑛
1/𝑠 · 𝑐𝑚3
𝑐𝑚−3
𝑐𝑚−3
𝑐𝑚
𝑐𝑚
𝑐𝑚

(3-2)
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where
𝑢 : the minority carrier mobility
𝑥 : the carrier position at time 𝑡 , 𝑥 = −𝑢𝐸𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙 𝑡 + 𝑥0
𝑡 : the time for the carrier to reach the junction, 𝑡 = 𝑥0 /𝑢𝐸𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙
Thus
qGuEdepl t t  Wdepl uE depl
J depl = 
.
 qGWdepl t  Wdepl uE depl

(3-3)

On the other hand, the diffusion photocurrent is caused by excess minority carriers
reached the edge of the depletion region, which are swept across the p-n junction and
generate a photocurrent under the steady state condition. If carriers are further away than
the diffusion length (𝐿𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑝 ), they do not contribute to the photocurrent (Alexander,
2003). According to the current flow equations, the diffusion photocurrent includes both a
drift term and a diffusion term, which are indicated in Eq. (3-4) and Eq. (3-5) (Alexander,
2003).
J n = qDn

n
+ qu n nE n .
x

J p = − qD p

p
+ qu p pE p .
x

(3-4)

(3-5)

According to electron and hole continuity equations, the time rate of changed excess
carriers is depended on the generated carriers, the recombined carriers, and the
divergence of the carrier flow within the volume, which are indicated in Eq. (3-6) and Eq.
(3-7) (Alexander, 2003).
n
1 J n
= G −Un +
.
t
q x

(3-6)

p
1 J p
= G −U p −
.
t
q x

(3-7)
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Combining Eq. (3-4) to Eq. (3-7), the behavior of excess electrons and holes generated by
transient ionizing radiation in p-side and n-side are indicated in Eq. (3-8) and Eq. (3-9)
(Alexander, 2003).
•
E n
n
n
n
 2 n
= g 0  (t ) −
+ u n n
+ u n En
+ Dn
.
t
n
x
x
x 2

•
E p
p
p
p
 2 p
= g 0  (t ) −
+ u p p
+ upEp
− Dp
.
t
p
x
x
x 2

(3-8)

(3-9)

According to the number of excess carriers generated by radiation particles, applications
can be separated into two categories conditions: low injection level and high injection
level. At low injection level, the number of carriers is much less than the doping
concentration. On the other hand, as the dose rate increases or in heavily doped p-n
junctions, the density of excess generated carriers may approach or surpass the density of
majority carriers in p-side and/or n-side. The analysis results of photocurrent modeling
may therefore not accurate. (Alexander, 2003; Fjeldly et al., 2001).
2) Low injection level
At low injection level, the diffusion length (𝐿𝑛 , 𝐿𝑝 ) depends on the minority carrier
diffusion coefficient (𝐷𝑛 , 𝐷𝑝 ) and minority carrier lifetime (𝜏𝑛 , 𝜏𝑝 ), which are indicated in
Eq. (3-10) and Eq. (3-11). The minority carrier lifetime is a constant, which can be
obtained from Shockley-Reed-Hall (SRH) recombination statistics for semiconductors.
The minority carrier diffusion coefficient is determined by the minority carrier mobility
(𝑢𝑛 , 𝑢𝑝 ) and 𝑘𝑇⁄𝑞 .
Ln =

Dn n .

(3-10)

Lp =

D p p .

(3-11)

Wirth-Rogers provided a solution for infinite p-n junctions with negligible electric fields
based on several assumptions of one-dimensional geometry, uniformly doping, and
constant across voltage (Wirth & Rogers, 1964). For example, for a pulse function with
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magnitude 𝐺 and duration 𝑇, the solution of Wirth-Rogers for the n-side region is
indicated in Eq. (3-12) (Wirth & Rogers, 1964).
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(3-12)
Enlow-Alexander presented an approximate solution in (Gleason et al., 2013), which use
Laplace transform techniques for a lightly doped p-n diode with a constant E-field.
However, it is inaccurate if ohmic fields are greater than about 10 V/cm (Wunsch &
Axness, 1992). Wunsch-Axness also provided a time domain solution for the lightly
doped p-n diode, which is appropriate for many modern device structures, whose solution
for the n-side region is indicated in Eq. (3-13) (Wunsch & Axness, 1992). The steady
state solution is indicated in Eq. (3-14) (Wunsch & Axness, 1992).
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(3-14)
where
Г : the gamma function
𝛾 : the incomplete gamma function
2

𝑐𝑚 = (𝑚𝜋 𝐿𝑝 ⁄𝑥𝑛 ) + 𝛽𝑝 + 1
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𝛽𝑝 =

𝑢𝑝 𝐸𝑝 𝐿𝑝
2𝐷𝑝

𝜁𝑝 = 𝑥𝑛 ⁄𝐿𝑝
3) High injection level
At high injection level, the concept of the depletion region loses validity and boundary
conditions are difficult to define. The following assumptions in the condition of low level
injection are inappropriate for the high injection level (Alexander, 2003):
(1) As the dose rate increases, the excess carrier density increases until the traps
saturate, and the lifetime reaches the saturated Shockley-Reed-Hall (SRH)
lifetime. For the very high ionizing dose rates, the recombination process changes
from trap assisted to direct band-to-band and the lifetime decreases significantly
(Alexander, 2003).
(2) When the density of excess carriers approaches the density of majority carriers,
electrons and holes do not move respectively, the movement generates an
imbalance in charge and an internal electric field (Alexander, 2003).
(3) The diffusion coefficient and mobility of minority carriers may approach the
ambipolar diffusion coefficient and mobility if the density of excess carriers is
high enough (Alexander, 2003).
(4) The effective diffusion length will be increased due to the effect of the ambipolar
diffusion (Alexander, 2003).
In consequence, the complete transport equations for the high injection level are very
difficult to solve analytically (Ishaque et al., 1989; Fjeldly et al., 2001). GleasonSchlenvogt developed a transient physics and equivalent circuit model for the high
injection level, which was examined with TCAD simulations and the experimental data
of physical radiation test (Gleason et al., 2013). The limitation is that the steady-state
current is determined by analytical solutions, which are also limited to the scope of their
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assumptions. Fjeldly-Ytterdal presented the stationary and dynamic model to simulate the
photocurrents of semiconductor devices for a wide range of ionizing radiation intensities
(Fjeldly et al., 2001), whose transient photocurrent (𝐼𝐺 ) is indicated in Eq. (3-15).
J total = q (GWdepl + G p L pd + Gn Lnd ) .

(3-15)

Effective e-h generation rates (𝐺𝑝 , 𝐺𝑛 ) are related to the dynamic voltages 𝑉𝐺𝑝 and 𝑉𝐺𝑛 ,
which are represented by RC equivalent delay circuits (Fjeldly et al., 2001). However,
this solution is depended on the choice of parameters and delay times are difficulty to
determine.

3.1.3 Problem Statement
In general, the purpose of modeling photocurrent is to predict the ionizing responses of
semiconductor devices and to analysis the response of a circuit or a system. As previously
discussed, accurate predictions of photocurrent must consider 3-D structures and the
appropriate formulations for different radiation dose rates (Alexander, 2003). However, it
is very complicated and also difficult to resolve to those equations for general
applications due to it depends on the selection of boundary conditions and assumptions
for different radiation dose rates and/or different doped silicones. As a result, the major
issue is the determination of photocurrents in different applications, particularly those
applications in the high injection level.
On the other hand, existing solutions is usually implemented with Gummel-Poon
transistor models. The appropriate current sources are inserted into devices models to
simulate the responses of photocurrents. However, Gummel-Poon transistor models are
non-linear and needs high computational costs. Hence, they are usually only used in
circuit simulators, e.g. SPICE, and not suitable for low-cost online algorithm.

3.1.4 The Framework of the Proposed Analysis Method
This work combines the semi-empirical technique and the numerical technique to
investigate a method for the analysis of ionizing radiation responses of devices and
circuits, whose flow diagram is show in Figure 3-2.
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Mathematical modeling of semiconductor
devices for post-irradiation
Determination parameters of radiation
responses for semiconductor devices in TCAD
Are models correct?

N

Y
Sub-circuits analysis for post-irradiation with
MNA equations
Large system analysis for post-irradiation

Figure 3-2: Flow diagram of the developed analysis method
Photocurrents of semiconductor devices can be calculated in TCAD. Then, the results are
integrated into the modified nodal analysis (MNA) circuit equations to analyze radiationinduced responses of circuits.
(1) Device modeling for post-irradiation: linear mathematical models of
semiconductor devices can be established for post-irradiation based on radiation
responses, which can be calculated in TCAD.
(2) Sub-circuit analysis: based on device models, the proprieties of sub-circuit for
post-irradiation can be calculated by the using of MNA equation.
(3) Large system analysis: a whole system can be separated into a number of subcircuit blocks, whose radiation responses can be obtained through Step 2. Then,
radiation response of the whole system can be analyzed by the integration of all
sub-circuit blocks.

3.2 Development of Device Models
3.2.1 Diode Model
1) Diode response
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As previously discussed, photocurrent will be generated due to the transport of generated
carriers within the oxide when diodes are exposed to ionizing radiation. Major radiationinduced effects in diodes are a general increase of the reverse current and the changes of
the forward voltage (Snow et al., 1967). The Companion model of diode for postirradiation in this work is illustrated in Figure 3-3. The radiation response is represented
as a linear current source (𝐼𝑝 ) in the model of diode, which is determined by
semiconductor materials, three dimensional structures, and radiation dose rate.
+
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𝑖𝑑
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−
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1
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Figure 3-3: Companion model of diode for post-irradiation
2) Diode modeling
The element equation of diode for before-irradiation is expressed in Eq. (3-20) (Najm,
2010):
 vVd

id = g (v d ) = I sat  e T − 1 .





(3-20)

where
𝐼𝑠𝑎𝑡 is the reverse saturation current,
𝑣𝑑 is the applied bias,
𝑉𝑇 ≜ 𝑘𝑇/𝑞 is the thermal voltage,
𝜂 ≈ 1 is the ideality factor
Assuming the diode is biased at 𝑣𝑑𝑘 and 𝑖𝑑𝑘 . The diode element stamp for before- and postirradiation can be expressed in Eq. (3-21).
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(3-21)

where

𝑘
𝐺𝑒𝑞

≜

𝑑𝑖𝑑
𝑑𝑣𝑑

𝐼𝑠𝑎𝑡

= 𝜂𝑉 𝑒

𝑘
𝑣𝑘
1 −𝑣2
𝜂𝑉𝑇

𝑇

𝐼′𝑘𝑒𝑞 for before-irradiation is:
𝑘
𝐼′𝑘𝑒𝑞 = 𝑖𝑑𝑘 − 𝐺𝑒𝑞
(𝑣1𝑘 − 𝑣2𝑘 )

𝐼′𝑘𝑒𝑞 for post-irradiation is:
𝑘
𝐼′𝑘𝑒𝑞 = 𝑖𝑑𝑘 − 𝐺𝑒𝑞
(𝑣1𝑘 − 𝑣2𝑘 ) + 𝐼𝑝𝑘

3.2.2 BJT Model
1) BJT response
The physical construction of BJTs consists of a pair of p-n junctions closed together.
When they are exposed to ionizing radiation, the density of interface traps increases at the
surface of the extrinsic base region; and positive charges build up in the emitter-base
depletion region (Johnston et al., 1994). The typical response is a large increase of base
current (𝐼𝑏 ) and a slight change of the collector current(𝐼𝑐 ). As a result, the primary
ionizing response of BJTs is the degradation of the current gain β (𝐼𝑐 /𝐼𝑏 ), particularly at
the low dose-rates (Zhao et al., 2015; Montagner et al., 1998). Generally, NPN BJTs are
more sensitive than PNP BJTs because NPN BJTs have a much lower doping level in pdoped base region than the p-emitter region of PNP BJTs, which easily leads to the
inversion (Johnston et al., 1994). Some models for ionizing radiation responses of BJTs
have been developed in (Fjeldly et al., 2001; Zhao et al., 2015; Montagner et al., 1998;
Kleiner and Messenger, 1982). In those models, photocurrents are represented as linear
current sources to insert into each junction in BJT devices.
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The Companion model of the NPN BJT for post-irradiation in this work is illustrated in
Figure 3-4. The photocurrents of ionizing radiation responses are represented by two
linear current sources (𝐼𝑝𝑒𝑏 and 𝐼𝑝𝑐𝑏 ) in parallel with base/emitter and base/collector in
the NPN BJT model. Different responses may be generated when BJTs are the part in
different circuits. To accurately model the radiation response of BJTs, both the forward
and inverse parameters have to involve into the model (Alexander, 2003).
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Figure 3-4: Companion model of NPN BJT for post-irradiation
2) BJT modeling
The element equations of the NPN BJT with Ebers-Moll model for before-irradiation are
indicated in Eqn.22 to Eqn. 3-24 (Najm, 2010).
 vb e

 vb c

ie = − I es  e VTe − 1 + a R I CS  e VTc − 1 .









(3-22)

 vbe

 vbc

ic = a F I es  e VTe − 1 − I CS  e VTc − 1 .









(3-23)

ib = −(ie + ic ) .

(3-24)

where
𝐼𝑒𝑠 is the emitter junction saturation current, 𝐼𝑐𝑠 is the collector junction saturation
current,
𝛽𝑓 , 𝛽𝑟 are the ideal maximum forward and reverse current gains,
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𝛽𝑓

𝑎𝐹 = 𝛽

𝑓 +1

𝛽𝑟

𝑎𝑅 = 𝛽

𝑟 +1

is typically in the range 0.98 and 0.99 for the forward active region,

is typically in the range 0.1 and 0.5 for the reverse active region.

The element stamp of NPN BJT for before- and post-irradiation is expressed in Eq. 3-25.
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3.3 Case Study: Radiation-Induced Responses of an Ideal
p-n Diode in TCAD
3.3.1 Simulation Parameters
The radiation-induced responses of an ideal diode with constant doping are performed in
TCAD. For simplicity, only one-dimensional geometry is considered in the calculation
and simulation. Simulation parameters of the ideal diode are summarized in Table 3-2,
which are taken from the references (Fjeldly et al., 2001; Kerr et al., 2012).
Table 3-2: Simulation parameters of an ideal p-n diode
Parameter

Value

Radiation source
Pulse width

5e-8s

Pulse dose-rate

0, 2, 1E4, 1E9 Rad (Si)/s

p-n junction

n-side

p-side

𝑊𝑛 , 𝑊𝑝

2.8875e-6m

2.8875e-6m

𝐷𝑛 , 𝐷𝑝

1.036e-3 m2/s

2.59e-3 m2/s

𝜏𝑝

2e-5 s

2e-5 s

Doping

1e16 m-3

1e16 m-3

Depletion region
𝑊𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙

1.225e-6 m

The simulation structure of the ideal diode in TCAD is shown in Figure 3-5.
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Figure 3-5: The simulation structure of the ideal p-n diode in TCAD

3.3.2 Simulation Results
Two cases with different biases are considered in this simulation. One is to obtain photocurrent with forward bias and another one is reverse bias.
1)

Photo-current with forward bias

Under various voltages, simulation results of photo-current response of an ideal p-n under
forward bias are listed in Table 3-3 and shown in Figure 3-6.
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Table 3-3: Simulation results of photo-current response of an ideal p-n diode under
forward bias
Total rate

Time

1.0E9 Rad (Si) /s 1.0E9 Rad (Si) /s

2 Rad (Si) /s

0

Voltage

0

-9.97777

-14.9778

-18.5881

-19.3842

0.00

1
2
3
4
5

-10.2184
-6.49530
-3.91851
-3.40214
-3.17658

-11.5074
-6.49528
-3.91851
-3.40214
-3.17658

-11.5073
-6.49528
-3.91851
-3.40214
-3.17658

-11.5073
-6.49528
-3.91851
-3.40214
-3.17658

0.30
0.60
0.90
1.20
1.50

6

-3.17658

-3.17658

-3.17658

-3.17658

1.50

7
8

-3.17658
-9.97775

-3.17658
-14.2648

-3.17658
-14.3579

-3.17658
-14.3579

1.50
0.00

9

-9.97777

-14.9778

-18.6548

-20.0148

0.00

10

-9.97777

-14.9778

-18.6487

-20.0454

0.00

1.0E9 Rad (Si)/s

1.0E4 Rad (Si)/s

2 Rad (Si) /s

0 Rad (Si) /s

Voltage

0.00E+00

2.00
1.80
1.60
1.40

-1.00E+01

1.20
1.00

-1.50E+01

0.80
0.60

-2.00E+01

0.40
0.20

-2.50E+01

0.00
1

2
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5
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Time (second)

8
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Figure 3-6: Photo-current response of an ideal p-n diode under forward bias in
TCAD

Voltage (V)

Log (total current)

-5.00E+00
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2)

Photo-current with reverse bias

Under various voltages, simulation results of photo-current response of an ideal p-n under
reverse bias are listed in Table 3-4 and shown in Figure 3-7.
Table 3-4: Simulation results of photo-current response of an ideal p-n diode under
reverse bias
Total rate
Time

1.0E9 Rad (Si) /s 1.0E9 Rad (Si) /s

2 Rad (Si) /s

0

Voltage

0

-9.97777

-14.9777

-18.7234

-19.7953

0.00

1

-9.83609

-14.6456

-15.0951

-15.0953

0.30

2

-9.73038

-14.5716

-15.0854

-15.0855

0.60

3

-9.64705

-14.5141

-15.0927

-15.0930

0.90

4

-9.57802

-14.4502

-15.0436

-15.0439

1.20

5

-9.51878

-14.3934

-14.9939

-14.9943

1.50

6

-9.51878

-14.4415

-15.2293

-15.2296

1.50

7

-9.51878

-14.4415

-15.2293

-15.2296

1.50

8

-9.97779

-14.5096

-14.3825

-14.3824

0.00

9

-9.97777

-14.9778

-18.7234

-19.5144

0.00

10

-9.97777

-14.9778

-18.7234

-19.5144

0.00
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Figure 3-7: Photo-current response of an ideal p-n diode under reverse bias in
TCAD

3.3.3 Discussion
Based on simulation results and studies in this work, the following discussions apply to
this simulation results:
•

Under the condition of both forward bias and reverse bias, simulation results have
shown that photo-current increases when total dose rate increases under both
forward bias and reverse bias. However, it is more intense than that of reverse
bias.

•

Under the condition of the variable voltage, the results have shown that photocurrents under different conditions, such as forward or reverse biases, or low/high
dose rates, will decrease significantly if the bias voltage is reduced to zero.
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3.4 Summary
In this Chapter, a method is proposed to analyze radiation responses of MOS/Bipolar
devices and circuits, as well as two device models are investigated for the post-irradiation
condition. Some simulations in TCAD have been also performed to obtain radiationinduced responses of an ideal p-n diode. The simulation results show that photo-current
under different radiation conditions decreases significantly if the bias voltage is reduced
to zero. Therefore, the damage to the semiconductor device by the accumulated photocurrent may be averted if the device is de-energized quickly.
In fact, destructive single event effects, such as SEL, SES, SEB, and SEGR, are all
caused by accumulated current and their effects can be mitigated if the current is quickly
removed. Moreover, non-destructive single event effects, such as SET, SEU, and SEFI,
can be recovered by using data re-initialization and/or system recovery, which can also be
accomplished by rapid power off. Methods of rapid power off are therefore highly
effectively in protecting electronic systems under ionizing radiation. It can be a potential
solution to mitigate the damages of single event effects.
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Chapter 4

4

Design Part I: Component Selection

As mentioned in Chapter 2, an electronic system built with regular commercial off-theshelf components will definitely be damaged when cumulative total dose is 1 M Rad (Si)
(Messenger and Ash, 1991). Radiation effects on various devices, circuits and systems
are different, depending on their unique materials, structure, manufacturing technologies,
and applications, where the dose range is typically in the range of 104-108 rad (Si)
(Foster, 2003). Therefore, some techniques have to be used to reduce total dose then to
make electronic device more resistant to the effects of total ionizing dose. Two
approaches are involved in this research to mitigate damages of total ionizing dose: (1)
component selection, which is to select regular commercial components with high
radiation resistance for the give total dose limit; and (2) radiation shielding protection,
which is to use shielding materials for the reduction of total dose to be less than the given
level. The former is discussed in this Chapter and the latter will be explained in the next
Chapter.
Component selection is a significant step in the design phase of COTS-based radiationtolerant systems. This Chapter starts with the investigation of radiation-tolerances of
various regular COTS components are investigated. Based on the result of the
investigation, the total dose limit in this work is defined as 20 K Rad (Si) in this work.
Subsequently, the principle of component selection is given. Then, a method is proposed
to assess radiation resistance through using a radiation degradation factor. Finally, a
number of component candidates for the implementation of the proposed wireless
monitoring system are given.

4.1 The Investigation of Radiation-Tolerance for COTS
Components
4.1.1

Radiation Damages Thresholds on Electronics

Selecting COTS components with high radiation resistances is the significant step to
achieve a radiation-tolerant system. Therefore, the understanding of radiation effects on
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these devices and technologies and the investigation of their radiation-tolerances are vital
in the design of the radiation-tolerant system. Radiation damages thresholds on
electronics are summarized in Table 4-1 (Houssay, 2000).
Table 4-1: Radiation damages thresholds on electronics
Device

Digital IC

Analog IC

Diode

Transistor

Type/Comments

Threshold level (Gy)

Bipolar logic
JFET, MESFET logic
MOSFET logic

100-106
105
50-500

Microprocessor
Memory

10-500
50-5.103

EPROM
Bipolar linear circuit
MOS linear circuit
Operational amplifiers and comparators
Voltage regulator
Analog-to-digital converter
Sample and hold
Multiplexer

10-200
10-104
10-100
50-106
103-106
100-104
103
50-103

Timer
Rectifying diode
Switching diode
Zener and avalanche diode
Schottky diode
Microwave diode
Varactor diode
Junction field effect transistor
MESFET

100
103
105
105-106
106
106
105
106
106

MOSFET
Photodiode
Phototransistor
Optoelectronic Light emitting diode
Opto-coupler
Laser diode
Vacuum tube

100
106
10-104
106
103-106
100-104
106
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Table 4-1 Continued
Device
Crystal

Resistors

Capacitor

Insulator

Type/Comments

Threshold level (Gy)

Synthetic quartz crystal
Natural quartz
Precision wire-wound ceramic bobbin
Metal film
Precision wire-wound epoxy bobbin, carbon film
Other film
Composition
Oxide film

104
100
106-1010
105-109
104-107
104-107
103-105
10-104

Glass
Paper

105-108
105

Mica
Ceramic
Tantalum
Polyester
Polycarbonate
Electrolyte
Depends on the hardness of the former and the
insulator materials

104-107
104-108
103-105
103-107
102
102

Cables

Connector

Relay

4.1.2

Polystyrene – dose to produce 25% damage
Polyethylene – dose to produce 25% damage
Duroc ceramic – dose to produce 25% damage
Melamine plastic
Switch based, asbestos filled phenolformald
Switch based, unfilled phenolformald

10-106
at least 106
6*107
9*105
3*106
3*106
1*107
1*105

The Definition of Total Dose Limit

According to radiation damage thresholds on electronics summarized in Table 4-1,
semiconductor devices are more sensitive to ionizing radiation than other electronic
devices. Radiation-tolerance by a family of regular commercial semiconductor
components is shown in Figure 4-1, which can also be used as a reference in the
component selection.
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No degradation

20 K Rad (Si)

Minor damage

Major damage

Linear ICs (Si-MOS)
Digital ICs (Si-MOS)
MOSFET transistors
Digital ICs (Si-CMOS)
Digital ICs (SOS/SOI)
Power transistors (bipolar)
Linear ICs (Si-bipolar)
Digital ICs (Si-bipolar)
Bipolar transistors
Signal diodes
Reference diodes
JFET transistors
Linear ICs (GaAs)
Digital ICs (GaAs)

1

10

100

1000

1000
0

100000

1000000

Total dose (Gy)

Figure 4-1: Radiation tolerance by a family of COTS components (Houssay, 2000)
According to radiation damages thresholds in Table 4-1 and radiation tolerance in Figure
4-1, as well as radiation test data in the literature (Boutte et al., 2013; Cochran et al.,
2008; Cochran et al., 2006), most semiconductor components will experience device
degradation and radiation damages when the total dose is more than 20 K Rad (Si) (1 Gy
= 100 Rad (Si)) (Messenger and Ash, 1991). Therefore, the total dose limit is defined as
20 K Rad (Si) in this work. The radiation-resistances of selected candidate components
should be more than this total dose limit.

4.2 The Method of Component Selection
4.2.1

The Principle of Component Selection

Referring to radiation test data from the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the
principles of component selection in this work are listed as follows:
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•

To implement redundant channels and their spares with diversity semiconductor
technologies, e.g., One channel uses bipolar components, second channel uses
CMOS components, and third channel uses hybrid components;

•

To select semiconductor component with higher radiation resistance by the
calculation of its radiation degradation factor based on radiation test data, the
selected component should work normally under the condition of total dose 20 K
Rad (Si);

•

To improve the radiation resistance of each channel by the assessment of
reliability under the given radiation conditions.

4.2.2

The Assessment Method of Component Selection

To take radiation effects in consideration in system reliability analysis, a new method for
electronic systems has been developed (Lauridsen et al., 1996a; Lauridsen et al., 1996b).
This method uses radiation degradation factors(∆), instead of the usual failure rate data
of an item in the reliability model, as input to describe the radiation response of this item
under a total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 , which will lie in the interval [0, 1] and can be defined as
follows:
 = min

 (P

0

− Pt ) / (P0 − Pf

) , 1.

(4-1)

A detailed description of the radiation degradation factor can be found in Lauridsen et al.,
1996b.
(P0 − Pt ) / (P0 − Pf

=
0

1


)

for P0  Pt  Pf or P0  Pt  Pf
for Pt  P0  Pf or Pt  P0  Pf .
for P0  Pf  Pt or P0  Pf  Pt

(4-2)

Previous research (Lauridsen, et al., 1996a; Lauridsen, et al., 1996b) has derived the
parameter values of radiation degradation from real radiation test data; with radiation
degradation functions which are used to describe how the material and/or components
change their properties under given radiation conditions. Radiation degradation functions

72

are separated into three categories in (Lauridsen, et al., 1996b), as shown in Figure 4-2
(Lauridsen, et al., 1996b).
(1) Piece-wise linear radiation degradation function, with logarithmic dose values and
linear parameter values;
(2) Linear radiation degradation function in the entire range of exposure; and
(3) Constant radiation degradation function. The value 1 is up to 𝐷𝑓 , and the value 0
is assumed to fail abruptly at the threshold dose.
Parameter value

f: “at failure”
t: “at time t”

P0
Pt

Pf
log (Dose)
Dt

0

Df

(a) Piece-wise linear radiation degradation function
Parameter value
P0

f: “at failure”
t: “at time t”

Pt
Pf
log (Dose)
0

Dt

(b)

Df

Linear curve in the entire range of exposure

Parameter value

f: “at failure”
t: “at time t”

P0

0
(c)

Dt

Df

log (Dose)

Simple radiation degradation function

Figure 4-2: Radiation degradation functions derived from Lauridsen, et al., 1996b
Due to the fact that semiconductor components may have a number (𝑛𝑝 ) of critical
parameters, in this study, the radiation degradation factor is defined as the mean value of
those degradation factors of all critical parameters, which can be described as follows.
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 min  (P
np

=

i =1

i0

)(

)

− Pit / Pi0 − Pi f , 1
np


.

(4-3)

4.3 Selected Candidate Components
The difficulty of the assessment lies in determining the degradation factors for
semiconductor devices. Most of radiation degradation factors under different radiation
doses in this study come from NASA Goddard Space Flight Center radiation test data,
which are available from online resources; others are derived from the existing literature
(Messenger and Ash, 1991; Houssay, 2000; Kulkami and Agarwal, 2003). Specifically,
𝑃𝑓 of some components are not easy to obtain from the NASA database and literature,
and are instead derived from specification limits of electronic parameters. Selected
candidate components for the proposed wireless monitoring system and their radiation
degradation factors for various total doses are summarized in Table 4-2.
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Table 4-2: The summary of selected candidate components and radiation
degradation factors
Device Type

Device

Δ10K

Δ20K

Δ50K

Δ100K

BJT

2N2222
LT1021
LT1009
MP5010
AD580
REF-10
AD780
TL431
LM117HVK
LP2951
UDS2983
CLC502
PA51M
LM108
LM136
MC35181
LM317
PA07M
OP43
AD544
AD713
MP3518
TL074
AD574

0.1940
0.0774
0.0642
0.0000
0.1510
0.1408
0.0039
0.0055
0.1639
0.1226
0.3607
0.0208
0.0409
0.2377
0.0098
0.0689
0.2970
0.1360
0.1409
0.1331
0.3271
0.0689
0.2402
0.0178

0.3201
0.1010
0.1099
0.0000
0.0181
0.3371
0.0229
0.0269
0.2916
0.1737
0.2557
0.0365
0.0770
0.3964
0.0186
0.1551
0.4120
0.0764
0.3128
0.3963
0.6739
0.1551
0.3267
0.0486

0.4267
0.2104
0.5158
0.0000
0.0087
0.3204
0.0246
0.0238
0.2933
0.3277
0.2472
0.0383
0.2989
0.6620
0.2431
0.3673
0.5294
0.1757
0.4047
0.4759
0.8221
0.3673
0.3742
0.0633

0.4591
0.3432
0.5786
0.0000
0.0094
0.3846
0.0209
0.0646
0.2464
0.5699
0.2541
0.0365
0.2168
0.6537
0.2593
0.5151
0.5568
0.2717
0.4182
0.5132
0.7451
0.5151
0.3250
0.0649

Voltage reference

OP amplifier

Analog-to-digital
converter

AD674

0.1735

0.1503

0.2741

0.3345

AD7885

0.0181

0.0229

0.0246

0.0209

E2PROM
FPGA

AD713
28C010
A1280

0.2265
0.0187
0.0023

0.3899
0.0465
0.0244

0.4286
0.1001
0.1341

0.3926
0.1179
0.1326

82C59
54AC02
54AC08

0.0638
0.0469
0.0133

0.0654
0.0494
0.0244

0.0985
0.0480
0.1850

0.1190
0.0724
0.2432

Microcontroller
Logic gate
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4.4 Summary
In this Chapter, radiation resistances of regular COTS components have been
investigated. The results have shown that semiconductor-based electronic devices are
more sensitive to ionizing radiation than that of other components. According to radiation
damage threshold on electronic and radiation test data in literature, the total dose limit is
defined as 20 K Rad (Si) in this work.
On the other hand, the principle of component selection is also given in this Chapter, as
well as the assessment method of radiation tolerance in the selecting of semiconductor
devices. Based on radiation test data in literature, a number of selected candidate
components and their radiation degradation factors are also presented. Many radiation
tests for simpler semiconductor devices have been performed in literature, such as BJT,
operator amplifier, analog-to-digital converter, voltage reference, logic gate, etc.
However, there have a limit number of test data for more complicate modern devices,
such as microcontroller, microprocessor, wireless transceiver, etc. More investigations of
radiation test for those modern devices need be investigated in the future.
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Chapter 5

5

Design Part II: Multi-Layer Radiation Shielding
Protection

As mentioned in Chapter 4, it is necessary and also important to find a way to reduce the
cumulative total dose to be less than 20 K Rad (Si). Otherwise, COTS-based electronic
systems cannot survive for a period of long time when the cumulative total dose is1 M
Rad (Si). As studied in the literature, shielding protection is an effective solution to
mitigate radiation damages, and to increase the reliability and the lifespan of electronic
systems. It is therefore considered as a solution to reduce the total dose in this work.
This Chapter starts with potential shielding materials to mitigate damages of total dose
and related problem statement. Then, the design of a multi-layer shielding protection is
presented in detail. A method to calculate the required shielding thickness according to
the given radiation condition is also covered. Finally, a multi-layer radiation shielding
protection is designed with several different solutions for the application of wireless
monitoring in nuclear power plants.

5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Background
As previously mentioned in Section 4.1.2, the objective of a radiation shielding
protection is to decrease the cumulative total dose to be less than 20 K Rad (Si) from the
given cumulative dose (1 M Rad (Si)), so as to avoid common-mode damages for
redundant systems. Therefore, the cumulative total dose measured after the shielding
protection must be less than 20 K Rad (Si). Because the selected electronic devices in the
design can work in when the cumulative total dose is from 0 K Rad (Si) to 20 K Rad (Si),
presented in Figure 5-1.
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Figure 5-1: Reduction of total radiation dose by shielding protection
There are several factors that can influence the selection and the use of shielding
materials, such as attenuation effectiveness, strength, resistance to damage, thermal
properties, and cost, etc. The primary factors include:
•

Energy level of the radiation source;

•

Maximum allowable dose rate;

•

Geometrical relationships between the radiation source and the position of the
device;

•

Distance from the source to the device;

Characteristics of different shielding materials and particle types are summarized in
Table 5-1.
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Table 5-1: Characteristics of particles and effective shielding layer
Radiation particles

Characterizes

Comments

Material density is the important
parameter to block alpha and beta,
and thickness is less of concern.

A half-inch plastic can
shield against alpha
particles, but lead is
ineffective to block alpha.

Gamma and x-ray

High-density materials are more
effective to reduce intensity of
radiation.

Lead is particularly
effective to block gamma
and x-ray.

Neutron

Neutron shielding should be
incorporated both high and low
atomic number elements.

Lead is ineffective to block
neutron.

Alpha and Beta

A great variety of materials have been investigated for radiation shielding purpose to
protect electronics in the literature, such as alloys, concrete, aluminum, copper, lead, and
tungsten, iron, hydrogen, and boron, etc. (Gencel et al., 2011; Kharita et al., 2008; Korkut
et al., 2010; Yilmaz et al., 2011, Akkurt et al., 2010; Damla et al., 2010; Kharita et al.,
2008; Kharita et al., 2011; Kurudirek et al., 2009, Abdao, 2002, Mangeret et al., 1996,
Singh and Badiger, 2014, Okuno, 2005, Calzada et al., 2011, Kurudirek, 2014; Zeynali et
al., 2012). Since the shielding characteristics of those materials are different. A parameter
known as Half-value thickness (HVT) is used to express the thickness of the material at
which the intensity of radiation is reduced by one half as compared to the entry surface
(Yilmaz et al., 2011).

5.1.2 Problem Statement
For a complicated radiation environment (alpha particles, beta particles, gamma rays, xrays, and neutron particles) after a severe accident in a nuclear power plant, the objective
of shielding protection cannot be achieved by using only one shielding material. Hence, a
radiation shielding protection with different materials has to be used to protect commonmode damages of COTS-based electronic components are used in the radiation-tolerant
systems. On the other hand, for the portability of the wireless system, the size and weight
of the shielding protection are also limited.

79

Key issues to deal with radiation shielding protection for COTS-based systems can be
summarized as follows:
(1) To design a shielding protection to reduce the intensity of Alpha, Beta, and
Gamma radiation simultaneously;
(2) To minimize common-mode damages in redundant systems; and
(3) To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed multi-layer shielding protection
under different radiation environments.

5.2 The Design of Multi-Layer Radiation Protection
In this work, the framework of shielding design is shown in Figure 5-2. Firstly, design
specifications are obtained according to the considered radiation conditions and the
design objectives of radiation-tolerance. Subsequently, the architecture of the multi-layer
protection is presented. Then, the materials are selected based on the design objectives.
The size and thickness are then calculated. Finally, simulations are carried out to validate
the effectiveness of the design for radiation particles at different energy levels.
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Figure 5-2: Design framework for multi-layer radiation protection
To enhance the radiation tolerance, the proposed architecture for electronic systems
includes triple module redundant channels with spare units. The entire system is further
protected by a multi-layer of radiation shielding as illustrated in Figure 5-3 to increase the
radiation tolerance while avoiding the common-mode damage. The physical circuit board
configuration is shown in Figure 5-3 (a). The three layers of shielding protection are
illustrated in Figure 5-3 (a) (b) and (c), respectively. The first layer tightly encloses the
circuit boards, while the second layer allows the circuit boards to be embedded in a leadblock. Finally, third layers encapsulate the entire system. Different materials used in each
layer are determined by the type and the radiation degradation factors of semiconductor
devices on these circuit boards.
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A3

A2
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S2
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A2

(a) Electronic circuit boards

S2
A3

S1
(b) The first layer wrapping
around the circuit board

(c) The second layer embeds
circuits into protection
block

(d) The third layer encapsulates
the entire system

Figure 5-3: The layout of the multi-layer shielding protection.
This radiation shielding has several unique advantages:
•

It is able to reduce the total dose to a tolerable level that the circuit components
can safely operate under the given radiation condition;

•

It reduces the likelihood of common-mode damages because different shielding
materials, shielding thickness, positioning angle, and placement locations are
used. These approaches will have different effects on the radiation exposure to the
electronic systems in six different irradiation directions (See installation of the
circuit boards with different angles in Figure 5-3 (a));

•

It allows one to select different shielding materials for different radiation
particles;
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•

It is possible to custom design by selecting specific shielding materials for the
first layer with consideration of the characteristics of the semiconductor materials
in a specific channel.

5.3 Calculation of Shielding Thickness in Multi-Layer
Radiation Protection
Considering gamma (γ) ray is more difficult to block than alpha (α) and beta (β) particles.
As a worst case scenario, only gamma radiation is considered as the radiation source in
the evaluation of the shielding protection.

5.3.1 Attenuation of Gamma Radiation
When a gamma ray passes through a material under conditions of a narrow geometry, as
shown in Figure 5-4 (Gollnick, 2011), no photons are scattered. This is idealistic and
without collimation or at a longer distance. Under this condition, a straight-line
relationship between the logarithm of the intensity and the thickness of the shielding can
be established as follows (Gollnick, 2011).
I = I 0 e − ud .

Source

Collimator

Absorber

(5-1)

Collimator
Electronic board

Figure 5-4: An attenuation of gamma radiation under conditions of narrow
geometry (Gollnick, 2011)
The linear attenuation coefficient (u) is the probability per unit thickness that particles
interact with the material. This value is dependent upon the atomic number Z of the
material and its density (p). This relation can also be described through a linear
attenuation coefficient as follows (Yilmaz et al., 2011).
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I = I 0 e − (u / p )( pd ) .

(5-2)

However, under a broad geometry condition, as shown in Figure 5-5 (Gollnick, 2011), all
scattered photons are assumed to reach the detector (or circuits in our case). This is also
unrealistic. The first method under a narrow geometry condition underestimates the dose
rate, while the second method under a broad geometry condition overestimates it
(Gollnick, 2011). To obtain a dose rate closer to reality, the shielding thickness can be
estimated by the use of a build-up factor (B), which is defined as the ratio of the intensity
of the radiation at any point in a beam to the intensity of the primary radiation only at that
point. It is a function of the total attenuation coefficient, the thickness of the shielding
material, and the energy of the gamma radiation (Yilmaz et al., 2011; Suteau and Chiron,
2005). Under this condition, only some of the scattered photons can reach the device,
which is closer to a real situation, Eq. (5-2) can, therefore, be estimated by Eq. (5-3)
(Gollnick, 2011).
I = B(ud , E )  I 0  e − (ul / p )( pd ) .

(5-3)

Electronic Board

Source
Absorber

Figure 5-5: Gamma radiation attenuation under conditions of broad beam geometry
(Gollnick, 2011)
Build-up factors have been calculated for different levels of gamma energies and for
various shielding materials, which can be found in (ANSI/ANS, 1991).

5.3.2 Calculation of the Shielding Thickness
As previously discussed, for a given radiation source, a given radiation dose rate, and a
known shielding material, based on Eq. (5-1) to Eq. (5-3), the required shielding
thickness under a broad geometry can be calculated as follows:
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I
d = ln  B  0  u .
I 


(5-4)

According to Eq. (5-4), various shielding materials can be selected and their performance
compared, the designed shielding thickness can also be evaluated to achieve the design
objective, of reducing the total dose to a level less than 20 K Rad (Si).

5.4 Case Study: Design of Shielding Protection for
Application to a Wireless Monitoring System in Nuclear
Power Plants
5.4.1 Development of Radiation Shielding Protection for the
Proposed WPAMS
As illustrated in Figure 5-3, with different shielding materials used in different layers,
shielding thickness, radiation angle, and installation locations, all have different effects
on the radiation exposure experienced by electronic devices in the six identified areas, as
shown in Figure 5-3(a) (𝐴1 − 𝐴3 , 𝑆1 − 𝑆3 ). Taking Co-60 as a gamma radiation source,
and considering radiation rates in Fukushima accident, the objectives of the shielding
protections can be summarized as follows:
•

Under the condition with dose rate 70 Sv/h, for a 24h period, the highest total
dose in six areas should be less than 2.6 K Rad (Si).

•

Under the condition with dose rate 530 Sv/h, for a 24h period, the highest total
dose in six areas should be less than 20 K Rad (Si);

•

Under the condition with dose rate 1350 Sv/h, for a 24h period, the highest total
dose in six areas should be less than 50 K Rad (Si);

•

Under the condition with dose rate 2700 Sv/h, for a 24h period, the highest total
dose in six areas should be less than 100 K Rad (Si);

Theoretically, all materials can be used for radiation shielding if thick enough. The
choice of the shielding material is dependent on many factors: desired attenuated
radiation levels, effectiveness of heat dissipation, resistance to radiation damage, required
thickness and weight, multiple use considerations, uniformity of shielding capability,
permanence of shielding and availability (Yilmaz et al., 2011). According to the design
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specifications and radiation given in Eq. (5-1) to Eq. (5-4), those designs for the proposed
multi-layer radiation shieling have been investigated. The details are described in the next
following Sections.
Design #1 is to use copper, lead, and tungsten. Its detailed parameters can be determinate
as follows theory calculation:
•

The material in the first shielding layer is tungsten, with the diameter being 4cm,
and the thickness is chosen to be 1cm.

•

The material in the second shielding layer is lead, with the size being 24cm X
24cm X 18cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 6cm; and

•

The material in the third shielding layer is copper, with the size being 26cm X
26cm X 20cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 1cm;

Design #2 is constructed with aluminum, iron, and lead. The detailed parameters can be
determinate as follows theory calculation:
•

The material in the first shielding is lead, with the diameter being 4.2cm, and the
thickness is chosen to be 1.2cm.

•

The material in the second shielding layer is Iron, with the size being 38.6cm X
38.6cm X 18cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 13cm; and

•

The material in the third shielding layer is aluminum, with the size being 42.2cm
X 42.2cm X 21.6cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 1.8cm;

Design #3 is constructed with lead glass, lead, and tungsten. Its detailed parameters can
be determinate as follows theory calculation:
•

The material in the first shielding layer is lead, with the size diameter being 4cm,
and the thickness is chosen to be 1cm.

•

The material in the second shielding layer is iron, with the size being 24cm X
24cm X 18cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 6cm; and

•

The material in the third shielding layer is aluminum, with the size being 25.4cm
X 25.4cm X 19.4cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 0.7cm;
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The parameters of these three designs are summarized in Table 4-4. Their performance
evaluations are given in next Section.
Table 5-2: Summary of the Parameters of radiation shielding protection for
different designs
Design
Solutions

Design #1

Design #2

Design #3

Layers

Material

Size

Thickness

First layer

Tungsten

4 cm

1 cm

Lead

24 cm X 24 cm X 18 cm

6 cm

Third layer

Copper

26 cm X 26 cm X 20 cm

1 cm

First layer

Lead

4.2 cm

1.2 cm

Second layer

Iron

38.6 cm X 38.6 cm X 18 cm

13 cm

Third layer

Aluminum

42.6 cm X 42.6 cm X 19.6 cm

1.8 cm

First layer

Tungsten

4 cm

1 cm

Lead

24 cm X 24 cm X 18 cm

6 cm

Lead glass

25.4 cm X 25.4 cm X 19.4cm

0.7 cm

Second layer

Second layer
Third layer

5.4.2 Performance Evaluation
The shielding performance of the above three designs has been evaluated by a program
RadPro Calculator (Rad Pro Calculator, 2018). RadPro Calculator provides an effective
tool for calculating the radiation dose rate and layers of protections. This program has
been widely used among radiation safety officers, health physics technicians (HP) and
other professionals in radiation physics and radiological engineering. Many researches
have also used RadPro Calculator for various academic and engineering applications
(Brugger et al., 2014; Prelas et al., 2016). With regard to various dose rates, the
performance evaluation is performed in RadPro Calculator. The results are summarized
in Table 5-3.
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Table 5-3: The performance evaluation for three shielding solutions (Sv/h)
Design Solutions

Initial dose rate

Layer 1

Layer 2

Layer 3

72

45

2

1.1

530

345

14.5

8

1350

900

38

21

2700

1800

75

41.5

72

55.5

1.8

1.1

530

410

13

8

1350

1040

33

20

2700

2090

65

40

72

46

2

1.1

530

340

14.5

8

1350

900

38

21

2700

1800

75

41.5

Design #1

Design #2

Design #3

Considering the highest dose rate in the Fukushima accident, being 530 Sv/h, the dose
rates within the shielded area are reduced to 8 Sv/h. Since the survival lifespan is 24
hours, the total dose after three shielding layer are 194 Sv (19.4 K Rad(Si)). Therefore,
all three designs satisfy the design specifications. On the other hand, the size of design #3
is the smallest form factor and design #2 is the biggest. However, the cost of design #3 is
the highest. Moreover, lead glass has the similar shielding characterize with lead.
Therefore, design #2 is selected as the shielding protection configuration in this work.

5.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter, based on the characteristics of various shielding materials, a multi-layer
shielding protection is proposed to reduce the total dose to a safe level for electronics. A
method to calculate the required shielding thickness is also presented. Three solutions
have been considered to achieve the design requirements in this work. Based on the
results of simulation, all three can be reduce the total dose to be less than 20 K Rad (Si)
from the given radiation condition (1 M Rad (Si)). Considering the size, the weight, the
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cost, and the shielding performance, the design #2 (Copper + Lead + Tungsten) is the
best one and it is therefore selected in this work.
It is important to point out that this work just focuses on the performance analysis for
blocking the total dose, for other types of radiations with various energy levels, more
solutions are needed.
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Chapter 6

6

Design Part III: Radiation-Tolerant Architecture

In Chapter 3, simulation studies of photocurrent responses have indicated that the
photocurrents of the ideal p-n diode under different levels of ionizing radiations can be
reduced dramatically if the bias voltage on the junction can be promptly reduced to zero.
Hence, if the power on the junction can be removed quickly in an event of radiation
exposure, a semiconductor device might not be damaged permanently by the accumulated
photocurrent. This observation leads to the development of a new radiation-tolerant
architecture and associated protection strategies.
This Chapter starts with the potential solution techniques and related problem statement.
Subsequently, some defense techniques are proposed for single event effects mitigation.
Then, a radiation-tolerant architecture by using fault-tolerant techniques is developed to
perform those functions and techniques. Based on this architecture, system-level design
and analysis have been carried out. Detailed radiation protection techniques and diversity
against the common-mode failure, online fault diagnosis scheme and prognostic
algorithm to detect, identify, and prognosticate potential radiation-induced faults, have
been presented. Finally, to validate the correctness of the architecture and the system
logic, a number of injection experiments are performed in a developed hardware
emulation bench.

6.1 Introduction
6.1.1

Potential Solution Techniques

To mitigate damages caused by single event effects, some existing designs utilize three
redundant duplicates for critical circuits and subsystems followed by a majority voter to
select the most desirable output. Others rely on extra added circuits to detect faults. These
techniques have been used in a range of situations, from low-level structures, to complex
circuits, hardware modules, and even multi-core architecture (Gao et al., 2015; Fenton et
al., 2001; Kim et al., 2010; Cuenca-Asensi et al., 2011; Sterpone et al., 2013; Voilante et
al., 2011; Straka et al., 2013; Abate et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2011). A drawback of those
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techniques is that additional measurement/test units and/or majority voters have to be
employed to detect and diagnose faults caused by radiation. The fact of the matter is that
these additional circuits themselves are also subject to the same radiation damage.
Moreover, most of existing fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) methods for electronic
systems mainly focus on common hardware or software faults in redundant systems, not
on cross-board radiation damages. For example, a fault tolerant platform able to function
in harsh space environments is developed in (Sterpone et al., 2013) for using in satellite
payload processing. Its main weakness is that the inter-module communication and
control buses are not independent of each other. The whole system will thus encounter
failure when just one module has faults on the buses. In the architecture proposed in
(Violante et al., 2011), the problem is the control logic unit which is also sensitive to
radiation particles.
It is important to point out that, unlike random hardware failures, radiation-induced
damages can affect multiple redundant channels causing functional failure of the whole
system. Special techniques have to be developed to deal with such unique situation
regarding common-mode failures.

6.1.2

Problem Statement

As discussed in the previous Sections, to design and build a rad-hardened system using
only COTS components, it is imperative to adopt radiation-tolerant architectures with
independent and diversified redundancies, online fault-detection and prognostic scheme,
equipped with proactive rapid power-off for recovery, as well as command-mode damage
avoidance. Within this framework, the following specific goals are investigated:
(1) To design completely independent redundant architecture without additional
detection units and/or hardware voters.
(2) To avoid common-mode damage in redundant channels.
(3) To design the mechanisms of online fault detection, real time preventive remedial
actions, and rapid power loss.
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In order to address these issues, this work develops a radiation-tolerant architecture with
a decision-making unit to achieve a high level of radiation tolerance and to prolong the
lifespan of COTS-based systems in high level radiation environments.

6.2 Techniques for Preventing Single Event Effects
6.2.1

Redundancy

One way to ensure continued operation of the system in the event of potential radiation
damages, the proposed system makes use of redundancy to ensure that not all channels
fail at the same time. It should have the capacity to detect and to prognosticate faults and
errors in a timely manner, and then locate faults and errors in order to make a
reconfiguration decision to deal with device power loss. Furthermore, in the proposed
redundant architecture, each redundant channel has to be completely independent and
there must have no additional measurement/test units or hardware majority voters.
In general, a sender in a modern digital communication system includes several
subsystems: input transducer, source encoder, channel encoder, modulator, and
transmitter. In this work, a function of decision making is inserted to perform the selfdiagnostic function, which is integrated in existing hardware and therefore does not need
any additional hardware. Each redundant channel can be divided into three layers: the
input layer, the decision layer, and the output layer. The input layer’s job is to collect the
information coming from input sensors, source encoders, and channel encoders.
Subsequently, fault detection, fault diagnosis, prognostic assessment, and reconfiguration
suggestions, are accomplished in the decision layer. The output layer then transmits
and/or receives data with the outsider, which consists of a digital modulator and
transceiver. All functions of the parameter measurement and the self-diagnostic are
accomplished inside each redundant channel, which does not need additional
measurement units to detect and diagnose faults.
To achieve these requirements, the proposed redundant system totally has six channels to
build an active triple modular redundant (TMR) system with their spares to replace the
active one in case of fault or failure. For the sake of analysis, the following definitions are
used to describe various channel states:
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Definition 1: the system consists of three active channels and three respective spaces.
A =  A1 , A2 , A3

(1  i  3) .

where 𝐴𝑖 represents the state of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ channel with 𝐴𝑖 = 1 and 0, respectively,
corresponding to its powered (active) state and non-power state (inactive).
S = S1 , S2 , S3

(1  i  3) .

where 𝑆𝑖 represents the state of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ spare channel with 𝑆𝑖 = 1 and 0, respectively,
corresponding to its powered (active) state and non-power state (inactive).
Definition 2: for channel 𝐴𝑖 and 𝑆𝑖 , their working conditions can be represented in the
following sets:





FAi = FA1 , FA2 , FA3 .

where 𝐹𝐴 𝑖 describes the state of 𝐴𝑖 channel. If 𝐴𝑖 is completely broken, then 𝐹𝐴 𝑖 = 1,
otherwise 𝐹𝐴 𝑖 = 0.





FSi = FS1 , FS 2 , FS3 .

where 𝐹𝑆 𝑖 describes the state of 𝑆𝑖 channel. If 𝑆𝑖 is completely broken, then 𝐹𝑆 𝑖 = 1,
otherwise 𝐹𝑆 𝑖 = 0.

6.2.2

Hardware Switch

With regard to the reconfigurator unit, its radiation resistance has to be higher than that of
all redundant channels. Otherwise, it will be a major weakness of the whole system. In
this work, two configurator are applied to control the power supply of each channel (the
power reconfigurator), as well as the location of internal buses (the bus reconfigurator),
which are determined by the reconfigure suggestions (𝑅𝑆𝑖 & 𝑅𝑀𝑖 ). The power
reconfigurator is to guarantee that the system only ever has three channels working
simultaneously, which is critical for the whole system (see Figure 6-1 (a)).The bus
reconfigurator, illustrated in Figure 6-1 (b), serves as the independent communication
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mechanism. This way, the bus will not affect other channels when one channel fails. In
addition, 𝑉𝑖𝑛_1 , 𝑉𝑖𝑛_2 , 𝑉𝑖𝑛_3 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑖𝑛_𝑟 are the power inputs to the redundant channels and
relays, and 𝑉𝐴𝑖 , 𝑉𝑆𝑖 are the power supplies for the redundant (TMR) core (𝐴𝑖 ) and spare
units (𝑆𝑖 ), which are controlled by the reconfigure commands (𝑅𝑆𝑖 & 𝑅𝑀𝑖 ). In addition,
the system has independent and diversified buses: internal bus (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑠), to exchange
information with other channels; and IO bus (𝐼𝑂𝑏𝑢𝑠), to accomplish the selection of
primary channels.
VA1
Vin_1

VS1
RS1

Vin_r

VS2
RM2

Vin_2

VA2
VS3

VS2
RS2

Vin_r

RM3

Vin_3

VA3
VS1

VS3
RS3

Vin_r

RM1
(a)
Combus

IO bus

CombusAi/Si

VAi/VSi

IOAi/Si
GND

VAi/VSi
GND

(b)

Figure 6-1: The schematic of reconfigurator (a) power reconfigurator (b) bus
reconfigurator
To ensure reliable operation, both Bus Reconfigurator and Power Reconfigurator units
should have higher level of radiation resistance than the rest of electronic components in
the system. For this reason, both units are designed using passive devices only, such as
resistors (tolerant up to 104-1010 Gy), capacitors (tolerant up to 104-108 Gy), and nonelectronic relays (tolerant up to 105-107 Gy) (Houssay, 2000; Boutte, et al., 2013;
Cochran, et al., 2008; Cochran, et al., 2006). The reconfigurator therefore can at least
withstand a high level of radiation (104 Gy).
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6.2.3

Diversity Techniques

One of the weaknesses for redundant systems is their vulnerabilities with respect to
common-mode failures. To ensure that the system is well protected, the following
diversification strategies are chosen:
1) Radiation protection
Radiation shielding is an effective solution to mitigate the effects of radiation, and to
increase the reliability and lifespan of the electronic system. The efficiency and
functional quality of a particular electronic system are determined by: the type of
radiation it is exposed to, the radiation resistance of its semiconductors, and the unique
properties of the shielding materials (Shultis and Faw, 2005). Many different solutions for
obtaining high levels of radiation resistance in radiation shielding have been applied for
the package and/or chips (Abdao, 2002; Mangeret et al., 1996; Calzada et al., 2011). This
work combines the proposed radiation-tolerant architecture with a structure of radiation
protection (illustrated in Figure 4-5) whose design increases the radiation tolerance while
avoiding common-mode damage. As illustrated in Figure 4-5, differences in shielding
material, shielding thickness, radiation angle, and radiation locations, all have different
effects on the radiation exposure experienced by electronic systems in the six identified
areas (𝐴1 − 𝐴3 , 𝑆1 − 𝑆3 ). The proposed architecture therefore offers the possibility of
reducing instances of common-mode damage. On the other hand, another objective of
this radiation protection is to ensure that the total radiation doses experienced by all six
areas should be less than a pre-specified level. Parameters of radiation protection are also
dependent on the given radiation condition.
2) Enforcing differences
Enforced differences are also considered for preventing common-mode failures in the
proposed architecture. Approaches used can be described as follows:
•

Use diversified semiconductor technologies (E1): Considering the following facts:
Bipolar devices can withstand a higher total dose; but they are particularly
sensitive to lower dose rates. On the other hand, MOS devices are sensitive to
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higher total doses and can also be robust to lower dose rates. Devices are chosen
to complement these unique properties to cover perceivable conditions.
•

Rely on diversified, but functionally equivalent, components (E2): Among
different channels, devices (mainly CPUs) rely on different technologies to
implement identical functions. In this case, a microcontroller, FPGA, and/or a
microprocessor are used, as they offer different tolerance to radiation.

•

Select the same component, but from different manufacturers (E3): Because
different manufacturing processes, such as semiconductor materials, component
size, etc., can realize the same functionalities for certain electronic components,
but with different level of radiation tolerance, it is beneficial to select components
of the same functionalities made by different manufacturers.

•

Use different tools for implementing different software and algorithms for the
same functionalities (E4): Due to memory utilization and storage locations, a same
software module developed using different programming languages and
environment may have different responses to radiation effects. In this case,
different programming environments have been used to develop modules for
different channels.

In summary, 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐴𝑗 (𝑖 = 1, 2, 3; 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) are built with diversified
hardware, diversified software, as well as different shielding protection. However, 𝐴𝑖 and
𝑆𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, 3) are built with the same hardware, but different software logics to achieve
the same functionalities. Different shielding protection is used in second layer also. Thus,
the protection measures used in different channels can be summarized as follows:

 Ai & A j (i  j ) : E1 , E2 , E3 , E4

 Ai & S j (i  j ) : E1 , E2 , E3 , E4

Ai & S i : E4
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6.2.4

Fault Detection and Diagnosis

Even though all possible measures have been taken at the system design and component
selection processes, there is still no guarantee that the system will function trouble-free.
To further improve the reliability of the system, real-time fault detection and diagnosis
schemes are developed so that some remedial actions can be taken during the operation to
restore system performance, for example by a rapid power reset.
A hierarchical fault model, drawn according to electronic system abstraction levels, is
illustrated in Figure 6-2. Radiation disturbances and/or other disturbances will directly
affect the device level, after which the disturbances will be transmitted to the circuit and
system level (subsystem). Faults at the device level (L1) correspond to sensors and
semiconductor components; faults at the circuit level (L2) correspond to analog circuits,
digital circuits, and mix circuits; and faults at the system level (L3) correspond to
subsystems or functional modules.
Radiation
Other
disturbance disturbance
no
nr
Device Level
(L1)

Input
u

Output
Circuit Level
(L2)

System Level
(L3)

y

Figure 6-2: Hierarchical fault model for electronic systems
As previously discussed, the system should have the capacity to detect and prognosticate
faults and errors in a timely manner, and then locate faults and errors in order to make a
reconfiguration decision to deal with device power loss. The objective of fault detection
is to detect abnormal operating conditions of those levels under radioactive environments,
and to estimate the nature and extent of the damages. Three definitions are given below to
describe various states at device, circuit and subsystem levels:
Definition 3 (Device): An electronic system consists of a number (𝑛𝑑 ) of components.



D = d1 ,

, di ,

d nd

 (1  i  n ) .
d
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where 𝑑𝑖 represents the state of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ component with 𝑑𝑖 = 0 being operational and 1
being fault states, respectively.
Definition 4 (Circuit): An electronic system consists of a number (𝑛𝑐 ) of circuit modules.
Each module consists of a number of components.



C = c1 ,

,cj ,

cnc

 (1  j  n )
c

.

where 𝑐𝑗 represents the 𝑗𝑡ℎ circuit modules in the electronic system. Similar
representations are used to represent the operational and fault modes as in Definition 5 in
all subsequent definitions.
Definition 5 (Subsystem): An electronic system can be decomposed into a number (𝑛𝑠 ) of
subsystems. Each subsystem consists of several circuit modules.



S = s1 ,, s ns



s k (1  k  ns ) .

where 𝑠𝑘 represents the 𝑘𝑡ℎ subsystem.
Definition 6 (Functional State): For each circuit module and subsystem, two states can
be defined:
𝑋𝐶 , 𝑋𝑆 represent the state that temporary fault or recovered failure in the circuit blocks
and subsystems, with 𝑥 = 0 for operational and 1 for temporary fault or recovered failure,
respectively.
𝑌𝐶 , 𝑌𝑆 represent the state that permanently fails in the circuit blocks and subsystems, with
𝑦 = 0 for no failure and 1 for permanent failure, respectively.
For each circuit module, the following conditions can be defined for the operational state:



X c = xc1 ,, xcnc



xc j (1  j  nc ) .

If 𝑐𝑗 operates incorrectly, 𝑥𝑐 𝑗 = 1, otherwise 𝑥𝑐 𝑗 = 0.
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Yc = yc1 ,, ycnc



yc j (1  j  nc ) .

If 𝑐𝑗 is completely failed, 𝑦𝑐 𝑗 = 1, otherwise 𝑦𝑐 𝑗 = 0.
For each subsystem, the following state can be defined:



X s = xs1 ,, xsns



xsk (1  k  ns ) .

If 𝑠𝑘 operates incorrectly, 𝑥𝑠𝑘 = 1, otherwise 𝑥𝑠𝑘 = 0.



Ys = y s1 ,, y sns



y sk (1  k  ns ) .

If 𝑠𝑘 is completely failed, 𝑦𝑠𝑘 = 1, otherwise 𝑦𝑠𝑘 = 0.
Based on the above definitions, a fault hypothesis for malfunctions of circuit blocks and
subsystems can be formed in Eq. (6-1), where the goal is to integrate states of circuit
blocks and subsystems.
H = X ,Y  .

(6-1)

where 𝑋 is the summary of 𝑋𝐶 and 𝑋𝑆 , as well as 𝑌 is the summary of 𝑌𝐶 and 𝑌𝑆 .
A detection function reflects the credibility of 𝐻 as defined in Eq. (6-2). A smaller 𝐸(𝐻)
suggests a higher credibility of 𝐻. If the detection function is equal or greater than unity,
a reconfigure command should be issued.
nc

(

)

ns

(

)

E (H ) =  Wxc j xc j + W yc j yc j +  Wxsk x sk + W ysk y sk .
j

(6-2)

k

where 𝑤𝑥𝑐𝑗 , 𝑤𝑦𝑐𝑗 ,𝑤𝑥𝑠𝑘 , and 𝑤𝑦𝑠𝑘 are the weights of the discrepancy index. The range of
the weights is from 0.1 to 1. If 𝑤1 ≫ 𝑤2 , its means that the discrepancy index 𝑤1 is
much more important than 𝑤2 . The values of these weights are determined according to
the significance of circuit blocks and subsystems in electronic systems.
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6.2.5

Prognostic for Lifespan of Components

The objectives of prognosis protection are: (1) to predict the behavior of a circuit based
on the present measurements, and hence to estimate whether a module or a subsystem can
remain functional before complete failure occurs; and (2) to select the most appropriate
channels for the radiation environment and corresponding characteristics of the
diversified hardware. A hypothesis to predict malfunction of a device and a circuit block
can be defined as follows:
P =  p d , pc  .

(6-3)

where 𝑝𝑑 = {𝑝𝑑 1 , … , 𝑝𝑑 𝑛 } represents the state of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ device with 𝑝𝑑 𝑖 = 0 and 1,
𝑑

respectively, based on the prediction of its operational and fault states, and 𝑝𝑐 =
{𝑝𝑐 1 , … , 𝑝𝑐 𝑛 } represents the prediction of incorrect circuit operation. If 𝑐𝑗 is predicted to
𝑐

operate incorrectly, then 𝑝𝑐𝑗 = 1, otherwise 𝑝𝑐𝑗 = 0.
A prognostic function can be formed to reflect the prediction state of the credibility of 𝑃,
which can be defined in Eq. (6-4). A smaller 𝐸𝑛 (𝑃) suggests a higher credibility of 𝑃.
nd

nc

i

j

E n (P ) = Wd i p d i + Wc j pc j

(n = 1,2,3) .

(6-4)

where 𝑤𝑑𝑖 and 𝑤𝑐𝑗 are the weights of the discrepancy index of devices and circuit blocks.
A function can also be used to reflect whether a particular semiconductor technology for
a specific channel can work correctly in a given radiation environment.

Rn = f ( s, d )

(n = 1,2,3).

(6-5)

where 𝑠 is the information about the radiation environment; 𝑑 is the information on the
semiconductor technologies; and 𝑅𝑛 is the predicted channel selection. If channel n is
estimated to have no capacity to operate in the given environment for a specific
semiconductor technologies, 𝑅𝑛 = 1, otherwise 𝑅𝑛 = 0.
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Using the fault prognostic function, if 𝐸𝑛 (𝑃) is equal or greater than 1 or 𝑅𝑛 = 1, the
reconfiguration command should be issued by the decision-making unit.

6.3 Resulting System Architecture
6.3.1

Redundant-Tolerant Architecture

Based on previous studies on radiation damages to COTS components and potential
prevention techniques, a radiation-tolerant architecture with independent redundancy,
online fault-detection, real-time prognostic protection, rapid power off/ recovery, as well
as command-mode damage avoidance, is proposed as shown in Figure 6-3. The
architecture consists of an active triple modular redundancy (TMR) core (𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ),
with spare units (𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , 𝑆3 ), and a bus, as well as a power reconfigurator. In an event that
an active channel has malfunctioned, its corresponding spares will be reconfigured to
replace the failed channel or channels automatically. This architecture can prolong the
life for both devices and systems through independent built-in redundant channels, online
fault detection, real-time prognostic protection, and rapid power off/on recovery, as well
as reduction of modes for common-mode damages.
Input layer
A1
TMR
core

Output layer

Decision layer
Decision making

A2

Decision making

A3

Decision making

xi

Spares

yi
S1

Decision making

S2

Decision making

S3

Decision making

VA1
Vin
VS3
Bus reconfigurator

Power reconfigurator

Figure 6-3: The proposed radiation-tolerant architecture
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6.3.2

Justification
The mechanism of redundant system

1)

At any given time, there is only one channel from the input layer to the output layer
needed for the system to function normally. This channel is known as the primary
channel. The signal in this channel has to go through in the decision layer with voting
functions. The other redundant channels are known as checkers. They can be selected by
the selection mechanism through the IO bus. In fact, the states of the channels can change
dynamically if a fault occurs in the primary channel. For internal information exchange
among the primary channel and its checkers, the decision-making unit uses two types of
buses: an internal bus for information exchange with other channels; and an IO bus for
selection of the primary channel. All buses operate independently. A fault on one channel
does not affect the operation of another channel. The flowchart of master selection
mechanism is illustrated in Figure 6-4.
Start

I am master
(CheckerTTLi = 3)

I am checker
(MasterTTL = 3)
Loop1

CheckerTTLi --

MasterTTL --

(𝑇𝑚 )

I will be
master

CheckerTTLi =
0?

Other masters
alive?

Checker[i] is
alive?

High priority?

CheckerTTLi = 3

Loop2 (𝑇𝑐 )

MasterTTL = 0?

Master is alive?
MasterTTL = 3

Y

Other
masters?

High priority?

Figure 6-4: The flowchart of master selection mechanism
The composition of the decision-making unit is illustrated in Figure 6-5. The information
is transmitted over its internal bus to fault detection, fault diagnosis, and fault prognostic
schemes to generate suitable reconfiguration decisions. The decision will include rapid
power-off to the failed channels. If a channel and its spare have both failed, a failure

102

signal 𝑅𝑀𝑖 is registered. This channel will be permanently removed from the system. As
mentioned early, diversity in components selection has been extensively used to avoid
simultaneous failures of all three channels in this system.

Ini
Input
layer

Prognostic
assessment

Ri
Ei(P)

Encoder
Fault
detection

Si

Decision
logic

RSi/RMi

Ei(H)Fault
diagnosis

Self-test
IO bus
IO checking
Checking
algorithm

Internal bus
Voter

Douti

Decision making unit

Figure 6-5: The block diagram of the decision making unit
In particularly, 𝑅𝑀𝑖 are only provided by the primary channel under two cases: both a
channel and its spare are in a state of failure; or neither are suitable to work at a given
radiation level. In addition, it is assumed that cases of all three channels simultaneously
encountering either faults or failure can be avoided by using a diversity of techniques. As
such, this scenario is not considered in this work.
The operating principle of the proposed system works as follows: when one channel fails
to operate, which will be detected by the self-diagnosis and/or the function externaldiagnosis units, the decision-making units in another channel will generate some
reconfiguration recommendations to cut off the power in a timely manner and its spare
channel will be powered up to form a new TMR core.
2)

Functionalities and operation of the decision logic unit

The objective of the decision logic unit is to integrate the functions of fault diagnosis and
component life-span prognostics to generate potential reconfiguration signals ( 𝑅𝑆𝑖
and 𝑅𝑀𝑖 ). A flowchart for this unit is illustrated in Figure 6-6. Specifically, all channels
have the ability to detect, diagnose, and configure other channels in the TMR core until
all channels have failed.
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Figure 6-6: The flowchart of the decision making in TMRi
If the semiconductor technology used in one channel (𝐴𝑖 ) has no capacity to operate
correctly in the given radiation environment ( 𝑅𝑖 = 0), or a channel (𝐴𝑖 ) and its spare (𝑆𝑖 )
are both failed, this channel and its spare will be power-off. Otherwise, only one of them
is power-on. The active state of all channels ( 𝐴𝑖 and 𝑆𝑖 ) can be described in Eq. (6-6).

 Si = 0 & Ai = 0 ,

Si = Ai ,



if FAi = 1& FSi = 1, or Ri = 1
otherwise

.

(6-6)

The detailed logics of the reconfiguration commands are determined by the outputs of the
fault diagnosis and prognosis schemes, which are illustrated in Eq. (6-7) and Eq. (6-8).
The signal 𝑅𝑆 is used to switch the power supply between the active channel and its
spare; and the signal 𝑅𝑀 is used to remove the power supply of one active channel and
that of its spare. If one of the detection function (𝐸𝑖 (𝐻)), prognostic function (𝐸𝑖 (𝑃)),
and the predicted channel (𝑅𝑖 ) selection is set, reconfiguration commands will be issued.
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RSi = RSi

if Ei ( H )  1 or Ei ( P)  1& Ri = 0

(1  i  3) .

(6-7)

 RMi = 0 if R j = 1 or Rk = 1 (1  i, j , k  3, i  j  k )

.
 RMi = 0 if FAj = 1 and FSj = 1 (1  i, j  3, i  j )
 R = 1 otherwise
Mi


(6-8)

Signals for the reconfigurator suggestions are generated as a result of the decisionmaking unit in other channels, as illustrated in Table 6-1.
Table 6-1: The provider of the signals for reconfigurator suggestions
Reconfigurator signal

A1 & S1

RS1
RS2

✓

RS3

✓

RM1&RM2&RM3

6.3.3

A2 & S2

A3 & S3

✓

✓

Primary

✓
✓
✓

Analysis

In general, it is difficult to online detect radiation response of each semiconductor device
in an electronic system without additional measurement/testing units. In the developed
redundant system, the detection focuses on the detection from circuit- and system-level.
All circuit blocks and subsystems are monitored by external channel and/or itself to rapid
remove its power when it encounters radiation damage. Then, according to the output of
circuit blocks and subsystems, the damage of component can be analyzed. In a typical
digital communication system, a sender is usually conducted by variety semiconductor
component, which is listed in Column 2 of Table 6-2. The detailed radiation response of
each component in this work and related damage result on the subsystem is listed in
Column 3, 4, and 5 of Table 6-2, and its detection method is illustrated in Column 6.
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Table 6-2: The analysis of faults and detection mechanism
Function

Component
Voltage
reference

Radiation
effects
TID
SEU, SEL
TID

Input
Source

SEL
Bipolar OP

The logical switch on GPIO ports.

The output of GPIO port
will be nonfunctional.

External
detection

Microcontroller will be
nonfunctional

External
detection

Wireless transmitter will
not work.

Internal
detection

Wireless transmitter will
not work.

Internal
detection

Wireless transmitter will
be nonfunctional.

External
detection

SEU

SEL
SEFI

TID

(CPU)

&Decision

SEE on
GPIO

Making&
Digital
Modulator

TID
Logic gate
SEU,SEL

Transceiver

External
detection

Internal
detection

TID

Encoder

OPs work nonfunctional.
The output of the function
of input source will be
incorrect.

Flash will be
nonfunctional.

TID

controller

External
detection

SETs are high current transients, possibly
upset producing events; memory’s contents
are altered during the transient events.

Voltage
reference diode

Channel

The output voltage
decreases, OPs work
nonfunctional.

SET, SEL,
SEU, SEFI,
TID on
Flash

TID

Micro-

The degradation in current during irradiation.

Detection
mechanism

SEU, SEL,
SEFI on
SRAM

NPN BJT

A/D
converter

The degradation of Vz, within specification
for high dose rate
Short only for SEU, increasing with a latchup
current.
The degradation is depending on both the
manufacturer and the circuit configuration.

Damage response

To be susceptible to SET, positive SETs are
expected for positive supply voltage, both
input and supply voltages affect amplitude
and duration
The primary ionizing response of BJTs is the
degradation of the current gain β (𝐼𝑐 /𝐼𝑏 ),
particularly at the low dose-rates.
Increase of the reverse current and the
changes of the forward voltage.
Electronic parameters are higher under high
radiation dose, the part experiences functional
failure at high irradiation levels.
A number of least significant bits (LSBs) are
masked out with the condition of positive
analog input; the LET threshold for the
negative input is significantly higher.
The LET threshold for SEL is higher, no SEL
was observed in some radiation tests.
To cause every conversion to be in error until
they were reset by cycling power to the
device.
Parameters exceed the maximum
specification limit when the dose is more than
10 K Rad (Si).
A logic gate switch, voltage transients,
alteration of stored information, and
destructive effects.

SET

Source
Encoder

Radiation responses of component

Voltage
reference diode

TID

Varactor

TID

Wireless
transmitter

TDI

The degradation of electronical parameters
during high irradiation level; the part is
functional and stays within the specification
limit.

The output of the function
of input source will be
incorrect.
The AD’s reference
voltage will be incorrect.

External
detection
External
detection

The output of the
functions of source
encoder will be incorrect.

External
detection

Microcontroller will be
nonfunctional.

External
detection

SRAM will be
nonfunctional.

Internal
detection

A logic gate switch, destructive effects occur.
Increase of the reverse current and the
changes of the forward voltage.
Increase of the reverse current nut not of a
serious degree, and the forward-voltage drop
not essentially change.
The failure of functions.

As illustrated in Table 6-2, when radiation effects on semiconductor components happen,
the function of related circuit block and/or subsystem may not work or be nonfunctional.
Then, through the external detection and/or the internal detection of the nonfunctional of
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subsystems, semiconductor component can be online monitored. Subsequently, the
decision-making unit generates reconfiguration suggestions to rapid remove the power of
its channel and to power on its spares. The whole system will not work when all
redundant channel are damaged.

6.4 Performance Evaluation of the Developed System
Architecture
6.4.1
1)

Emulation of Radiation Damages
Radiation-induced damages considered in this work

As previously discussed, the emulation of radiation-induced failure is also a critical
element to evaluate the effectiveness and correctness of the design. This work combines
with two emulation methods to mimic radiation responses of semiconductor component:
circuit emulation, which is based on hardware-implemented fault injection, using external
circuits to mimic circuit responses under radioactive conditions; and logic emulation,
which is based on software-implemented fault injection, and uses injection commands to
forcibly control and/or stop system functions. According to the analysis listed in Table 62, the radiation failure modes concerned in this work are listed as follows.
(1) Total dose effects on bipolar devices and circuits, such as diode, BJT, OP
Amplifier;
(2) Total dose effects on MOS devices and circuits, such as MOSFET, A/D
converter, microcontroller, transceiver;
(3) Single event effects on MOSFET devices, such as SEB, SEGR;
(4) Single event effects on integrated circuits (ICs) (microcontroller, SRAM, Flash,
wireless transceiver, etc.), such as SEU, SET, SEL, SEFI.
2)

Hardware emulation bench

In the design phase of electronic systems for high level radiation environments,
evaluating the system’s weaknesses and effectiveness is necessary but also difficult.
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Generally, the evaluation can be accomplished by a physical radiation test, which uses
external perturbation sources, such as natural and accelerated particle radiation, laser
beams, pin forcing, etc.; such tests are very precise (Quinn et al., 2013). However,
physical radiation tests are not always suitable in the design phase due to their excessive
complexity and expense. Evaluation can also be accomplished by testing via a simulated
environment, which usually uses logic resources of the circuit or system to access internal
elements and insert the effect of a fault, according to the fault model (Quinn et al., 2013).
In this work, a hardware emulation bench is developed to evaluate the correctness of the
proposed architecture. The bench uses fault injection techniques to mimic radiation
damages on semiconductor devices. It combines with two emulation methods: logic
emulation (LE), which is based on software-implemented fault injection, and uses
injection commands to forcibly control and/or stop system functions; and circuit
emulation (CE), which is based on hardware-implemented fault injection, using external
circuits to mimic circuit responses under radioactive conditions. The architecture of this
emulation bench is illustrated in Figure 6-7.
Fault injection unit

Receiver
unit

Hardened system

Bus #1
Bus #2

Figure 6-7: The architecture of the developed hardware emulation bench
The developed hardware emulation bench includes four parts: a redundant wireless
device, a wireless gateway, emulation circuits, and a control tool. The emulation bench is
built with two communication buses: bus #1 (915MHz network) is used to
transmit/receive the normal communication data; and bus #2 (RS485) is used to
transmit/receive commands/reports for fault injection. This emulation bench is illustrated
in Appendices A.
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6.4.2

Actual Evaluation and Results

Variables (𝑅𝑖 , 𝐸𝑖 (𝑃), 𝐸𝑖 (𝐻)) under several different cases and related experimental
results (𝐴𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖 ) on the hardware emulation platform are listed in Table 6-3. Specifically,
other cases are not listed in the table due to their similarity to the listed cases. The
experimental results show that wireless channels can switch smoothly in several hundred
milliseconds when single faults and multi-faults are inserted; reconfiguration suggestions
are also correctly generated in the architecture’s decision-making unit. Therefore, the
proposed architecture can clearly be shown to work smoothly and the logics of fault
diagnosis, fault prognostic, and the logic of decision unit are correct and effective.
Table 6-3: Summary of variables logic and experimental results in hardware
emulation bench

The experimental results have shown that wireless channels can switch smoothly in
several hundred milliseconds (less than 500ms) when single- and multi-faults are
inserted; reconfiguration suggestions are also correctly generated in the architecture’s
decision-making unit. Therefore, the proposed architecture can clearly be shown to work
smoothly and the logics of fault diagnosis, fault prognostic, and decision unit are correct
and effective.
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6.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter, a radiation-tolerant architecture with a decision making unit is presented
to allow COTS-based electronic systems for highly radioactive environments through
independent redundancy, online fault detection, real-time preventive remedial actions,
and rapid power loss/recovery. To evaluate the proposed architecture, a wireless
communication system with redundant and diversified channels is implemented as a case
study; and a simulated fault injection experiment has been performed on a hardware
bench. The experimental results have shown, the developed radiation-tolerant
architecture was verified to effectively work, and wireless channels were shown to switch
smoothly in several hundred milliseconds (less than 500ms) when single- and multi-faults
are inserted. The logics of fault diagnosis, fault prognostic, and decision unit work
correctly.
Therefore, the developed radiation-tolerant architecture can be used to design COTSbased systems to achieve the independence, diversified, and redundancy without
additional detection units and/or hardware voters. The function of fault detection and
diagnosis, the algorithm of fault prognosis, the assessment method of radiation-tolerance,
and the results of the physical radiation test will all be explained in the following
Chapters.
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Chapter 7

7

Design Part IV: Online Fault Detection Mechanism

As previously discussed, methods of rapid power off are therefore highly effectively in
protecting electronic systems under ionizing radiation, the key step is to timely detect the
fault and the damage. Fault diagnosis techniques, such as case-based reasoning (CBR),
rule-based reasoning (RBR), model-based approaches, machine learning (ML)
approaches, artificial neural networks (ANN), etc., have been applied to isolate the nature
and the location of the failures; and the correct diagnosis information is then used to
reconfigure the unit to recover the functionality of the system (Fenton et al., 2001). In
fact, an effective method of fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) plays an important role
in some radiation-hardened electronic systems.
This Chapter starts with the analysis of radiation damages in electronic systems.
Subsequently, the online detection mechanism of radiation damages is illustrated, as well
as the real-time diagnosis algorithm is discussed. Finally, some experimental tests are
used to validate the effectiveness and correctness of the developed detection mechanism.
As well as the detection coverage under the given radiation condition (20 K Rad (Si)) is
given.

7.1 Problem Statement
Most existing fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) methods for electronic systems mainly
focus on common hardware faults in redundant systems, not on cross-board radiation
damages (Fenton et al., 2001; Gao et al., 2015). Some model-based FDD methods have
been considered, but it is not a trivial task to develop accurate models to deal with
potential failure modes caused by radiation (Fenton et al., 2001; Gao et al., 2015).
Moreover, those methods usually detect and diagnose fault occurrences by using
additional measurement/test units or majority voters, which are also affected and
damaged by radiation. Therefore, it represents a major weakness in the whole system and
as such should also be protected.
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As previously discussed, the difficulty to diagnose radiation damages in electronic
systems is the lack of the self-diagnosis architecture and the online diagnosis method of
post-irradiation responses. Key issues to deal with the detection and diagnosis of
radiation damages are listed as follows:
(1) The analysis and identification of fault, error, and failure of devices and circuits
under the given radiation condition.
(2) An online logic to detect radiation damages and a real-time algorithm to diagnose
and to locate radiation damages.
(3) The validation of the developed detection method without physical radiation test
in the design phase.
To address these issues, in this Chapter, combining with the radiation-tolerant
architecture developed in Chapter 6, an online detection and diagnostic approach is
developed to timely identify/locate radiation damage in the system for prolonging its life,
which are significant for the proposed radiation-tolerant architecture.

7.2 The Framework of Detection Mechanism
The functional organization and data flow of the fault detection and diagnosis unit can be
illustrated in Figure 7-1. This unit consists of two parts: (a) database creation and (b) realtime fault detection and prognosis for decision-making. In the first part, data
specifications of the electronic components, boundaries of faults, errors, and failure are
obtained to create an alarm database. Such information is used to create a fault detection
hypothesis test framework. During online operation, measurements are then used to test
the hypothesis, subsequently, to generate appropriate decisions in the decision-making
unit for the reconfigurator.
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Figure 7-1: The framework of the fault detection and diagnosis method

7.3 Analysis of Radiation-Induced Damages
7.3.1

Analysis Model

According to abstraction levels of electronic systems, a hierarchical fault model is
illustrated in Figure 7-2. Radiation disturbances and/or other disturbances will affect
device level directly, and then the disturbance will be transmitted to circuit level and
system level (subsystem). Faults at device level (L1) correspond to sensor and
semiconductor components, faults at circuit level (L2) correspond to analog circuits and
digital circuits, and faults at system level (L3) correspond subsystems or functional
modules.
Radiation
Other
disturbance disturbance
Input
u

no
nr
Device Level
(L1)

Output
Circuit Level
(L2)

System Level
(L3)

Figure 7-2: Hierarchical fault model for electronic systems

y
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The state of each level is defined as 𝑥𝑖 (i = 1, 2, 3). The model can be described as
follows:
 x1 (k + 1) = ( A + A)x(k ) + ( B + B)u (k ) + Br n r (k ) + Bo no (k )

.
 x 2 (k + 1) = (C + C )(x1 (k ) + x1 )
 x (k + 1) = y (k + 1) = (D + D )(x (k ) + x )
2
2
 3

(7-1)

where
𝑥𝜑 (𝑘) ∈ 𝑅 𝑛 , 𝑢(𝑘) ∈ 𝑅 𝑚 , 𝑦(𝑘) ∈ 𝑅 𝑝 , 𝑛𝑟 (𝑘) ∈ 𝑅𝑙𝑟 , 𝑛𝑜 (𝑘) ∈ 𝑅𝑙𝑜 is the state of the
different levels, the input, radiation fault, and the component/parameter fault,
respectively. 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷 are known parameter matrices; and ∆𝐴, ∆𝐵, ∆𝐶, ∆𝐷, ∆𝑥1 , ∆𝑥2 are
unknown fault and errors.
As previously discussed, the system should detect and diagnose faults and
errors (∆𝐴, ∆𝐵, ∆𝐶, ∆𝐷, ∆𝑥1 , ∆𝑥2 ) in a timely manner. A number of assumptions for faults
concern in this work are listed as follows:
(1) Each component is either functioning, fault and failure;
(2) Each circuit block is functional, operating incorrectly, and failure;
(3) Each subsystem is functional, operating incorrectly, and failure;
(4) All components are functional at initial moment.

7.3.2

Definition and Properties

Definition 1 (Device): An electronic system consists of a number (𝑛𝑑 ) of components.



D = d1 ,

, di ,

d nd

 (1  i  n ) .
d

where 𝑑𝑖 represents the state of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ component with 𝑑𝑖 = 0 and 1, respectively,
corresponding to its functional and fault state.
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Definition 2 (Circuit): An electronic system consists of a number (𝑛𝑐 ) of circuit blocks.
Each module consists of a number of components.



C = c1 ,

,cj ,

, cnc

 (1  j  n )
c

.

where 𝑐𝑗 represents the 𝑗𝑡ℎ circuit of the electronic system.
Similar representations are used to represent the operational and fault modes at
Definition 2 in all subsequent definitions.
Definition 2 (Subsystem): An electronic system can be decomposed into a number (𝑛𝑠 ) of
subsystems. Each subsystem consists of several circuit modules.



S = s1 ,

, sk ,

, sns

 (1  k  n ) .
s

Definition 3 (Functional State): For each circuit module and subsystem, two states can
be defined.
𝑋𝐶 , 𝑋𝑆 represent the state that temporary fault or recovered failure in the circuit blocks
and subsystems, with 𝑥 = 0 for operational and 1 for temporary fault or recovered failure,
respectively.
𝑌𝐶 , 𝑌𝑆 represent the state that permanently fails in the circuit blocks and subsystems, with
𝑦 = 0 for no failure and 1 for permanent failure, respectively.
For each circuit module, the following conditions can be defined for the operational state.



X c = xc1 ,

, xc j ,

, xcn

c



(1  j  nc ) .

If 𝑐𝑗 operates incorrectly, 𝑥𝑐 𝑗 = 1, otherwise 𝑥𝑐 𝑗 = 0.



Yc = yc1 ,

, yc j ,

ycn

c



(1  j  nc ) .

If 𝑐𝑗 is completely failed, 𝑦𝑐 𝑗 = 1, otherwise 𝑦𝑐 𝑗 = 0.
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For each subsystem, the following state can be defined:



X s = xs1 ,

, xsk ,

, xsn

s



(1  k  ns ) .

If 𝑠𝑘 operates incorrectly, 𝑥𝑠𝑘 = 1, otherwise 𝑥𝑠𝑘 = 0.



Ys = ys1 ,

, ysk ,

, ysn

s



(1  k  ns ) .

If 𝑠𝑘 is completely failed, 𝑦𝑠𝑘 = 1, otherwise 𝑦𝑠𝑘 = 0.
Definition 4 (Logic Action): 𝑅𝑑𝑐 is the relation from set 𝐷 to set 𝐶, and 𝑅𝑐𝑠 is the relation
from set 𝐶 to set 𝑆. The entries of 𝑅𝑑𝑐 and 𝑅𝑐𝑠 are defined by:
1,
M dci , j = 
0,

(d , c ) R
(d , c ) R
i

j

dc

i

j

dc

.

and
1,
M cs j , k = 
0,

(c , s ) R
(c , s ) R
j

k

cs

j

k

cs

.

Thus, the relation from set 𝐷 to set 𝑆 can be expressed by:
M dsi , k = M dci , j  M cs j , k .

Definition 5 (Fault Set): for the circuit block 𝑐𝑗 , the fault set is





Fc j = Fc j1 ,, Fc jnd .

𝐹𝑐𝑗 𝑖 describes that ionizing radiation effects of 𝑖𝑡ℎ component 𝑑𝑖 to the circuit block 𝑐𝑗 .
𝐹𝑐𝑗 0 denotes the functional state of the circuit block 𝑐𝑗 , which considers components
tolerance effect.
Fc ji = 0

if M i , j = 0 .
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For the subsystem 𝑠𝑘 , the fault set is





Fsk = Fsk1 ,, Fsknc .

𝐹𝑠𝑘 𝑗 describes that ionizing radiation effects of 𝑗𝑡ℎ circuit block 𝑐𝑗 to the sub-system 𝑠𝑘 .
𝐹𝑠𝑘 0 denotes the functional state of the subsystem 𝑠𝑘 .
Fsk j = 0 if M j ,k = 0 .

7.3.3

Identification of Fault, Error, and Failure

The identification focuses on analog and mixed circuit blocks with certain input. Suppose
that 𝑢 is the measured voltage of the output of one circuit block (𝑐𝑗 ). An ambiguity region
of the output of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗 ) for all components 𝑑𝑖 can be created in time domain.



u di (t ) = u d1 (t ), u d2 (t ),, u

d nd

(t ).

with
u di (t ) = 0

if M i , j = 0 (1  i  nd ,1  j  nc ) .

In general the element value with component tolerance is changed from 𝑌 to 𝑌 + ∆𝑌. The
upper and lower envelopes of the output of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗 ) for all components
responses are:

 (

(

(

)

d
(t ) = max u d1 (t ), max u d 2 (t ) ,  , max u
u upper

d nd

(t ))).

and

 (

)

(

)

(

d
(t ) = min u d1 (t ) , min u d 2 (t ) , , min u
u lower

d nd

(t )).

Thus, the response for the functional state of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗 ) is:
d
d
(t )  u(t )  uupper
(t ) .
u lower
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On the other hand, for the output of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗 ) of each component 𝑑𝑖 under the
𝑑

𝑑

𝑑

𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
condition of the fault, error, and failure (𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
, 𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟,
and 𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙
), the upper and lower

envelopes of the circuit 𝑐𝑗 output for sensitive component 𝑑𝑖 under the fault state are:
di
i
(t )  u(t )  u err
(t ) .
u dfault

(7-2)

j
(t ) .
u errj (t )  u (t )  u fail

(7-3)

d

d

𝑐

𝑐

𝑐

𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
The fault, error, and failure of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗 ) response 𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
, 𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟,
and 𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙
can

also be obtained. The upper and lower envelopes of the fault state of the
circuit 𝑐𝑗 response are:
j
(t )  u(t )  u errj (t ) .
u fault

c

c

(7-4)

The upper and lower envelopes of the broken state of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗 ) response are:
j
(t ) .
u errj (t )  u (t )  u fail

c

c

(7-5)

According to Eq. (7-2) to Eq. (7-5), malfunction of components and circuit blocks in
analog and mixed circuits can be classified into several types:
(1) Component operates incorrectly, the output of related circuit block should be
𝑑

𝑑

𝑖
𝑖
range from 𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
to 𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟,
;

𝑑

𝑖
(2) Component fails, the output of related circuit block should be range from 𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟
to

𝑑

𝑖
𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙,
;

(3) Circuit block operates incorrectly, the output of circuit block should be range
𝑐

𝑐

𝑗
𝑗
from 𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
to 𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟
;

𝑐

𝑗
(4) Circuit block is broken; the output of circuit block should be range from 𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟

𝑐

𝑗
to 𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙
.
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Fault diagnosis of analog and mixed circuits is to identify the current state of the circuit
block according to the measured value 𝑢. If 𝑢 is within the neighborhood of the nominal
value under fault 𝐹𝑖 , the similarity between the current state and fault 𝐹𝑖 is high. On the
other hand, if 𝑢 is out of the neighborhood, the similarity will be low. 𝑈𝐹𝑖 (𝑢) is used to
express the similarity between the current state and fault 𝐹𝑖 state. According to the
maximum degree of criterion, if fault 𝐹𝑖 satisfies





U Fi (u ) = max U F0 (u ), U F1 (u ), U F2 (u ), , U Fnd (u ) .

(7-6)

Then we can deem that 𝑢 is subordinate to 𝐹𝑖 , and the current state is more similar with
fault 𝐹𝑖 state.

7.4 Detection of Radiation Damages
7.4.1

Determination of 𝑈𝐹𝑖 (𝑢)

According to the characteristics of different circuit blocks and/or subsystems, the method
of the determination of 𝑈𝐹𝑖 (𝑢) can be separated into internal detection and external
detection. Even though Figure 7-1illustrates a general framework for fault detection and
diagnosis schemes, the current design includes three distinctive levels: devices, circuits,
and subsystems. Damage to the device propagates to circuit and subsystem. According to
the characteristics of circuit modules and subsystems, detection of fault state can be
carried out within its own channel or by using the data from other channels. For circuit
modules, such as power related circuits, self-test circuits, faults can be detected within the
channel. However, other circuit modules, particularly with uncertain inputs, such as
sensor inputs, sub-functional blocks, it would be difficult to validate their functionalities
within the channel. The fault detection is often accomplished by comparing with the
measurements from other channels. These two approaches can be shown in Figure 7-3.

119

Primary
channel
𝑐2𝑗+1𝑐2𝑗+𝑙𝑠2𝑘+1𝑠2𝑘+𝑚

Self channel
𝑐11 𝑐1𝑗 𝑠11 𝑠1𝑘

Checker channel

Mixed circuit analysis
Internal diagnosis
Measurement
signals

Symptom
generation

Knowledge

Checker1

Checker2

Itself

𝑐2𝑗+1 𝑐2𝑛 𝑠2𝑘+1 𝑠2𝑛 𝑐3𝑗+1 𝑐3𝑛 𝑠3𝑘+1 𝑠3𝑛 𝑐1𝑗 𝑐1𝑛 𝑠1𝑘 𝑠1𝑛
OR

Primary channel
External diagnosis

Signal from
the output
layer

Measurement
signals
Signals
from internal

Voters

bus

Figure 7-3: The block diagram of detection logical allocation

7.4.2

Internal Detection

For analog and mixed circuits with certain input, the determinate 𝑈𝐹𝑖 (𝑢) is accomplished
by the comparison of the measured voltage with the voltage distribution under the fault
state. The voltage distribution under the fault state can be obtained from the calculation
result of the identification of fault, error, and failure. For example, suppose the voltage
distribution of a circuit block (𝑐𝑗 ) under the fault state is presented as Figure 7-4.

Voltage
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2
𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟
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𝐹

1
𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟
(𝑡)
𝐹2
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 (𝑡)

𝑢𝐹2 (𝑡)
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𝐹

1
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟
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𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 (𝑡)

𝑢𝐹0 (𝑡)

Figure 7-4: Voltage levels of a circuit block under the fault state
When there has free space between 𝑢𝐹0 (𝑡) and 𝑢𝐹𝑖 (𝑡), if the measured voltage 𝑢 is
located at the region of 𝑢𝐹0 (𝑡) or 𝑢𝐹𝑖 (𝑡), then
U F0 (u ) = 1

or

U Fi (u ) = 1 .
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When there has no free space between 𝑢𝐹1 (𝑡) and 𝑢𝐹2 (𝑡). If 𝑢 is located at the overlap
region of 𝑢𝐹1 (𝑡) and 𝑢𝐹2 (𝑡), the similarity between the current state and fault 𝐹1 , 𝐹2 state
can be determined by sensitivity analysis for 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 .

7.4.3

External Detection

For those circuit blocks with uncertain input, the determinate 𝑈𝐹𝑖 (𝑢) is accomplished by
combining with the error detection code and the voter mechanism. The information of
circuit blocks and subsystems can be encoded and transmitted to the primary channel
through the internal bus. Then, the primary channel accomplishes the function of
detection damages among all three channels. As previously mentioned, due to the inputs
of those circuits are unknown, moreover, in high level radiation fields, radiation damages
may occur in one or two even three of the triplication simultaneously. The detection of
radiation damages in those circuits is difficult by only using majority voters and/or
additional test/detection units. A filter function is therefore used to detect radiation
damages in three channels according to past and present measurements, which is
expressed in Eq. (7-7). The detection function will output the states of those circuit
blocks.

(

)

[ X 1 j , X 2 j , X 3 j , Y1 j , Y2 j , Y3 j ] = f m1 j , m2 j , m3 j , p1 j , p2 j , p3 j .

where
𝑚𝑙𝑗 is the present measurement of the circuit block 𝑗 in the channel 𝑙;
𝑝𝑙𝑗 is the past measurement of the circuit block 𝑗 in the channel 𝑙;
𝑋𝑙𝑗 , 𝑌𝑙𝑗 is the state of the circuit block 𝑗 in the channel 𝑙.

(7-7)
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7.5 Diagnosis of Radiation Damages
7.5.1

Fault Hypothesis

Based on the above definitions, a fault hypothesis for malfunctions of circuit blocks and
subsystems can be formed in Eq. (7-8), where the goal is to integrate states of circuit
blocks and subsystems.
H = X ,Y  .

(7-8)

where 𝑋 is the summary of 𝑋𝐶 and 𝑋𝑆 , as well as 𝑌 is the summary of 𝑌𝐶 and 𝑌𝑆 .

7.5.2

Detection Function

A detection function reflects the credibility of 𝐻 as defined in Eq. (7-8). A smaller 𝐸(𝐻)
suggests a higher credibility of 𝐻. If the detection function is equal or greater than unity,
a reconfigure command should be issued.
nc

(

)

ns

(

)

E (H ) =  Wxc j xc j + W yc j yc j +  Wxsk x sk + W ysk y sk .
j

(7-9)

k

where 𝑤𝑥𝑐𝑗 , 𝑤𝑦𝑐𝑗 ,𝑤𝑥𝑠𝑘 , and 𝑤𝑦𝑠𝑘 are the weights of the discrepancy index. The range of
the weights is from 0.1 to 1. If 𝑤1 ≫ 𝑤2 , its means that the discrepancy index 𝑤1 is
much more important than 𝑤2 . The values of these weights are determined according to
the significance of circuit blocks and subsystems in electronic systems.

7.5.3

Diagnosis Mechanism

The flowchart of fault detection loop in each channel is illustrated in Figure 7-5. The
states of fault hypothesis (𝐻1 , 𝐻2 , 𝐻3 ) will be timely updated for the calculation of
detection functions (𝐸(𝐻1 ), 𝐸(𝐻2 ), 𝐸(𝐻3 )) in each channel for all three channels. The
results of fault detection are transmitted to the diagnosis loop for the calculation of
objective function, then the decision making unit generates diagnosis results and
reconfigure suggestions.
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Figure 7-5: The flowchart of fault detection loop
The flowchart of fault diagnosis is illustrated in Figure 7-6. Firstly, new fault hypothesis
is generated according to the system architecture. Subsequently, objective function is
updated based on the results of fault detection. If the objective function 𝐸(𝐻) is equal or
greater than 1, 𝑈𝐹𝑖 (𝑢) and the diagnosis suggestions should be generated.

123

Generate a new fault
hypothesis
Calculate the objective
function
N

Ei(H) ≥ 1?
Y
Determinate 𝑈𝐹𝑖 (𝑢)
Generate diagnosis result
Output reconfiguration
signals
End

Figure 7-6: The flowchart of fault diagnosis function

7.6 Experimental Validation
7.6.1

Experimental Results

The proposed method of fault detection and diagnosis are validated in the developed
hardware emulation bench which is described in Appendices A. Detailed information are
listed in Table 7-1. Radiation effects and their responses of selected semiconductor
devices are described in Column (5) and Column (6) of Table 7-1. The radiation damages
concerned in this work are listed as follows:
(1) Total dose effects on bipolar devices and circuits, such as diode, BJT, OP Ampler;
(2) Total dose effects on MOS devices and circuits, such as MOSFET, A/D
converter, transceiver;
(3) Single event effects on MOSFET devices, such as SEB, SEGR;
(4) Single event effects on ICs (microcontroller, SRAM, Flash, etc.), such as SEU,
SET, SEL, SEFI.
Above radiation-induced failure, several simple failures can be emulated through external
circuits. However, most failures are very sophisticated due to the significant architecture
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and fabrication technology of complicated circuits. They are therefore only performed
through the method of software-implemented fault injection. All emulation approaches
and related radiation-induced damages are summarized in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1: The summary of radiation-induced damages and emulation methods
considered in this work
Component

Diode

Fault
number

Gain degradation

F2

Loss of the function

(HW) Adding a current source to mimic
gain degradation
(HW) Removing the component

The gain degradation at collectoremitter voltage
The gain degradation at baseemitter voltage
Loss of the function
The change of circuit parameters/
gain degradation
Loss of the function

(HW) Adding a current source to mimic
gain degradation
(HW) Adding a current source to mimic
gain degradation
(HW) Removing the component
(HW) Adjusting resistor values to change
amplify gain
(HW) Removing the component

F8

Large threshold voltage shift, loss
of on/off control

(HW) Injecting a voltage to change the
ON/OFF state

F9

Destructive effects

(HW) A short circuit between the drain and
the gate

F10

Loss of the function

(HW) Removing the component

F11

Loss of drive capability

(HW) Disconnect the output control signal

F12

Propagation delay and/or the
change of circuit timing

(HW) Disconnect control/data signals

F13

Inaccurate conversion

F14

Temporarily lose the functionality

F4
F5

OPs

F6
F7

MOSFET

Analog-todigital
converter

Voltage
reference

MCU

(HW) Adjusting the input of the
measurement signal
(SW) Temporarily disable the function of
transceiver

F16

Loss of the function / out of the
control
The change of the voltage level

F17

Loss of drive capability

(HW) Disconnect the output signal

F18

Loss of the function

(HW) Removing the component

F19

Loss of drive capability

(HW) Adjusting the configure circuit

F20

Loss of the function

(HW) Removing the component

F21

Loss of drive capability on GPIO

(HW) Disconnect the GPIO signal

F22

The invert of the voltage level

(HW) Inverting the voltage level of GPIO
output

F23

The change of circuit timing
parameter (inaccurate frequency)

(SW) Changing the timer period

F15

Logic gate

Emulation method

F1

F3
BJT

Radiation-induced damage

(HW) Removing the component
(HW) Inverting the voltage level
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(Continued Table 7-1)
Component

Fault
number

F24
F25
F26
F27
F28
SRAM
F29
F30

Radiation-induced damage
The change of circuit parameter
(data / address bus)
Temporarily lose the functionality
(SEFI)
Loss of the function / out of the
control
Loss of drive capability on bus
The invert of the voltage level of
memory unit (SEU)
Temporarily lose the functionality
(SEFI)
Loss of the function / out of the
control

F31

Loss of drive capability on bus

F32

The change of the voltage level of
memory unit

F33

Temporarily lose the functionality

FLASH

F34
F35

Loss of the function / out of the
control
A loss of drive capability on
control signal

Emulation method
(SW) Injecting a wrong value on
data/address bus
(HW) Hardware restart
(HW) Removing the component/module
(SW) Injection a wrong value on a unit of
SRAM
(SW) Injection a wrong value on a unit of
SRAM
(SW) Temporarily disable the function of
SRAM
(SW) Disable the function of SRAM
(SW) Injection a wrong value on a unit of
flash
(SW) Injection a wrong value on a unit of
flash
(SW) Temporarily disable the function of
flash
(SW) Disable the function of flash
(HW) Disconnect the control signal

F36

Non-function of receiving data

(HW) Disconnect the receiving circuit

F37

Receiving incorrect data

(SW) Injection a wrong data in receiving
buffer

F38

Non-function of sending data

(HW) Disconnect the sending circuit

F39

Sending incorrect data

F40

Incorrect frequency

F41

Temporarily lose the functionality

F42

Loss of the function

Transceiver

(SW) Injection a wrong data in sending
buffer
(SW) Modifying the configuration of
frequency
(SW) Temporarily disable the function of
transceiver
(SW) Disable the function of transceiver

HW: hardware-based emulation; SW: software-based emulation

As mentioned in Chapter 6, a hardware emulation bench, illustrated in Appendices A, is
developed to evaluate the correctness of the proposed detection method. The bench uses a
combination of fault injection techniques, which combined with two emulation methods,
mimic radiation effects on semiconductor devices; logic emulation (LE), which is based
on software-implemented fault injection, and uses injection commands to forcibly control
and/or stop system functions; and circuit emulation (CE), which is based on hardware-
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implemented fault injection, using external circuits to mimic circuit responses under
radioactive conditions. With respect to each fault, related emulation method is listed in
Column (4) of Table 7-1.
The hardware emulation platform includes an implementation of a wireless monitoring
system as a case study of the proposed radiation-tolerant architecture. In this work, for
simplicity, all channels are considered with the same hardware to validate the developed
architecture and fault detection mechanism; and the system considers two uncertain input
signals: 4~20mA and 0~100 Ω. The detailed information of the implementation of the
wireless channel is given in Table 7-2. Specifically, those components with the high
radiation resistances, such as resistance, capacitance, etc., are not listed in the table due to
they have the capacity to survive in the given radiation condition. Each wireless channel
consists of 13 semiconductor components (component-level), which are listed in the
Column (2) of Table 7-2; 9 circuit blocks (circuit-level): 2 voltage reference circuit, 2
analog signal processing circuits, A/D convert circuit, memory circuit, controller circuit,
wireless sending circuit, wireless receiving circuit; also includes 6 modules (systemlevel): signal input, source encoder, channel encoder, decision making, digital modulator,
and transceiver.
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Table 7-2: The information of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless device
Comp.

Q.

FIT

Fault
cases

Voltage
reference

1

3.30

F19,
F20

OPs

4

1.85

F6,
F7

NPN BJT

1

2.45

Voltage
reference

1

3.30

AD
converter

Microcont
roller
(CPU)

1

1

0.20

5.60

Logic gate

1

0.50

Diode

1

3.30

Varactor

1

3.30

Wireless
transmitter

1

1.90

F3F5
F19,
F20
F11F12

Detection
Mechanism

Detection
Period

Fault
coverage

The output voltage decreases,
OPs work nonfunctional

External

200 ms

1/2

OPs work nonfunctional. The
output of the function of input
source will be incorrect.

External

200 ms

2/2

External

200 ms

1/3

External

200 ms

2/2

Radiation response analysis

The output of the function of
input source will be incorrect.
The AD’s reference voltage will
be incorrect.
Out of control

2/2

F13

The output (10bits) of the
functions of source encoder will
be incorrect.

F14F15

Loss of the functionality

F24

Microcontroller will be
nonfunctional.

External

300 ms

1/1

F23

Timer period is incorrect.

Internal

100 ms

1/1

F27F30
F31F34
F21F22
F25,
F26
F16F18
F1F2
F1F2

SRAM (256 bytes) will be
nonfunctional
Flash (4K bytes) will be
nonfunctional
The output of GPIO (32 bits) will
be nonfunctional.

Internal

500 ms

16/256

Internal

300 ms

256/
4096

External

500 ms

24/32

External

300 ms

2/2

External

300 ms

3/3

Internal

500 ms

1/2

Internal

500 ms

1/2

F35

Out of control

Internal

500 ms

1/1

F36F40
F41F42

Communication will be
nonfunctional

External

500 ms

5/5

Wireless transmitter will not work

External

500 ms

2/2

Microcontroller will not work.
Microcontroller will be
nonfunctional.
Wireless transmitter may be
nonfunctional
Wireless transmitter may be
nonfunctional

External

200 ms

7/10
2/2
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7.6.2

Detection Coverage

One way to quantify the effectiveness of the fault tolerance capability is by fault coverage
measure 𝐶. This figure of merit is defined as the number of faults dealt with successfully
over the total number of faults considered (Kim et al., 2006).
C = P( fault processed correctly / fault existence).

(7-13)

Considering a system in a radiation environment, for a given time ∆𝑡, the fault detection
coverage of a system 𝐶𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 can be calculated by:

 C
=

N

Csystem

i =1

i ,d
N

• i t

 t
i =1 i

 C
=

N

i =1

i ,d
N

• i


i =1 i

.

(7-14)

where
𝐶𝑖,𝑑 is the detected faults in component 𝑖; and 𝜆𝑖 is the failure rate of component 𝑖 (𝑖 =
1, 2, ⋯ 𝑛𝑑 ).
In the current validation process, for the chosen fault rates in Column 4 in Table 7-2 and
experimental results, the detection coverage is calculated to be 62.11%. This means that
62.11% of perceivable radiation induced fault scenarios can be successfully dealt with.

7.7 Conclusions
In this Chapter, a method of fault detection and diagnosis within a radiation-tolerant
architecture is developed to enhance the radiation tolerance and to prolong the life of
electronic systems. To evaluate the proposed method, a number of simulated experiments
through fault injection are performed on a developed hardware emulation bench. The
experimental results have shown that the radiation-tolerant wireless device was verified
to effectively work and the developed detection and diagnosis logic was also verified to
timely detect the abnormal condition. The detection coverages of the developed method
for the redundant wireless device is 62.11%. Moreover, the detection coverages can be
improved if putting more resources into the function of fault detection but need more
cost.
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Based on the experiment results in this work, the developed detection and diagnosis
method can timely detect and diagnose most of radiation damages in the radiationtolerant architecture. It can therefore be applied to design redundant systems without radhardened devices for high level radiation fields. System validation through the physical
radiation test will be presented in the following Chapters.
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Chapter 8

8

Implementation: an Application of Wireless Monitoring
System for Radiation Environments in NPPs

Considering various potential scenarios, e.g., the high level of radiation, the lack of
power, and the damaged communication infrastructure, during a severe accident in
nuclear power plants, a self-powered wireless monitoring system (WPAMS) is extremely
useful in surveying the plant even when there is no functioning communication
infrastructure during a severe post-accident situation, as well as those high level radiation
fields in nuclear power plants. Key issue is to protect wireless devices for surviving in
high level radiation environments. As previously mentioned, a number of radiationhardened design techniques and methods are investigated in this research, which can be
applied to implement the proposed wireless monitoring system. On the other side, this
wireless monitoring system can be also used to validate the correctness and effectiveness
of the investigated techniques and methods.
This Chapter starts with design considerations of the proposed wireless monitoring
system for high level radiation environments in nuclear power plants. Subsequently, the
developments of all devices in the system are described in detail, which include radiationtolerant wireless device, gateway device, portable monitoring device, and remote
monitoring station. Then, the developed system is tested in the normal condition, as well
as related test results are presented.

8.1 Design Considerations
1)

Design Requirements

The mission of a wireless monitoring system is to obtain essential information about the
status of the plant even when there is no communication infrastructure, which is crucial
to plant operators and emergency response teams to effectively manage and to mitigate
the effects of the accident. In this mission, the issues listed in Chapter 2.1.2 may need to
be considered and investigated.
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As explained in Chapter 1.2, the highest radiation level considered in this research is 1 M
Rad (Si). Those cases whose total radiation doses are more than 1 M Rad (Si) are not
considered in this research.
Criteria Variables

2)

The monitoring variables should refer the selection criteria of IEEE Std.-2016. The
variable types include type A, B, C, D, and E.
•

Type A: planned manually controlled actions for accomplishment of safety
functions for which there is no automatic control.

•

Type B: assess the process of accomplishing or maintaining plant safety functions

•

Type C: indicate an actual breach of fission product barriers.

•

Type D: indicate performance of safety systems, indicate the performance of
required auxiliary support features, indicate the performance of other systems
necessary to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition, verify safety system
status.

•

Type E: monitor the magnitude of releases of radioactive materials through
identified pathways, monitor the environmental conditions used to determine the
impact of release of radioactive materials through identified pathways, monitor
radiation levels and radioactivity in the plant environs, monitor radiation and
radioactivity levels in the control room and selected plant areas where access may
be required for plant recovery.

Also Regulatory Guide 1.97 (rev 3) provides a graded method to requirements according
to the importance of variables. Three separate categories are listed as follows.
•

Category 1: provides the most stringent requirements and is intended for key
variables.

•

Category 2: provides less stringent requirements and generally applies to
instrumentation designated for indicating system operating status.
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•

Category 3: is intended to provide requirements that will ensure that high-quality
off-the-shelf instrumentation is obtained and applies to backup and diagnostic
instrumentation.

One of the lessons we learned from the Fukushima accident is that the equipment should
be for multi-purpose use under post-accident circumstances, such as radiation detecting,
hydrogen monitoring, thermal imaging, pressure, temperature, gas, and humidity sensing.
Considering those factors, the criteria variables and specifications for WPAMS are shown
in Table 8-1. Furthermore, conditions of protection systems, such as water level in a spent
fuel pool, coolant inventory, containment pressure, etc., also need to be monitored. The
system should reserve some channels which used for monitoring those condition
parameters. Moreover, those channels have flexible voltage range and can be
reconfiguration according to sensors signals, e.g., 0.5v to 5v voltage signal, 4~20 mA
current signal, etc.
Table 8-1: Criteria variables and specifications considered in the design of wireless
monitoring systems for nuclear power plants
Parameter

Type

Category R.G
1.97

Measurement range

Neutron flux

Type B

1

10-6 % to 100 %

Containment Hydrogen concentration

Type C

1

0 to 30 vol-%

Containment area radiation

Type C

1

1 to 107 R/hr

Containment atmosphere humidity

Type D

Containment atmosphere temperature

Type D

3)

0% to 100%
2

40 oF to 400 oF

Potential Solution

Considering potential scenarios and issues during a severe accident, a wireless
monitoring system, illustrated in Figure 8-1, is proposed in this work to obtain up-to-date
information of the plant after a severe accident. The proposed monitoring system includes
four types of devices: radiation-tolerant wireless devices (strong radiation field), gateway
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device (low radiation field), portable monitoring device, and remote monitoring station.
The detailed implementations of those devices are described in the follow.

Satellite

Portable Monitoring
Device

Cellular
Ethernet

Low Radiation

Remote
Monitoring Station

Field
Gateway2

Repeater
Repeater Gateway

2

1

1

D

2

D

1

Strong Radiation Field

Figure 8-1: A potential wireless monitoring system for high level radiation
environments in a nuclear power plant

8.2 Development of Wireless Monitoring System
8.2.1

Measurement and Transmission Unit

In the proposed monitoring system, wireless devices will be installed in high level
radiation environments and are used to collect up-to-date environment parameters, such
as temperature, humidity, gamma dose, neutron level, hydrogen level, water level, etc.,
and to transmit that information to the gateway which is installed out of the containment.
Therefore they have to have high radiation resistance to survive in those environments.
The previously investigated techniques will be used in the implementation of those
wireless devices. The framework of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless device is
illustrated in Figure 8-2.
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Power Monitor and
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Transceiver
(1)

Tolerant Management
Processor
(1)

Processor
(n)
Transceiver
(n)

Signal
Processing
(1)

Diversity Power
Supply
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Processing
(n)

Diversity
Communication
Bus

Control Bus
Shielding to against
radiation

Data Bus
Power Bus

Sensors (temperature, level, pressure, relative humidity, radiation,
hydrogen gas, etc.)

Figure 8-2: The framework of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless device
As illustrated in Figure 8-3, the tolerant management of the developed radiation-tolerant
wireless device includes an active triple modular redundant core. Each modular consists
of an input layer, a decision layer, and a output layer. Specially, the input layer consists
of input sources, a source encoder, and a channel encoder; the decision layer consists of
the decision-making unit; and the output layer consists of a digital modulator and
transceiver. For simplity’s sake, only temperature sensor and water level sensor are taken
as the input signal in this Chapter. In addition, all channels are constructed with
diversified semiconductor technologies.
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Figure 8-3: The TMR core of the proposed wireless communication system (Proakis
and Salehi, 2008)
On the other hand, component selection is a significant step to implement radiationtolerant system. Radiation hardness of different semiconductor technologies and COTS
components are different. In this work, referring to radiation test data from the NASA
Goddard Space Flight Center, all wireless channels and their spares are implemented with
diversified devices. Picture of the developed wireless device is shown in Figure 8-4, as
well as picture of the radiation shielding protection is illustrated in Figure 8-5.
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Figure 8-4: Picture of radiation-tolerant wireless device developed in this work

Figure 8-5: Picture of radiation shielding protection developed in this work
The detailed implementation of wireless monitoring device and related information are
listed in Table 8-2. Specifically, those components, such as resistance, capacitor, relay,
etc., are not listed in the table due to their robustness to radiation.
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Table 8-2: The implementation of radiation-tolerant wireless devices in this research
Channel

Function

Quan. Technology

Manufacture

NPN BJT

1

Bipolar

Semicoa

Voltage reference

1

Bipolar

Ti

OP amp
Voltage reference
AD

3
1
1

Bipolar
Bipolar
Bipolar

National Semi.
Ti
Analog Devices

E2PROM

1

CMOS

Atmel

Microcontroller

1

CMOS

Microchip

Voltage reference

1

Bipolar

Linear

Transceiver

Diode
433 MHz RF

1
1

Bipolar
Bipolar

Toshiba
RFMD

Source
encoder

Voltage reference

1

BiCMOS

Ti

OP amp

3

CMOS

Analog Devices

OP amp
Voltage reference

1
1

CMOS
CMOS

Analog Devices
Ti

AD
Microcontroller

1
1

BiCMOS
CMOS

Analog Devices
Atmel

Logic gate

1

CMOS

Ti

433MHz RF

1

CMOS

Freescale Semi

Voltage reference

1

HSCMOS

Allegro

OP amp

3

BiFET

Ti

Voltage reference
AD
OP amp

1
1
2

CMOS
LC2MOS
Hybrid

Analog Devices
Analog Devices
Motorola

Microcontroller

1

TTL Logic

Silicon

Logic gate

1

TTL Logic

Ti

433 MHz RF

1

TTL Logic

Silicon

Voltage reference

1

BiMOS

Ti

Source
encoder
Channel
encoder
A1&S1
Decision &
Digital

A2&S2

Type

Channel
encoder
Decision &
Digital
modulator
Transceiver
Source
encoder
Channel
encoder

A3&S3
Decision &
Digital
modulator
Transceiver
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Specially, as previously mentioned, the important variables of interests are temperature,
humidity, hydrogen concentration, and radiation levels of the environment. It is also
important to gather information about the conditions of protection systems, such as water
level in a spent fuel pool, and coolant inventory etc. However, to be simple, only two
different sensor signals are involved in this work, they are:
•

4~20 mA current source (water level sensor);

•

0~100 Ω resistance (temperature sensor).

More work about sensors, such as gamma detector, neutron detector, etc., will be
investigated in other works.

8.2.2

Gateway

The objective of a gateway device is to collect the up-to-date information from wireless
devices, to transmit that information to remote emergency monitoring station and/or the
portable monitoring device, and also to integrate and to preserve that information. The
device works in the low level radiation fields and consists of diversified communication
interfaces, such as diversified wireless networks, Ethernet network, satellite
communication interface, cellular network, etc. It therefore needs a powerful processor to
hand all communication threads and data processing tasks.
In this work, the gateway device is constructed by Freescale i.mx6 microprocessor, which
is a feature- and performance-scalable multicore platform based on the ARM Cortex
architecture and run up to 1.2 GHz with various communication interfaces. The gateway
device includes several local hardware interfaces, such as USB, SD card, HDMI, LCD,
etc. They are used to debug, to setup working parameters, and to save the history data.
The overview of the developed gateway device is illustrated in Figure 8-6.
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Figure 8-6: The block diagram of the gateway device developed in this research
In addition, the gateway device uses a Linux operating system to manage its resources,
which include several threads to accomplish all functions, such as WSN communication
thread. On the other hand, due to the gateway device is installed in the low level of
radiation fields, a copper shielding (1cm thickness) is used to mitigate radiation effects on
the electronics. The picture of the developed gateway device is shown in Figure 8-7, as
well as the developed shielding for gateway device is illustrated in Figure 8-8.
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Figure 8-7: Picture of gateway device developed in this research

Figure 8-8: Picture of the shielding for gateway device developed in this research

8.2.3
1)

Remote Monitoring Station
Remote monitoring station

The objective of remote monitoring station is to collect the up-to-date information from
the gateway devices, to manage and to analyze environment parameters of high radiation
fields, as well as to display those parameters. A software tool is therefore developed to
control, to collect, and to display the information of environment parameters, as well as
to analyze the node performance of wireless network.
In this work, a rugged laptop is used as the remote monitoring station to accomplish all
functions, such as message transceive function, data collecting management, data

141

processing, database management, and GUI function. The overview of this software tool
is illustrated in Figure 8-9.

Data Processing
Communication
Thread

Collection
Management

Database
Management
GUI Function

Figure 8-9: The overview of remote monitoring station developed in this research
Picture of the remote monitoring station used in this research is shown in Figure 8-10.

Figure 8-10: Picture of the remote monitoring station used in this research
2)

Portable monitoring device

In addition, a portable monitoring device is also implemented in this work by using the
DLI8800 rugged tablet, which also includes several hardware interfaces, such as USB
ports, user-programmable key, and multiple radio communication interfaces. Operating
system uses Windows Embedded 7. Picture of portable monitoring device is shown in
Figure 8-11.

142

Figure 8-11: Picture of portable monitoring device used in this research
3)

Monitoring Tool

A software tool has been developed to collect, to display, and to handle the data in the
remote monitoring device and portable monitoring device. It is developed by using C++
in Microsoft Visual Studio. Picture of the software tool is shown in Figure 8-12.

Figure 8-12: Picture of a monitoring software tool developed in this research
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8.3 Testing in a Normal Environment
8.3.1

Accuracy of Parameters Measurement

Taking water level as an example, the measurement results during 24 hours, listed in
Table 8-3, demostrate the reliable and accurate monitoring performance of the developed
system under a normal condition.
Table 8-3: The parameter measurement of the developed monitoring system in a
normal environment
Parameter

Water
Level

8.3.2

Max
Min
Deviation
Deviation
measurement
measurement
(%)
(%)
value
value

Actual
value

Duration
(hour)

2 inch

1

2

0%

2

0%

10 inch

1

10.2

2%

9.8

2%

20 inch

1

20.3

1.5%

19.8

1%

40 inch

1

40.4

1%

39.6

1%

Wireless Communication Performance

In the test, wireless device sends one message packet to the gateway at a period of two
seconds. Packet loss rate can be calculated by:
PacketLossRate = PacketLoss

PacketSent

(8-1)

.

And packet error rate can be calculated by:
PacketErrorRate = PacketError

Re ceivedTotalPacket

.

(8-2)

The test results of communication performance under a normal condition are given in
Table 8-4. The test results have shown that the real-time transmission from wireless
detectors to the remote monitoring station is stable and reliable. The remote station
receives the data and adequately displays the up-to-date information.

144

Table 8-4: The performance of wireless communication in a normal environment
During Time
(hours)

Received
Total
Packets

Packet Loss

Loss Rate
(%)

Packet Error

Error Rate
(%)

24

43153

47

0.054%

55

0.127%

8.4 Summary
In this Chapter, based on design considerations, the implementation of the proposed
wireless monitoring application for radiation environment in a nuclear power plant is
presented in detail. The system includes four type devices: radiation-tolerant wireless
device, gateway device, portable monitoring device, and remote monitoring device. In a
normal environment, the developed system can work smoothly. Experimental results
have shown that environment parameters can be correctly measured and its deviation is
less than 2%. In addition, the performance of wireless communication satisfies the design
requirement; its packet loss rate and packet error rate are 0.054% and 0.127%,
respectively.
Experiment results have shown that the proposed redundant architecture is correct and the
developed wireless monitoring system can be used to effectively obtain up-to-date
information from a specified environment. The radiation-tolerance assessment for the
developed redundant wireless device will be explained in Chapter 9. As well as the
experimental validation in a real radiation environment will be presented in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 9

9

Evaluation: Radiation-Tolerance Assessment

In the design of a radiation-tolerant system, the assessment of its radiation-tolerance is a
critical step. The physical test is very precise but could be excessively complicated and
expensive. As well as simulation method is difficult to assess the radiation-tolerance of
the whole system. A method is developed in this Chapter to assess the radiation-tolerance
in the design phase without repeated physical test.
This Chapter starts with the problem about radiation-tolerance assessment in the design
of electronic systems for high radiation level fields. Subsequently, reliability assessment
models are established for before- and post-irradiation. Then, radiation degradation factor
are used to describe the radiation response of the component, the subsystem, and the
system under a total radiation dose. Finally, the reliability assessment for the developed
wireless device is given in detail.

9.1 Problem Statement
In general, the performance of rad-hardened systems can be evaluated in two ways: (1)
physical tests: which use external perturbation sources (natural and accelerated particle
radiation, laser beam, pin forcing, etc.) to create a similar radiation environment to
evaluate the performance of the design. This approach is very precise but could be
excessively complicated and expensive; and (2) simulation with analysis: which uses
logic relationships of the circuits and systems to access internal elements and insert the
effect of a radiation induced fault according to the fault model. However, a limitation of
this approach is that it is difficult to assess the radiation-tolerance of the whole system.
To address these issues, an approach by combining with reliability analysis and radiation
degradation factor is developed. Key issues to deal with the assessment of radiationtolerance without physical tests are listed as follows:
(1) To establish reliability assessment model for post-irradiation.
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(2) To obtain radiation degradation factors for semiconductor components.

9.2 Evaluation of Radiation Shielding Protection
Taking radiation levels (7.3 K Rad/h and 53 K Rad/h) in Fukushima nuclear accident, as
illustrated in Chapter 5, using Co-60 as a radiation source for gamma radiation, the ability
of the developed protections can be evaluated with the aid of RadPro Calculator (Rad Pro
Calculator, 2018).
•

Under the condition with dose rate 70 Sv/h (7 K Rad/h), for a 24h period, the
highest total dose in six areas should be less than 2.6 K Rad (Si).

•

Under the condition with dose rate 530 Sv/h (53 K Rad/h), for a 24h period, the
highest total dose in six areas should be less than 20 K Rad (Si);

•

Under the condition with dose rate 1350 Sv/h (130 K Rad/h), for a 24h period, the
highest total dose in six areas should be less than 50 K Rad (Si);

•

Under the condition with dose rate 2700 Sv/h (270 K Rad/h), for a 24h period, the
highest total dose in six areas should be less than 100 K Rad (Si);

9.3 Assessment of System Reliability
9.3.1

Reliability Assessment Model

The reliability function 𝑅(𝑡) represents the probability that an item (component,
subsystem, or system) will perform the designed functions over a given time interval
[0, 𝑡] under specific operating environment and conditions (Song and Wang, 2013).
Conventional analysis methods for system reliability are dependent on probabilistic
approaches, which incorporate all failure events as random events. These methods are
based on two fundamental assumptions: (1) binary state assumptions, where the system
can only be in either of the two states (fully functioning or completely failed); and (2)
probability assumptions, where the system failure behavior is fully characterized by the
probability measures (Ravi et al., 2000). However, there are many uncertainties when a
device or a system is operating in a harsh environment, which may include strong level of
radiation, extremely high temperature, and high humidity, etc.; those uncertainties
challenge the assumptions made in the “conventional” reliability analysis of the
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components, and lead to an increase in the probability of failure for the item (component,
subsystem, and/or system) (Lauridsen et al., 1996). Therefore, the analysis employed by
the conventional methods may not represent a realistic situation in a harsh environment.
Radiation effects should be considered in the reliability analysis.
The current work establishes the assessment model for non-radiation conditions first
through failure rates to obtain the reliability of the proposed architecture under radiation
conditions. The failure rate 𝜆(𝑡) of an item expresses the “possibility to failure” of the
item after time 𝑡 has passed (Song and Wang, 2013). It is estimated from the mean
number of failures per unit time, which can be expressed by failure in time (FIT) as
follows:
1 FIT = 10 −9

failure / hour.

The reliability 𝑅(𝑡) of the item can then be determined from the failure rate 𝜆(𝑡) with the
consideration of 𝑅(0) = 1 as follows from (Song and Wang, 2013):
−  ( )d
R(t ) = e 0
.
t

(9-1)

Assuming that the failure rate is independent of time (𝑡), then 𝜆(𝑡) = 𝜆, Eq. (9-1) can be
simplified to (Song and Wang, 2013)
R(t ) = e − t .

(9-2)

Considering that the proposed architecture consists of an input layer, a decision layer, and
an output layer; and the reliability of diversified channels are all different, the reliability
of the 𝑗th layer in the channel 𝑖 , which consists of 𝑛𝑙 components, can be evaluated using
the formula.

Rij (t ) = e

−ij t
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= e

−k t

=e

−
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 ijk t
k =1

(i = 1, ..., m ; j = 1, 2, 3).

(9-3)

k =1

The reliability of the channel 𝑖 can be described as follows:
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−
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(9-4)
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According to Eq. (9-3), 𝑅𝑖1 (𝑡), 𝑅𝑖2 (𝑡), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖3 (𝑡) can be obtained. Subsequently, the
reliability model of the proposed architecture under non-radiation conditions can be
derived as follows:
m
m

 

RS (t ) = 1 −  (1 − Ri1 (t ))  1 −  (1 − (Ri 2 (t )  Ri 3 (t ))).
i =1
i =1

 


(9-5)

Specifically, as previously discussed, cases of all three channels encountering failures
simultaneously are not considered in this work, common-mode failure is therefore not
considered.

9.3.2

Radiation Degradation Factor

To take radiation effects in consideration in the system reliability analysis, a new analysis
method for electronic systems has been developed in (Lauridsen et al., 1996a; Lauridsen
et al., 1996b). This method uses radiation degradation factors(∆), instead of the usual
failure rate data, of an item in the reliability model, to describe the radiation response of
this item under a total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 , which will lie in the interval [0, 1] and can be
defined as follows:
 = min

 (P

0

− Pt ) / (P0 − Pf

) , 1.

(9-6)

A detailed description of the radiation degradation factor can be found in (Lauridsen et
al., 1996b).
(P0 − Pt ) / (P0 − Pf

=
0

1


)

for P0  Pt  Pf or P0  Pt  Pf
for Pt  P0  Pf or Pt  P0  Pf .
for P0  Pf  Pt or P0  Pf  Pt

(9-7)

Some previous studies (Lauridsen, et al., 1996a; Lauridsen, et al., 1996b) have derived
the parameter values of radiation degradation based on actual radiation test data; with
radiation degradation function which are used to describe how the properties of the
materials and/or components change under various radiation conditions.
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Since semiconductor components may have a number (𝑛𝑝 ) of critical parameters, in this
study, the radiation degradation factor is chosen as the mean value of the degradation
factors across all critical parameters as follows:

 min  (P
np

=

i0

i =1

)(

)

− Pit / Pi0 − Pi f , 1



(9-8)

.

np

The reliability (𝑅 ′ (𝑡)) of an item under the total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 can then be expressed
in Eq. (9-9).
R ' (t ) = (1 − )  R(t ) = (1 − )  e − t .

(9-9)

The reliability of the 𝑗th layer in the channel 𝑖 under the total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 can be
evaluated in Eq. (9-10).
nl

R ' ij (t ) =  (1 −  k )e

− k t

(9-10)

(i = 1, ..., m ; j = 1, 2, 3).

k =1

Assuming that the channel 𝑖 consists of 𝑛𝑐 components, the reliability of the channel 𝑖
under the total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 can be evaluated by using Eq. (9-11).
nc

R ' Ci (t ) =  (1 −  k )e

− k t

(9-11)

(i = 1, ..., m).

k =1

Using Eq. (9-10), the reliabilities 𝑅 ′ 𝑖1 (𝑡), 𝑅 ′ 𝑖2 (𝑡), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 ′ 𝑖3 (𝑡) can be evaluated. The
reliability model of the redundant architecture mentioned in Figure 6-3 under the total
radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 can be derived as Eq. (9-12).
m
m

 
R ' S (t ) = 1 −  1 − R ' i1 (t )   1 −  1 − R ' i 2 (t )  R ' i 3 (t )
i =1
i =1

 

(

)

( (

)).


(9-12)

9.4 Radiation-Tolerance of the Developed Wireless Device
In the assessment of system reliability using Eq. (9-12), only the total radiation dose has
been considered. One difficulty in the assessment is proper determination of the
degradation factors for semiconductor devices used. Most of radiation degradation factors
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under different radiation doses in this study come from NASA Goddard Space Flight
Center radiation test database, which are publicly available on-line; others are derived
from the existing literature (Messenger and Ash, 1991; Houssay, 2000; Kulkami and
Agarwal, 2003).
In this work, the failure rates of semiconductor components listed in Column (5) of Table
9-1 come from the online resources of their manufacturers, while those radiation
degradation factors listed in Column (7) to (10) of Table 9-1. For some components, their
𝑃𝑓 are not available in NASA database and literature. Under these circumstances, they are
derived from the limits of respective parameters in the specifications. According to the
sources used, they can be categorized into three types:
•

Most radiation degradation factors (83.34%) for different radiation doses are
derived from the test data;

•

Several radiation degradation factors (8.33%) are derived from the test data of
similar components of same function and same semiconductor technologies;

•

Other radiation degradation factors (8.33%) are derived from the mean value of
the test data of different components with the same semiconductor technologies.
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Table 9-1: Radiation degradation factors of the developed wireless device
Channel

Function

Source
encoder
Channel
encoder
A1&S1

Decision &
digital
modulator
Transceiver

Source
encoder

A2&S2

Channel
encoder

Type

Q.

FIT

R.
D.F

Δ

Δ

Δ

Δ

10K

20K

50K

100K

NPN BJT

1

2.45

A

0.194

0.3201

0.4267

0.4591

Voltage ref.

1

3.30

A

0.0774

0.1010

0.2104

0.3432

OP Amp

3

1.85

A

0.0208

0.0365

0.0383

0.0365

Voltage ref.

1

3.30

A

0.0642

0.1099

0.5158

0.5786

AD

1

0.20

A

0.0178

0.0486

0.0633

0.0649

2

E PROM

1

2.20

A

0.0023

0.0244

0.1341

0.1326

FPGA

1

3.30

A

0.0187

0.0465

0.1001

0.1179

Voltage ref.

1

3.30

C

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Varactor

1

3.30

A

0.0000

0.0577

0.0145

0.0769

915 MHz RF

1

1.90

A

0.0395

0.0745

0.1503

0.1810

Voltage ref.

1

3.30

A

0.1510

0.0181

0.0087

0.0094

OP amp

3

0.28

A

0.0409

0.0770

0.2989

0.2168

OP amp

1

0.28

A

0.2377

0.3964

0.6620

0.6537

Voltage ref.

1

3.30

A

0.1408

0.3371

0.3204

0.3846

AD

1

0.25

A

0.1735

0.1503

0.2741

0.3345

Decision&
digital
modulator

Controller

1

5.60

A

0.0638

0.0654

0.0985

0.1190

Logic gate

1

0.50

A

0.1330

0.0244

0.1850

0.2432

Transceiver

915 MHz RF

1

2.0

A

0.1026

0.1336

0.2310

0.2451

Source
encoder

Voltage ref.

1

3.30

A

0.1408

0.3371

0.3204

0.3846

OP amp

3

0.20

A

0.0689

0.1551

0.3673

0.5151

Voltage ref.

1

3.30

A

0.0039

0.0216

0.0223

0.0644

AD

1

1.60

A

0.0181

0.0229

0.0246

0.0209

OP amp

2

0.20

A

0.1360

0.0764

0.1757

0.2717

Controller

1

2.26

A

0.0109

0.0134

0.0149

0.0168

Logic gate

1

3.30

A

0.0469

0.0494

0.0480

0.0724

915 MHz RF

1

1.90

A

0.0479

0.0781

0.1108

0.1567

Voltage ref.

1

3.30

A

0.0055

0.0269

0.0238

0.0646

Channel
encoder
A3&S3
Decision&
digital
modulator
Transceiver

According to Eq. (9-12), under four total radiation dose levels (10 K Rad (Si), 20 K Rad
(Si), 50 K Rad (Si), 100 K Rad (Si)), the reliabilities of the developed wireless devices
are shown in Figure 9-1. It can be seen that the reliability decreases significantly as the
total radiation dose increases. Moreover, through the comparison, the reliabilities in
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single channel (A1/S1, A2/S2, A3/S3), the system with triple channels (FT (m=3)), and the
system with six redundant channels (FT (m = 6)), also shown in Figure 9-1. It is evident
that the reliabilities (98.4%, 94.9%, 61.5%, 44.2%) of the system with redundant
architectures are much higher than those (60.3%, 37.5%, 11.9%, 7.2%; 33.6%, 20.7%,
3.2%, 3.4%; and 35.2%, 36.8%, 16.0%, 6.2%) of non-redundant channels under the same
radiation conditions.
A1/S1

A2/S2

A3/S3

FT (m=3)

FT (m=6)

1.00
0.90
0.80

Reliability

0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
FT (m=6)
FT (m=3)
A3/S3
A2/S2
A1/S1

0.20
0.10
0.00
0K

10 K

20 K

50 K

Wireless device

0.30

100 K

Total dose (Rad (Si))

Figure 9-1: The compassion of the reliability of the developed redundant system and
no-redundant channels under the given total doses (0, 10 K Rad (Si), 20 K Rad (Si),
50 K Rad (Si), and 100 K Rad (Si))
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70 Sv/h

530 Sv/h

1350 Sv/h

2700 Sv/h

1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80

Reliability

0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
0h

2h

4h

8h

16 h

24 h

Working time (hours)

Figure 9-2: Radiation assessment of the developed wireless device under various
dose rates
In a summary, combing with the developed radiation protection in Chapter 5, the
radiation assessment of the developed system under various dose rates for (24h) duration
is illustrated in Figure 9-2. It can be seen that the reliability of the developed device
under a dose rate of 530Sv/h for 24 h is about 89.6%. This means that the device can
therefore work reliably in those high level radiation environments. Cumulative dose can
be calculated by:
Dose = Dose Rate  Irradiated Time.

(9-12)

According to Eq. (9-12), using the levels of Fukushima disaster as a guideline, before
March 2012, the highest dose rate recorded is about 73 Sv/h, that means the developed
system can survive for at least 7 days. In Feb. 2017, the highest recorded dose rate is 530
Sv/h, the system can survive for at least 24 hours.
On the other hand, based on the calculation, as the radiation level increases, the radiation
degradation factors of the semiconductor components increase significantly as well,
which results in decreases of the reliability of these components. Moreover, under
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different levels of the total doses, the reliability (60.3%, 37.5%, 11.9%, 7.2%) of A1/S1
channel (bipolar semiconductor technologies) is higher than that (35.2%, 36.8%, 16.0%,
6.2%) of A3/S3 channel (Hybrid semiconductor technologies) and much higher than that
(33.6%, 20.7%, 3.2%, 3.4%) of A2/S2 channel (CMOS semiconductor technologies).
These results agree with the known knowledge in the domain of radiation assurance.
Hence, this assessment technique can be used to select components and to evaluate the
radiation-tolerance of the entire whole system in the design phase. It is also an effective
tool to aid in design of tests in a physical radiation environment.

9.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter, an assessment method of the radiation-tolerance of a wireless monitoring
device is presented for radiaiton conditions, which is developed by using radiation
protection and radiation-tolerant techniques. The study results show that total dose can be
effectively decreased by radiation protections. The analytical results conclude that, under
given radiation conditions (10 K Rad (Si), 20 K Rad (Si), 50 K Rad (Si), 100 K Rad (Si)),
the reliability of the developed architecture (98.4%, 94.9%, 61.5%, 44.2%) is much
higher than those of non-redundant channels (60.3%, 37.5%, 11.9%, 7.2%; 33.6%,
20.7%, 3.2%, 3.4%; and 35.2%, 36.8%, 16.0%, 6.2%). The system reliability can further
be improved by selecting components with higher radiation resistance and/or by
increasing the protection capability of radiation shielding.
According to assessment studies, the developed system can work in high level radiation
fields with a total dose up to 1 M Rad (Si). It provides an economical and effective
solution to obtain up-to-date information in the event of a severe accident in a nuclear
power plant without resorting to use of expensive rad-hardened electronics components.
However, it is important to mention that the proposed radiation-tolerance assessment
method should not replace physical tests. It can be used to design physical tests and be
treated as complementary tool. Their value cannot be underestimated at the design phase
of the system to select suitable electronic components and to evaluate their radiationtolerance.
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Chapter 10

10

Experimental Validation

In the design of a radiation-hardened electronic system, the investigation of the
correctness and effectiveness of the proposed radiation-hardened design techniques and
the evaluation of the radiation hardness of the developed electronic devices are the
critical parts. They are usually performed by exposing the device and/or system to a
radiation environment and measuring the performance parameters. Over the years, a lot
of research works has been done to obtain radiation data. In general, a radiation test has
three distinct objectives: (1) to investigate the mechanisms of the interaction of radiation
particles with semiconductor materials and to understand how a device fails caused by
these effects; (2) to investigate radiation responses of specific devices and technologies
for the component selection in the system design; and (3) to investigate the radiation
hardness of the product to determine its acceptability (Ronald et al., 1988). The first type
of tests is fundamental for the understanding of radiation effects and damages on
electronics. The second focuses on radiation responses of devices and technologies. The
third focuses on the system-level to investigate the radiation hardness of the product.
However, investigation of radiation responses of modern wireless communication devices
is limited in the literature. Such information is not only significant but also necessary for
design of systems operating in high level radiation environment.
In this Chapter, to investigate the radiation hardness of the developed wireless systems,
as well as to validate the investigated methods, four different experiments with several
distinct wireless devices built with diversified commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
components have been performed under radiation conditions with both high dose rate (20
K Rad (Si)/h) condition and low dose rate (200 Rad (Si)/h) condition by using 60Co
gamma irradiator in Nuclear Reactor Laboratory of the Ohio State University (OSUNRL). The goals are: (1) the investigation of radiation vulnerabilities of the wireless
monitoring system with diversified commercial off-the-shelf components under a high
dose rate condition; (2) performance evaluation of popular wireless transceivers and
networks under a radiation environment; (3) evaluation of diversified non-redundant
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wireless monitoring devices under radiation conditions with high and low dose rate; (4)
evaluation of the radiation hardness of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless devices
under a high dose rate condition.
This Chapter starts with the objectives of the total dose test. Test facility is then described
and experimental approaches are also explained. Subsequently, experimental schemes,
experimental results, and related technical discussions for four tests are presented in
detail. Finally, based on experiment results, conclusions are given.

10.1 Overview
10.1.1

Objectives of Experiments

To obtain up-to-date information, modern digital communication technologies are offen
applied to specifically deal with digital data and digitally pre-processed signals and also
to transmit that information. The composition of a digital communication system is
illustrated in Figure 10-1. The basic elements of a transmitter in a digital communication
system include: (1) input transducer, which converts the output of a practical sensor into
an electrical signal; (2) source encoder, which converts the output of either an analog or a
digital source into a sequence of binary digits; (3) channel encoder, which introduces, in a
controlled manner, some redundancy in the binary information sequence used at the
receiver to overcome the effects of noise and interference encountered in the transmission
of the signal through the channel; (4) digital modulator, which serves as the interface to
map the binary information sequence into the signal waveforms (Proakis and Salehi,
2008). At a receiver end, the basic elements are: (1) digital demodulator, which processes
channel-corrupted transmitted waveforms and reduces each of them to a single number
that represents an estimate the transmitted data symbol; (2) channel decoder, which
reconstructs the original information sequence from the knowledge of the code used in
the channel encoder; (3) source decoder, which reconstructs the original signal from the
source; and (4) output transducer, which converts the electrical signals into a form that is
understandable to the user (Proakis and Salehi, 2008).
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Strong radiation fields
Transmission system
Signal processing
circuit
Input
transducer

AD

Source
encoder

Microcontroller

Transmitter

Channel
encoder

Modulator

Channel

User

Output
transducer

Source
decoder

Channel
decoder

Demodulator

Receive system

Figure 10-1: Composition of a digital communication system (Proakis and Salehi,
2008)
As illustrated in Figure 10-1, various modern semiconductor components and circuits
have to be used for implementing the functions in wireless senders, such as signal
processing circuit, analog-to-digit converter, microcontroller/microprocessor, and
transceiver, etc. The block diagram of a typical transmission system is illustrated in
Figure 10-2.
Input
transducer
Sensor

Source encoder
Signal
processing
circuits

Analog-to-Digit
convertor

Channel
encoder
Microcontroller/
microprocessor

Modulator
Wireless
transceiver

Figure 10-2: A block diagram of the implementation of a typical wireless
transmission system
When a transmission system works in a strong radiation environment, semiconductorbased electronic components and circuits could be damaged due to radiation particles
through either non-ionization processes (displacement damage) and/or ionization
processes (total ionizing dose and single event effect)( Srour and McGarrity, 1988;
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Gregory and Gwyn, 1974). In order to ensure that a device can complete its mission in a
radiation environment, investigation of radiation responses at component-level, circuitlevel, and system-level becomes significant and necessary. As explained in Chapter 2,
many research works have been carried out to investigate radiation effects on
components. However, for a digital communication system, investigation of radiation
effects on circuit-level and system-level is still limited. There have a number of questions
need to be investigated, such as:
(a) Which module is most sensitive to high level radiation?
(b) Which wireless transceivers and networks are suitable to be used in a high level
radiation environment?
(c) How different wireless measurement and communication devices can be built
with diversified hardware to survive under different radiation environments? and
(d) What is the radiation hardness of the developed redundant wireless device in a
high level radiation environment?
Hence, the experiments in this research focus on circuit- and system-level rather than
component-level to determine answers to the above questions through measuring
radiation responses of the developed wireless devices, as well as to validate the
developed radiation-hardened methods. The overview of the experimental validations is
illustrated in Figure 10-3.
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Figure 10-3: An overview of the experimental validation in this research
The objectives of the irradiation test are as follows:
(1) Experiment Part I: to investigate radiation vulnerability in wireless measurement
and transmission devices with diversified COTS components in a radiation
environment with a high dose rate;
(2) Experiment Part II: to evaluate the performance of popular wireless transceivers
and networks, such as ZigBee, Wireless-Hart, ISA100.11a, LoRa, 433MHz
network, and 915MHz network, in a radiation environment with a high dose rate;
(3) Experiment Part III: to evaluate the performance of non-redundant wireless
devices implemented with different semiconductor technologies, e.g., CMOS,
Bipolar, and Hybrid, etc., under radiation conditions with both low and high dose
rate conditions.
(4) Experiment Part IV: to evaluate the performance of the developed redundant
wireless devices under a radiation condition with a high dose rate, such as lifespan,
and the performance of wireless communication, etc.
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10.1.2

Experimental Approaches

One typical approach of a system and part level hardness assurance is to irradiate the
system and/or the part by a selected radiation source (such as γ source) for fixed period of
time and then test hardware for potential errors and/or degradations (Ronald et al., 1988).
According to characterizations of the radiation source, it can be also separated into three
types: (1) displacement damage test, which is performed by exposing a device to a fixed
particle fluence (electron, proton, or neutron) and characterizing its parameter
degradation; (2) total dose test, which is performed by exposing a device to an ionizing
radiation environment and measuring the electrical performance under various operating
conditions; and (3) single particle effects test, which is performed by continually
measuring the device responses under a high-energy particle accelerator while the device
is operating (Ronald et al., 1988).
Furthermore, there are two other tests to characterize the responses: (1) step-stress test,
which is performed by first measuring the electrical performance of the device,
subsequently, exposing it to a fixed dose of ionizing radiation for a certain duration of
time, then re-measuring those parameters to obtain their responses; and (2) in-flux test,
which the device response is continually measured while it is being irradiated (Ronald et
al., 1988).
According to the previously mentioned objectives, the current work focuses on total dose
test at the circuit-level and the system-level. All test samples will be exposed to an
ionizing radiation environment first. Afterwards the electrical performance and wireless
communication performance are measured. In Experimental Part I, using the method of
step-stress test, irradiated samples are exposed to radiation for a fixed period of time, and
then their electrical parameters are re-measured until most modules fail. Other
experiments are performed using online method to continually measure the device
response until it fails.
Three type parameters are monitored to reflect behaviors of tested samples under
radiation environments: (1) the lifespan defined that the unit has a functional failure
under the condition of dose rate; (2) the accuracy of parameter measurement, e.g., 4~20
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mA current signal; and (3) the performance of wireless communication, e.g., packet error
rate, packet loss rate, frequency, and received signal strength indicator (RSSI). The
amount of radiation dose can be calculated how much radiation the device has
accumulated over time, which is illustrated in the following equation.
Dose = Dose Rate  Irradiated Time.

Hence, radiation resistance of the irradiated sample can be calculated by:
Radiation Re sis tan ce = Dose Rate  Survival Time.

(10-1)

Experimental objectives and approaches of each test are summarized in Table 10-1.
Table 10-1: Summary of experimental objectives and approaches in this total dose
test
Experiments

Dose rates

Approaches

Part I

To investigate radiation vulnerability in a
wireless measurement and transmission
device

20 K Rad/h

Off -line

Part II

To evaluate the performance of six
industrial wireless transceivers and
networks under a radiation environment

20 K Rad/h

Online

Part III

To evaluate the performances of nonredundant wireless devices implemented
with varies semiconductor technologies
under radiation conditions with both low
and high dose rate

20 K Rad/h &
200 Rad/h

Online

Part IV

To investigate radiation hardness of the
developed redundant wireless device with a
shielding protection

20 K Rad/h

Online

10.1.3

Objectives

Radiation Level Considered in Experimental Validation

As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.3, in March 2012, the level of radiation particles was
estimated to be up to 73 Sv/h (7.3 K Rad/h) inside the containment of No.2 reactor in
Fukushima plant (Eisler, 2012), and in Feb. 2017, it was up even further to 530 Sv/h (53

162

K Rad/h) (The Guardian, 2017). Therefore, taking that information as a reference,
radiation level in this experimental validation is therefore considered in the range of 10 K
Rad/h ~ 100 K Rad/h. The selected highest dose rate in this test is 20 K Rad/h, which is
within ballpark of 530 Sv/h.

10.1.4

Experimental Facility

In this work, all tested devices are irradiated in a 6"-diameter dry tube in the Cobalt-60
underwater irradiator in Nuclear Reactor Laboratory of the Ohio State University. The
irradiation chamber is a dry, air-filled, 6 inches tube that is open to atmosphere (OSUNRL, 2018). For samples, a shielded elevator is used to move them into the irradiation
position. The approximate dose rate at the peak location is 20 K Rad (Si)/h and the lowest
dose rate is 200 Rad (Si)/h (2018-10-08) (OSU-NRL, 2018). The Cobalt-60 gamma
irradiator dose-rate curve in 6" tube is shown in Figure 10-4.

Figure 10-4: The Co-60 gamma irradiator dose-rate curve (OSU-NRL, 2018)
The distance above the bottom of the highest dose rate (20 K Rad/h) is 8 inch and that of
the lowest dose rate (200 Rad/h) is 20 inch. The sample plate and the shielding of the Co60 gamma irradiator are shown in Figure 10-5.
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Figure 10-5: Sample plate and shielding of 60Co gamma irradiator (OSU-NRL,
2018)

10.1.5

Experimental Schemes

Due to the highest dose rate in 60Co gamma irradiator is located at the bottom and the
length of dry tube is about 45 inch, it is therefore difficult to use the online method for
directly measuring signals from the devices under test. Moreover, the measurement
equipment cannot be directly exposed to the radiation source. There are several issues
need to be resolved if the tests are performed through continually measuring the device
responses while it is being irradiated. These issues are: (1) signal issues, where the signal
will be attenuated if transmitted by using long cables; (2) power supply issue, where the
power will be reduced if passing through a long cable, and (3) the location of the
measurement equipment, which cannot be working in strong radiation environments.
An experimental setup is developed to obtain responses of irradiated devices under a high
dose rate (20 K Rad/h) condition. An illustration diagram for a high dose rate condition is
shown in Figure 10-6.
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Figure 10-6: Schematic of the experimental setup inside 60Co irradiator
Some equipment and devices are used to measure electrical parameters and obtain
behaviors of the device while the samples are irradiated. A list is provided in Table 10-2.
Table 10-2: Testing equipment using in the experiment
Equipment

Type

Manufacture

34410 A

Digital multi-meter

AGiLENT

1672 D

Precision DC power
supply

BK

TDS2024B

Oscilloscope

RF Explorer

Handheld spectrum
analyzer

T430

Laptop

TEKTRONIX
Seed Studio
Lenovo

Function
To measure 4~20 mA signal as a
reference
DC power supply for irradiated
samples
To measure electrical parameters
of an irradiated sample
To measure frequency and RSSI
of wireless transceivers
To receive, record, and analyze
wireless communication data
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10.2 Part I: Investigation of Radiation Vulnerability with
Diversified COTS Components
In this Section, a total dose test for various modules in a typical wireless measurement
and transmission unit is performed under a high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) condition by
using 60Co gamma irradiator. The irradiated modules are implemented with selected
diversified commercial off-the-shelf components as indicated in Chapter 4, which include
the module of analog signal processing, the module of analog-to-digital converter, the
module of microcontroller, and the module of wireless transceiver. The results of this test
will provide a guideline at the design phase for wireless monitoring systems to be used in
high level radiation environments.
This Section starts with the experimental background, which includes test circuits and
related experimental approaches. Subsequently, experimental setup is described in detail.
Then, experimental results for each module are presented, which include the output of the
analog signal processing circuits, the response of the analog-to-digital converters, the
performance of microcontroller units, and the performance of wireless transceivers.
Finally, several technical discussions and limitation of this test are presented.

10.2.1
(1)

Introduction of Irradiated Circuits

Analog Signal Processing Circuits

When ionizing radiation passes through a bipolar device, due to an increase in the density
of interface traps at the surface of the extrinsic base region and positive charge buildup,
the degradation of a bipolar transistor can include two aspects: the increase of
recombination current, and the reduction in the common-emitter current gain (Johnston et
al., 1994). For many linear bipolar technologies, the degradation at a given total dose
depends on the dose rate and it is more prominent at the low dose rate, which is called
Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitivity (ELDRS) (Boch et al., 2004). Several critical
parameters of operational amplifiers under different dose rates have been investigated in
(Boch et al., 2004; Pease et al., 1997; Pease et al., 1998), such as the input bias current,
supply current, input offset voltage, and output voltage, etc. As previously mentioned,
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this test focuses on circuit responses, instead of component responses. Therefore, the
output voltage of the entire circuit is the only parameter considered in this test.
Many variables in a nuclear power plant are measured by sensors whose output is a
current source (4~20 mA). The processing circuit for 4~20 mA signal is illustrated in
Figure 10-7. Experiment Part I is performed under the condition of high dose rate for
three different operational amplifiers: CLC502, LM108, and UA741, which are
manufactured by National Semiconductor, Texas Instruments, and STMicroelectronics,
respectively. The main purpose is to evaluate radiation-induced damage in different
operational amplifiers, as well as to determine the radiation hardness of different
amplifier circuits. Due to the selected operational amplifiers need a -5V signal as the
power source and the input of the power supply is +5 V, several voltage regulators are
used to generate -5 V signal: LT1611, MAX660, and LM2662, which are manufactured
by Linear Technology, and Texas Instruments, respectively.
GND

47 K

47 K

+5V

100

Output
1K

47 K
-5V
47 K
4~20 mA

Voltage regulator

+5V

GND

Figure 10-7: Irradiated circuits of analog signal processing in Experiment Part I
Pictures of electronic circuits for analog signal processing used in Experiment Part I are
shown in Figure 10-8.

167

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

Figure 10-8: Pictures of electronic circuit boards for analog signal processing used
in Experiment Part I
(2)

Analog-to-Digital Converter

Analog-to-digital converter (ADC) is analog- and mix-signal circuit in a digital
communication system, which can become non-functional due to performance
degradation, loss of calibration, transient output errors, and latchup caused when it works
in strong ionizing radiation environments (Sternberg et al., 2006). Several critical
parameters of various ADCs amplifiers under different dose rates have been investigated
in (Sternberg et al., 2006; Kalshnikov et al., 1998; Lee and Johnston, 1998; Lee et al.,
1994), which include conversion time, degraded conversion function, power supply
current, output voltage degradation, reference voltage degradation, and current noise, etc.
In this work, the test is performed under the radiation condition with high dose rate for
three circuits with different ADCs: AD571, AD674, and AD1671, which are all
manufactured by Analog Devices. Several parameters are involved to reflect radiation
responses of those circuits: the output voltage of ADC’ IO port and the output of analogto-digital conversion. The analog-to-digital circuits and analog signal circuits are
integrated in a same circuit board, which is shown in Figure 10-8.
(3)

Microcontroller Module

For the measurement and transmission unit, many functions of calculation and control are
carried out inside the microcontroller module, which is the most important part in a
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digital communication system. Ionizing radiation may affect many aspects of the
microcontroller, such as degradation of general-purpose input/output (GPIO)’s drive
capability, non-function of memory units, inaccuracy of clock frequency, etc. In this
work, tests for three type microcontrollers are performed under the radiation condition
with a high dose rate: P89V51RC2, PIC16F77, and C8051F581, which are manufactured
by NXP, Microchip, and Silicon Labs, respectively. Several test parameters are involved
in this part: output voltage of GPIO, performance of memory unit (SRAM and
EEPROM/FLASH), accuracy of clock frequency (PWM). Pictures of irradiated circuit
boards of microcontroller modules are shown Figure 10-9.

(a) Sample-4

(b) Sample-5

(c) Sample-6

Figure 10-9: Pictures of electronic circuits for microcontroller modules used in
Experiment PART I
(4)

Wireless Transceiver Module

Irradiation may affect many aspects of wireless transceiver from system-level, such as
degradation of IO’s drive capability, inaccuracy of frequency, degradation of
communication performance, received signal strength indicator (RSSI), etc. In this work,
tests for three type wireless transceivers (433 MHz & 915 MHz) have been performed
under the radiation condition with a high dose rate: RF2905, SI4463, and SX1278, which
are manufactured by RF Micro Devices, Silicon Labs, and Semtech, respectively. Several
test parameters are involved to obtain the degradation of wireless transceivers: output
voltage of IO port, packet loss rate, packet error rate, frequency, and RSSI.
Pictures of irradiated circuit boards of wireless transceiver modules in Experiment Part I
are shown in Figure 10-10.
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(a) Sample-7

(b) Sample-8

(c) Sample-9

Figure 10-10: Picture of electronic circuits for wireless transceiver modules using in
Experiment Part I

10.2.2

Experimental Setup

In this test, samples are placed in the 6-inch diameter Co-60 irradiator tube. The gamma
irradiator generates the dose rate of 20 K Rad/h on the samples. A voltage source located
outside the irradiator is connected to wireless measurement and transmission units as
power supply with 30 ft wires. A DC-DC converter is installed at the top of the elevator
as power supplies for all irradiated samples. A lead shielding is used to mitigate radiation
damages on the DC-DC converter. Picture of this experimental setup is shown in Figure
10-11.
DC-DC Converter

Lead Shielding

Irradiated Samples

Figure 10-11: Picture of experimental setup in Experiment Part I
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Several radiation levels are considered in this part of tests: 0 Rad, 10 K Rad, 30 K Rad,
50 K Rad, 100 K Rad, and 130 K Rad. The test is performed by first measuring electrical
parameters of the device, then according to the selected radiation level, exposing it to
ionizing radiation, after a fixed period of time (30 mins, 90 mins, 150 mins, 300 mins,
and 390mins), re-measuring those parameters to obtain their responses. If a device
permanently loses its function, it will not further be irradiated. According to measured
parameters, radiation-tolerances of each module can be obtained and the radiation
vulnerability in a wireless monitoring device using these modules can be also analyzed.
All irradiated samples and their information in Experiment PART I are summarized in
Table 10-3.
Table 10-3: The summary of the irradiated devices in Experiment Part I
Module Function

Analog signal
processing circuit

Analog-to-digital
converter

Microcontroller

Wireless
transceiver

Semiconductor
Device
CLC502
LT1611

Manufacture

Semiconductor
Technology

National Semiconductor,
Linear Technology

Bipolar, Bipolar

LM108,
MAX660

Texas Instruments, Texas
Instruments

CMOS, BiCMOS

UA741,
LM2662

STMicroelectronics, Texas
Instruments

BiFET, BiCMOS

AD571

Analog Devices

Bipolar

AD674

Analog Devices

CMOS

AD1671

Analog Devices

BiMOS

P89V51RC2

NXP

CMOS

PIC16F77

Microchip

CMOS

C8051F581

Silicon Labs

TTL Logic

RF2905

RF Micro Devices

Bipolar

SX1278

Silicon Labs

CMOS

SI4463

Semtech

TTL Logic
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10.2.3
(1)

Experimental Results

Analog Signal Processing Circuits

The outputs of the analog signal processing circuits with the input signal with 4~20 mA
during 390 minutes under the high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) are listed in Table 10-4 and are
illustrated in Figure 10-12.
Table 10-4: Radiation responses of analog signal processing circuits during 390
minutes under a high dose rate condition
Irradiated time
(total dose)

0 min
(0 K Rad)

30 mins
(10 K Rad)

90 mins
(30 K Rad)

150 mins
(50 K Rad)

300 mins
(100 K Rad)

390 mins
(130 K Rad)

Output measurement (V)

Input signal
(mA)

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

4

0.251

0.470

0.466

10

0.735

1.070

0.977

20

1.515

2.070

1.890

4

0.252

0.470

0.465

10

0.734

1.070

0.977

20

1.530

2.080

1.890

4

0.250

0.470

0.468

10

0.730

1.060

0.977

20

1.470

2.070

1.890

4

0.250

0.484

0.451

10

0.730

1.080

0.963

20

1.460

2.080

1.850

4

0.646(incorrect)

5.0 (Failed)

5.0 (Failed)

10

0.984(incorrect)

5.0 (Failed)

5.0 (Failed)

20

1.780(incorrect)

5.0 (Failed)

5.0 (Failed)

4

4.25 (Failed)

5.0 (Failed)

5.0 (Failed)

10

4.25 (Failed)

5.0 (Failed)

5.0 (Failed)

20

4.25 (Failed)

5.0 (Failed)

5.0 (Failed)
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0 min

30 mins

90 mins

150 mins

300 mins

390 mins

5
4.5

Output Voltage (V)

4
3.5
3
2.5

Irradiation Time (Minutes)

2
1.5
1

390 mins
300 mins
150 mins
90 mins
30 mins
0 min

0.5
0

Irradiated samples with different current inputs under a 20 K Rad/h condition

Figure 10-12: Radiation responses of analog signal processing circuits during 390
minutes under a high dose rate condition
Experimental results have shown that when total doses are less than 50 K Rad, each
circuit works well with the complete function for different current inputs. At 50 K Rad,
sample-2 and sample -3 (LM108 and UA741) still work well. However, when the total
dose is 100 K Rad, the output of Sample-1 becomes incorrect and Sample-2 and Sample3 have permanently failed. At 130 K Rad, all irradiated samples are permanently failed.
Function statuses of the failed analog processing circuits are listed in Table 10-5.
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Table 10-5: Status of the failed analog signal processing circuits
Irradiated
Devices
Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

(2)

Functions

Components

Output

Test Result

-5V reference

LT1611

0.296 V

Failed

Amplifier
circuit

CLC502

-

-

-5V reference

MAX660

-5V

Functional

Amplifier
circuit

LM108

0V

Failed

-5V reference

LM2662

0.046V

Failed

Amplifier
circuit

UA741

-

-

Analog-to-Digital Converter

The conversion outputs of ADC chips with the output of analog processing circuits
during 390 minutes at high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) are listed in Table 10-5 and are
illustrated in Figure 10-13. The ADC inputs are the outputs of signal processing circuits
with 4~20 mA signals.

174

Table 10-6: Measurement conversion outputs of analog-to-digital converters during
390 minutes under a high dose rate condition
Irradiated
time
(total dose)

0 min
(0 K
Rad(Si))

30 mins
(10 K
Rad(Si))

90 mins
(30 K
Rad(Si))

150 mins
(50 K
Rad(Si))

Sample-1
Output code
(Hex / Dec)

Input
voltage

Output code
(Hex / Dec)

Input
voltage

Output code
(Hex / Dec)

0.251

0020 / 32

0.470

0490 / 1168

0.466

00D0 / 208

0.735

0050 / 80

1.070

0530/ 1328

0.977

0290 / 656

1.515

00A0 / 160

2.070

0650 / 1616

1.890

0560 / 1392

0.252

0020 / 32

0.470

0490 / 1168

0.465

00D0 / 208

0.734

0050 / 80

1.070

0530 / 1328

0.977

0290 / 656

1.530

00A0 / 160

2.080

0650 / 1616

1.890

0560 / 1392

0.250

0020 / 32

0.470

0490 / 1168

0.468

00D0 / 208

0.730

0050 / 80

1.060

0530 / 1328

0.977

0290 / 656

1.470

00A0 / 160

2.070

0650 / 1616

1.890

0570 / 1392

0.250

0020 / 32

0.484

0490 / 1168

0.451

00D0 / 208

0.730

0050 / 80

1.080

0530 / 1328

0.963

0280 / 640

1.460

00A0 / 160

2.080

0650 / 1616

1.850

0560 / 1370

0.984
1.780
4.50

390 mins
(130 K
Rad(Si))

Sample-3

Input
voltage

0.646
300 mins
(100 K
Rad(Si))

Sample-2

4.50
4.50

03FC
(Failed)
03FC
(Failed)
03FC
(Failed)
03FC
(Failed)
03FC
(Failed)
03FC
(Failed)

5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0

0FF0
(Failed)
0FF0
(Failed)
0FF0
(Failed)
0FF0
(Failed)
0FF0
(Failed)
0FF0
(Failed)

5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0

0FF0
(Failed)
0FF0
(Failed)
0FF0
(Failed)
0FF0
(Failed)
0FF0
(Failed)
0FF0
(Failed)
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300 mins
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4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0

390 mins
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0 min

Irradiation Time (Minute)

ADC's output value

4500

Irradiated samples with different current inputs under a 20 K Rad/h condition

Figure 10-13: Radiation responses of analog-to-digital converter modules during
390 minutes under a high dose rate condition
The drive capability of ADC I/O port (output voltage) during 390 minutes under a high
dose rate (20 K Rad/h) is shown in Table 10-7.
Table 10-7: the drive capability of ADC’s output port during 390 minutes under a
high dose rate condition
Drive capability (V)

Irradiated time
(total dose)

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

0 min (0 K Rad)

5.01

5.03

4.97

30 mins (10 K Rad)

5.01

5.03

4.96

90 mins (30 K Rad)

5.01

5.03

4.96

150 mins (50 K Rad)

4.95

5.04

4.96

300 mins (100 K Rad)

Failed

Failed

Failed

390 mins (130 K Rad)

Failed

Failed

Failed
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The experimental results have shown that all ADC circuits work well with full functions
when total dose is less than or equal to 50 K Rad. Their drive capabilities and conversion
outputs for different voltage inputs are same with those as before. However, all devices
are permanently failed after irradiated 300 mins (100 K Rad). Hence, radiation-tolerances
of all selected analog-to-digital conversion circuits seem to be between 50 K Rad and 100
K Rad.
(3)

Microcontroller Module

The output voltages of GPIO during 390 minutes under a high dose rate (20 K Rad/h)
condition for diversified microcontrollers are illustrated in Table 10-8.
Table 10-8: Output voltages of microcontroller’s GPIOs during 390 minutes under a
high dose rate condition
Irradiated time
(total dose)

Output voltage of GPIO (V)
Sample-4

Sample-5

Sample-6

0 min (0 K Rad)

5.05

5.01

3.25

30 mins (10 K Rad)

5.05

5.01

3.25

90 mins (30 K Rad)

5.05

5.01

2.81

150 mins (50 K Rad)

5.02

Failed

Failed

300 mins (100 K Rad)

5.28

Failed

Failed

390 mins (130 K Rad)

Failed

Failed

Failed

Several memory types of microcontroller are considered in this test: (1) Type-1, directly
addressable internal data memory; (2) Type-2, indirectly addressable internal data
memory; (3) Type-3, external data memory; and (4) Type-4, program memory. The
performance of the memory on three samples during 390 minutes under a high dose rate
(20 K Rad/h) condition is listed in Table 10-9.
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Table 10-9: Performance of the memory in microcontrollers during 390 minutes
under a high dose rate condition
Irradiated time
(total dose)

0 min
(0 K Rad)

30 mins
(10 K Rad)

90 mins
(30 K Rad)

150 mins
(50 K Rad)

300 mins
(100 K Rad)

390 mins
(130 K Rad)

Error units / total tested units

Memory
type

Sample-4

Sample-5

Sample-6

Type-1

0 / 32

0 / 32

0 / 32

Type-2

0 / 32

0 / 32

0 / 32

Type-3

0 / 32

0 / 32

0 / 32

Type-4

0 / 16

0 / 16

0 / 16

Type-1

0 / 32

0 / 32

0 / 32

Type-2

0 / 32

0 / 32

0 / 32

Type-3

0 / 32

0 / 32

0 / 32

Type-4

0 / 16

0 / 16

0 / 16

Type-1

0 / 32

0 / 32

0 / 32

Type-2

0 / 32

0 / 32

0 / 32

Type-3

0 / 32

0 / 32

0 / 32

Type-4

0 / 16

0 / 16

0 / 16

Type-1

0 / 32

Type-2

0 / 32

Failed

Failed

Type-3

0 / 32

Type-4

0 / 16

Type-1

0 / 32

Type-2

0 / 32

Failed

Failed

Type-3

0 / 32

Type-4

0 / 16

Type-1

Failed

Type-2

Failed
Failed

Failed

Type-3

Failed

Type-4

Failed
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The programming performance of diversified microcontrollers during 390 minutes under
a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h) is illustrated in Table 10-10.
Table 10-10: Program performance of microcontroller during 390 minutes under a
high dose rate condition
Irradiated time
(Total dose)

Sample-4

Sample-5

Sample-6

0 min (0 K Rad)

Program OK

Program OK

Program OK

30 mins (10 K Rad)

Program OK

Program OK

Program OK

90 mins (30 K Rad)

Program OK

Program OK

Program OK

150 mins (50 K Rad)

Program OK

Failed

Failed

300 mins (100 K Rad)

Program OK

Failed

Failed

390 mins (130 K Rad)

Failed

Failed

Failed

The accuracy of Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) frequency during 390 minutes under a
high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h) for diversified microcontrollers are illustrated in
Table 10-11.
Table 10-11: PWM output of microcontrollers during 390 minutes under a high
dose rate condition
Irradiated time
(Total dose)
0 min
(0 K Rad)
30 mins
(10 K Rad)
90 mins
(30 K Rad)
150 mins
(50 K Rad)
300 mins
(100 K Rad)
390 mins
(130 K Rad)

PWM (Hz)
Sample-4

Sample-5

Sample-6

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

49.8

50.0

50.0

49.8

Failed

Failed

49.8

Failed

Failed

Failed

Failed

Failed
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The functions of UARTs during 390 minutes under a high dose rate condition for
diversified microcontrollers are illustrated in Table 10-12.
Table 10-12: UART function of microcontrollers during 390 minutes under a high
dose rate condition
Irradiated time
(total dose)
0 min
(0 K Rad)
30 mins
(10 K Rad)
90 mins
(30 K Rad)
150 mins
(50 K Rad)
300 mins
(100 K Rad)
390 mins
(130 K Rad)

UART Function
Sample-4

Sample-5

Sample-6

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

Failed

Failed

OK

Failed

Failed

Failed

Failed

Failed

Experimental results have shown that all performance parameters (voltage output,
memory testing, programming capability, PWM, and UART) are correct before the total
dose reaches the limitation of the microcontroller. However, the total dose limitations of
three microcontrollers are different. Sample-4 (P89V51RC2) can work well at 100 K Rad
and it fails at 130 K Rad; both Sample-5 (PIC16F77) and Sample-6 (C8051F581) can
work functionally when the total dose is less than or equal to 30 K Rad, but they fail at 50
K Rad. The status of typical functions in failed microcontroller is summarized in Table
10-13.
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Table 10-13: The status of typical functions in failed microcontroller circuits
Irradiated Device

Sample-4

Sample-5

Sample-6

(4)

Function

Output

Result

Crystal

20 MHz

Functional

GPIO

5.05V

Functional

UART

OK

Functional

PWM

49.8 Hz

Functional

SRAM

OK

Functional

EEPROM

Program failed

Failed

Crystal

No responses

Failed

GPIO

0.0 V

Failed

UART

No responses

Failed

PWM

No responses

Failed

SRAM

No responses

Failed

EEPROM

Program OK

Functional

Crystal

No responses

Failed

GPIO

1.7 V

Failed

UART

No responses

Failed

PWM

No responses

Failed

SRAM

No responses

Failed

FLASH

Program failed

Failed

Wireless Transceiver Module

Several transceivers are involved to measure their communication performance, they are
shown in Figure 10-14. Communication performance is evaluated through re-measuring
the error rate and the loss rate during 2 minutes, frequency, and RSSI after wireless
transceiver circuits expore in ionizing radiation for a specific period of time (30 mins, 90
mins, 150 mins, 300 mins, and 390 mins).
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(b) Measurement unit for Sample-8

(a) Measurement unit for Sample-7

(c) Measurement unit for Sample-9

Figure 10-14: Pictures of the developed devices to measure the performance of
irradiated wireless transceivers using in Experiment Part I
The output voltage of IO port (drive capability) during 390 minutes under high dose rate
conditions of diversified wireless transceivers are illustrated in Table 10-14.
Table 10-14: The output voltage of IO port of wireless transceivers during 390
minutes under a high dose rate condition
Output voltage of GPIO (V)

Irradiated time
(total dose)

Sample-7

Sample-8

Sample-9

0 min (0 K Rad)

4.60

5.03

3.15

30 mins (10 K Rad)

4.48

5.03

3.15

90 mins (30 K Rad)

4.48

4.58

2.74

150 mins (50 K Rad)

4.55

Failed

2.73

300 mins (100 K Rad)

4.48

Failed

2.74

390 mins (130 K Rad)

3.65

Failed

2.73
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Communication performance parameters (packet error rate, packet loss rate, frequency,
RSSI) of three wireless transmission circuits during 390 minutes under a high dose rate
condition are illustrated in Table 10-15.
Table 10-15: Communication performance of wireless transceivers during 390
minutes under a high dose rate condition
Irradiated durtion
(total dose)
0 min
(0 K Rad)

30 mins
(10 K Rad)

90 mins
(30 K Rad))

150 mins
(50 K Rad (Si))

300 mins
(100 K Rad (Si))

390 mins
(130 K Rad (Si))

Parameter
Total packets
Packet error & rate
Packet loss & rate
Frequency
RSSI
Total packets
Packet error & rate
Packet loss & rate
Frequency
RSSI
Total packets
Packet error & rate
Packet loss & rate
Frequency
RSSI
Total packets
Packet error & rate
Packet loss & rate
Frequency
RSSI
Total packets
Packet error & rate
Packet loss & rate
Frequency
RSSI
Total packets
Packet error & rate
Packet loss & rate
Frequency
RSSI

Sample-7

Sample-8

Sample-9

60
60
60
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
913.243MHz 433.225MHz 433.225MHz
-67.43dBm
-6.90dBm
-7.90dBm
60
60
60
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
912.973MHz 431.261MHz 431.261MHz
-79.56dBm
-17.8dBm
-23.80dBm
60
60
60
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
912.973MHz 431.261MHz 431.261MHz
-80.94dBm
-34.3dBm
-22.80dBm
60
Failed
60
0 (0%)
Failed
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
Failed
0 (0%)
912.973MHz
Failed
431.261MHz
-94.44dBm
Failed
-17.30dBm
60
60
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
Failed
0 (0%)
913.784MHz
431.261MHz
-79.43dBm
-24.30dBm
60
60
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
Failed
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
914.730MHz
-85.42dBm

433.090MHz
-51.40dBm
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Comparison of wireless signal performance of three wireless devices used in Experiment
Part I is shown in Figure 10-15.

Frequency (MHz)
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(b) RSSI
Figure 10-15: Comparison of wireless signal performance of three wireless devices
used in Experiment Part I
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10.2.4

Discussions

Based on the experimental results and studies, the following summary can be drawn from
Experiment Part I:
(a) All irradiated circuits can work normally under the radiation condition with total
dose as long as it is less than 30 K Rad.
(b) When the total dose is more than 30 K Rad and less than 50 K Rad, for analog
signal processing circuits, all irradiated samples remain working. For analog-todigital converters, all irradiated circuits work well. For microcontrollers, Sample5 and Sample-6 have failed for all tested functions. But Sample-4 still works well
and it’s all functions are normal. For wireless transceivers, Sample-7 and Sample9 work well and their communication performance does not degrade, but Sample8 has failed.
(c) When the total dose is more than 50 K Rad but less than 100 K Rad, for analog
processing circuits, the output sample-1 is incorrect, Sample-2 and Sample-3
failed permanently. For analog-to-digital converters, all irradiated circuits have
permanently failed. For microcontrollers, Sample-4 still remains working.
Wireless transceiver Sample-7 and Sample-9 also work well.
(d) When the total dose is more than 100 K Rad but less than 130 K Rad, all analog
signal processing circuits stop working. All analog-to-digital converters also
failed. Microcontroller Sample-4 still works well with full functionalities.
Wireless transceiver Sample-7 and Sample-9 also work well.
(e) After testing samples are irradiated 390 minutes, the total dose reaches130 K Rad
(Si), Sample-4 stops working. Wireless transceiver Sample-7 and Sample-9 still
work well. All communication parameters have no changes except RSSI.
Radiation resistances of all irradiated circuits in Experiment Part I are summarized in
Table 10-16.
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Table 10-16: Radiation resistances of irradiated circuits under a high dose rate
condition in Experiment Part I
Modules
Analog signal
processing
circuits

Analog-todigital
conversion
circuits

Microcontroller
circuits

Wireless
transmission
circuits

Irradiated
devices

Semiconductor
technologies

Failed
total doses

Estimated radiation
resistances

Sample-1

Bipolar

100 K Rad

50 K ~ 100 K Rad

Sample-2

CMOS, BiCMOS

100 K Rad

50 K ~ 100 K Rad

Sample-3

BiFET, BiCMOS

100 K Rad

50 K ~ 100 K Rad

Sample-1

Bipolar

100 K Rad

50 K ~ 100 K Rad

Sample-2

CMOS

100 K Rad

50 K ~ 100 K Rad

Sample-3

BiCMOS

100 K Rad

50 K ~ 100 K Rad

Sample-4

CMOS

130 K Rad

100 K ~ 130 K Rad

Sample-5

CMOS

50 K Rad

30 K ~ 50 K Rad

Sample-6

TTL Logic

50 K Rad

30 K ~ 50 K Rad

Sample-7

Bipolar

-

> 130 K Rad

Sample-8

CMOS

50 K Rad

30 K ~ 50 K Rad

Sample-9

TTL Logic

-

> 130 K Rad

Estimated radiation resistances of different modules are shown in Figure 10-16.
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Radiation Resistance (K Rad)

Min Value

Max Value

150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20

Figure 10-16: Estimated radiation resistances for irradiated simples testing used in
Experiment Part I
The following conclusions apply to this total dose test:
(a) Experimental results have shown that all irradiated devices have no the significant
degradation of electrical parameters before they fail. All functions are correct
until the total dose reaches the limitation. This discovery agrees well with the
effects of total ionizing dose in Chapter 2.
(b) According to the estimated radiation resistances shown in Figure 10-16,
microcontroller modules may be more susceptible to high dose rate radiation than
other modules.
(c) Some selected COTS components can survive when the cumulative total dose is
more than 100 K Rad, such as P89V51RC2, RF2905, and SI4463. They may have
equivalent performances with some radiation-hardened components.
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Total dose tests in this study are conducted to investigate the radiation vulnerability in a
typical wireless monitoring system under a variety of operating conditions. However,
there are same limitations that can be addressed in the future:
(a) Online methods may be a better solution to obtain up-to-date responses of
irradiated circuits and also to measure their limits of total dose in a more timely
manner; and
(b) More investigations for modern semiconductor devices and circuits need to be
carried out in the future.

10.2.5

Summary

In this Section, total dose tests with 60Co gamma source to investigate radiation
vulnerability in the developed wireless monitoring devices have been performed. Those
modules are conducted with diversified COTS semiconductor devices. Experimental
results have shown that all the irradiated devices perform correctly before the total dose
are more than their limits. According to the estimated radiation resistances,
microcontroller modules are more susceptible to high level of radiation than other
modules. Under a high dose rate condition, devices built with bipolar semiconductor
technology have high level of radiation resistances than those with other semiconductor
technologies.
Furthermore, experimental results have shown that all selected semiconductor devices
can work normally at total dose 30 K Rad and radiation resistances of some modules and
circuits are up to 130 K Rad. It has proved that the method of component selection in this
work is correctness and effectiveness. It has also shown that the definition of total dose
limits in this research (20 K Rad) is reasonably correct for electronic systems using in
COTS components.
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10.3 Part II: Evaluation of Six Industrial Wireless
Transceivers and Networks in a Radiation Environment
Wireless monitoring techniques have been used in a wide variety of applications in past
decades. A number of wireless transceivers and networks have been designed to acquire
data from environment on physical processes. A design for a wireless monitoring system
depends on the requirements of a specific application. To be used in a high level radiation
environment, it will be benefited in the selecting of the wireless transceiver and network
if radiation responses of those wireless transceivers and networks are known. However,
so far, the investigation of this topic is very limited. In this Section, behaviors of six
commonly used in industrial wireless transceivers and networks are investigated under a
radiation environment with a high dose rate. The experimental results will provide a
reference to design wireless monitoring systems to be used in high level radiation
environments.
Six industrial wireless sensor nodes are chosen to undergo irradiation test in this Section,
they are: CC2530 (2.4GHz ZigBee standard), CC2520 (2.4GHz WirelessHART
standard), CC2530 (2.4GHz ISA100.11a standard), SX1278 (433MHz LoRa network),
SI4463 (433MHz point-to-point network), and RF2905 (915MHz point-to-point
network). Tests are conducted until each unit has a functional failure under a dose rate
condition (20 K Rad/h). The behaviors of those devices and networks, e.g.,
communication performance (packet loss rate, packet error rate), wireless signal
performance (frequency and RSSI), and survival time (lifespan), are continually online
monitored throughout the tests.
This Section starts with an introduction to selected six industrial wireless sensor networks
and nodes currently available on the market. Subsequently, the implementation of each
wireless network and the related network configuration in this test is explained in detail.
Then, the experimental setup and investigated parameters are presented. Finally,
experimental results are also analyzed. Based on experimental results, several technical
discussions are also provided, and potential limitations of those systems are also
identified.
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10.3.1
(1)

Introduction of Selected Industrial Wireless Systems

Wireless Transceivers and Networks

In a typical wireless sensor network system, radio frequency (RF) signals are used to
transfer the data from one node to another or a base station. Several distinct frequency
bands have been assigned for wireless sensor networks in industrial applications, such as
433 MHz, 868 MHz, 915 MHz, and 2.4 GHz, etc. In the past few decades, a number of
wireless transceivers have been developed to implement various communication
functions. On the other hand, wireless sensor network standards define the functions and
protocols for sensor nodes to integrate with a variety of networks. In recent years, many
wireless sensor networks have also been developed to for various industrial applications,
such as IEEE 802.15.4, ZigBee, WirelessHART, ISA100.11a, IETF 6LoW-PAN, IEEE
802.15.3, and Wibree (Yick et al., 2008). Hence, a designer of industrial wireless
systems faces many choices of wireless transceivers and network standards. However, if
the application of these systems is within a high level radiation environment, further
attentions have to be paid. Unfortunately, there are only limited resources available about
radiation hardness of wireless transceivers and networks in the literature. Hence, the
investigation of behaviors of wireless transceivers and networks is not only significant
but also necessary.
In this Section, six industrial wireless devices and networks are selected as irradiated
samples to investigate their behaviors under a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h).
They are summarized in Table 10-17.
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Table 10-17: Selected wireless transceivers and networks to be irradiated in
Experiment Part II
Sample

Network Protocol

Transceiver

Controller Unit

Frequency

Sample-1

ZigBee

CC2530

AVR ATMEGA 328

2.4 GHz

Sample-2

WirelessHART

CC2520

Sample-3

ISA100.11a

CC2530

STM32L486

2.4 GHz

Sample-4

LoRa

SX1278

PIC16F77

433 MHz

Sample-5

Point-to-point

SI4463

C8051F581

433 MHz

Sample-6

Point-to-point

RF2905

P89V51RC2

915 MHz

2.4 GHz

Pictures of irradiated wireless devices used in Experiment Part II are shown in Figure 1018.

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

Sample-4

Sample-5

Sample-6

Figure 10-17: Irradiated wireless devices used in Experiment Part II
(2)

Network Setup in Experiment PART II

This experiment is to be conducted in such a way that its performance is being monitored
continually until the unit fails. Several wireless networks have been setup to online obtain
radiation responses of wireless devices. The detailed information of each network and
selected transceivers is introduced next.
➢ ZigBee network
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ZigBee network supports Star, Tree, and Mesh topologies, and the star topology is often
the best choice for industrial applications. Typical Star structure of ZigBee network for
industrial application is illustrated in Figure 11-19 (Wang and Jiang, 2016). According to
the role in network, devices are separated to three types: Coordinator, Router, and End
Device. A Coordinator is used to initialize, maintain, and control the network, Router is
responsible to route messages, and an End Device executes whatever actions associated
the application (Wang and Jiang, 2016).

Figure 10-18: Typical Star topology of ZigBee network for industrial application
(Wang and Jiang, 2016)
In this test, E800-DTU (Z2530-485-20) manufactured by Ebyte Electronic Company is
used as Router and Coordinator, and E18-MS1PA1-IPX is considered as the transceiver
of End Device, which is also manufactured by Ebyte Electronic Company. In addition, an
AVR ATMEGA 328 is selected as the controller of End Device. Pictures of ZigBee
devices using in Experiment Part II are shown in Figure 10-20. End Device sends one
message to Router and Coordinator at a period of two seconds. The messages will then be
transmitted to the Control Workstation through RS232 protocol.
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(a) End device

(b) Router & Coordinator

Figure 10-19: ZigBee devices used in Experiment Part II
➢ WirelessHART network
Basic elements in a WirelessHART network include: Field Devices, Gateway, Access
Point, Network Manager, and Handled Devices, which is shown in Figure 10-21 (Wang
and Jiang, 2016). A Field Device is connected to the industrial process and also has the
router function. An Access Point is used to connect Field Devices with Gateway. The
network manager is used to configure the network, schedule and manage communications
among WirelessHART devices (Wang and Jiang, 2016).

Figure 10-20: WirelessHART network for industrial applications (Wang and Jiang,
2016)
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In this test, Awia Warrior 220 manufactured by AwiaTech Company is considered as a
Field Device. WirelessHART device communicates with WirelessHART Gateway, which
connects to a router. HART Server installed on the Control Workstation is selected to
configure WirelessHART network. The communications are performed by
WirelessHART network with proper standard protocols and HART IP between
WirelessHART Gateway and the Control Workstation. Pictures of WirelessHART
devices used in Experiment Part II are shown in Figure 10-22.

(a) Field Device

(b) Access Device & Gateway

Figure 10-21: WirelessHART devices used in Experiment PART II
The menu of displaying value of chosen sensor in HART Server is shown in Figure 1023. The connection will be disconnected when the irradiated Field Device is damaged by
radiation. The tester needs to refresh this menu each a fixed period of time (5 minutes).
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Figure 10-22: Menu of displaying value of chosen sensor in HART Server
➢ ISA100.11a network
A typical ISA100.11a network includes two type devices: Field Device and Infrastructure
Devices. The former includes Routing Device, I/O Device, and Handheld Device. The
latter includes Backbone Router, Gateway, and System and Security Manager (Wang and
Jiang, 2016). The typical structure of ISA100.11a network for industrial applications is
shown in Figure 10-24.

Figure 10-23: ISA100.11a network for industrial applications (Wang and Jiang,
2016).
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In this test, VN210 manufactured by Company is considered as Field Router and IO
Device. VersaRouter 900 is selected as Backbone Router and Gateway as hardware
support for the infrastructure components, which also perform the functions of System
Manager, Security Manager, and System Time Source. A web application called
Monitoring Control System is developed to remotely check and configure ISA100.11a
network, which is installed in VersaRouter 900 through Ethernet to communication with
the Control Workstation. The user can use Internet Explorer to operator the web
application at the Control Workstation. Pictures of ISA100.11a devices used in
Experiment Part II are shown in Figure 10-25.

(a) I/O Device

(b) Router & Gateway

Figure 10-24: Pictures of ISA100.11a devices used in Experiment PART II
The web application installed in ISA100.11a Gateway is shown in Figure 10-26. The
detailed device information is given in this application. Statistics of transmitted and
received packets are also presented and analyzed in this web application. The Gateway
cannot continually receive messages when irradiated ISA100.11a device is damaged by
radiation. In the test, the tester needs to refresh this web application each a fixed period of
time (5 minutes).
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Figure 10-25: Web application installed in ISA100.11a Gateway
➢ LoRa network
LoRa devices and wireless radio frequency technology is developed proposed by
Semtech, which is a long range, low power wireless platform for Internet of Things (IoT)
applications (Georgiou and Raza, 2017). LoRa network includes three type devices: End
Device, Gateway, and LoRa NetServer. The typical structure of LoRa network for
industrial application is shown in Figure 10-27 (Centenaro et al., 2016).

Figure 10-26: Typical structure of LoRa network in industrial application
(Centenaro et al., 2016)
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In this test, E19-433MS1W (SX1278-based) manufactured by Ebyte Electronic Company
is considered as LoRa device. A microcontroller PIC16F77 is selected to control and
setup LoRa transceiver (SX1278). A gateway for LoRa, 433 MHz and 915 MHz
networks shown in Figure 10-28 is also developed to obtain messages and then send them
to the Control Workstation though RS232 protocol.

Figure 10-27: Pictures of gateway for LoRa, 433 MHz & 915MHz networks using in
Experiment PART II
➢ 433MHz & 915MHz point-to-point network
A point-to-point network is the simplest arrangement in a communication system. It
usually consists of two nodes. Typical structure of point-to-point network is shown in
Figure 10-29.

A

B

Figure 10-28: Typical structure of point-to-point network
SI4463 manufactured by Silicon Labs Company is a high-performance and low-current
transceiver. It is designed to be compliant with 802.15.4g and WMbus smart metering
standards. In this test, SI4463 is considered as the transceiver of 433 MHz point-to-point
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network and C8051F581 manufactured by Silicon Labs Company is selected as its
controller.
RF2905 manufactured by is developed for linear or digital applications in different
frequency bands. It is conducted with bipolar semiconductor technology. In this test,
RF2905 is considered as the transceiver of 915 MHz point-to-point network and
P89V51RC2manufactured by NXP Company is selected as its controller.

10.3.2

Experimental Setup

In this part, samples are placed in the 6-inch diameter Co-60 irradiator tube. The gamma
irradiator generates a dose rate of 20 K Rad/h on the samples. A potentiostat located
outside the irradiator is connected to wireless measurement and transmission units as
power supply with 30 ft wires. A DC-DC converter is used to generate +5 power supplies
for all irradiated samples and installed at the top of the elevator. A lead shielding is used
to mitigate radiation damages on the DC-DC converter. Picture of experimental setup for
2.4 GHz wireless networks used in Experiment Part II is shown in Figure 10-29.

Irradiated Devices
Ethernet
Router

ZigBee
Gateway

WirelessHART
Gateway

ISA 100.11a
Gateway

Control
Workstation

Figure 10-29: Experimental setup for 2.4 GHz wireless networks used in
Experiment Part II
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Picture of experimental setup for LoRa, 433 MHz, and 915 MHz wireless networks used
in Experiment Part II is shown in Figure 10-30.
DC-DC
Converter
Lead Shielding

Power Supply

Control
Workstation

Irradiated Devices
Wireless Gateway

Figure 10-30: Experimental setup for LoRa, 433MHz, and 915MHz wireless devices
and networks used in Experiment Part II
A software tool installed in the Control Workstation is developed to collect wireless
messages of LoRa network, 433 MHz and 915 MHz network and to analyze their
communication performances. Picture of the developed software tool used in Experiment
Part II is shown in Figure 10-31.
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Figure 10-31: The developed software tool to collect wireless messages and analyze
the communication performance used in Experiment PART II

10.3.3
(1)

Experimental Results

Survival Time

According to Eq. (10-1), survival times and radiation resistances of irradiated wireless
devices under a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h) are summarized in Table 10-18.
Table 10-18: Survival times and radiation resistances of irradiated wireless devices
under a high dose rate condition in Experiment PART II
Parameter

Sample-1
(ZigBee)

Sample-2
(Wireless
HART)

Sample-3
(ISA100.11a)

Sample-4
(LoRa
Network)

Sample-5
(433MHz
Network)

Sample-6
(915 MHz
Network)

Survival
time (h)

3h12m

50m

62m

2h2m18s

1h18m

5h42m53s

Failed
components

CPU &
Transceiver

Transceiver

Transceiver

CPU &
Transceiver

CPU

CPU

Radiation
resistance
(K Rad)

64

16.7

20

40

26

114
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Radiation resistances of six industrial wireless transceivers and networks used in
Experiment Part II are shown in Figure 10-32.
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Radiation Resistance (K Rad)

100

80

60

40

20

0
ZigBee

WirelessHART

ISA100.11a

LoRa network

433MHz
network

915MHz
network

Wireless Transceivers and Networks

Figure 10-32: Radiation resistances of six industrial wireless transceivers and
networks used in Experiment Part III
(2)

Performance of Wireless Communication

Experimental results of communication performance of ZigBee device and network, as
well as ISA100.11a device and network under both a normal condition and a high dose
rate condition, are summarized in Table 10-19 and Table 10-20, respectively. The
evaluation is performed through measuring its communication performance during a
fixed period of time (5 minutes).
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Table 10-19: Experimental results of communication performance of ZigBee devices
and network used in Experiment Part II
Radiation
condition

Normal
condition

20 K
Rad/h

Duration
(minutes)

Total
packets

Packet
loss

Loss
rate
(%)

Packet
error

Error
rate
(%)

30

150

0

0.000

0

60

150

0

0.000

90

150

0

150

150

180

(GHz)

RSSI
(dBm)

0.000

2.405

-43.00

0

0.000

2.406

-32.00

0.000

0

0.000

2.407

-53.50

0

0.000

0

0.000

2.404

-35.00

150

0

0.000

0

0.000

2.406

-48.00

30

150

0

0.000

0

0.000

2.411

-22.50

60

150

0

0.000

0

0.000

2.411

-53.50

90

149

1

0.670

0

0.000

2.410

-45.50

150

150

0

0.000

0

0.000

2.409

-35.50

180

150

0

0.000

0

0.000

2.409

-39.50

192

Frequency

Failed

Table 10-20: Summary of communication performance of ISA100.11a devices and
network used in Experiment Part II
Radiation
condition
Normal
condition

20 K
Rad/h

Durtion
Total
(minutes) packets

Packet
loss

Loss
rate
(%)

Packet
error

Error
rate
(%)

(GHz)

RSSI
(dBm)

Frequency

30

119

0

0.000

0

0.000

2.406

-33.50

60

1375

0

0.000

0

0.000

2.403

-50.50

30

117

2

1.709

0

0.000

2.403

-45.00

60

1368

9

0.658

0

0.000

2.403

-51.00

62

Failed

Experimental results of communication performance of WirelessHART device and
network under both a normal condition and a high dose rate condition is listed in Table
10-21.
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Table 10-21: Experimental results of communication performance of
WirelessHART devices and network used in Experiment Part I
Radiation
condition
Normal
condition

20 K Rad/h

Duration
Device ID
(minutes)

Analog
value
(mA)

Percent
range

Frequency
(GHz)

RSSI
(dBm)

30

131874

11.90

49.50 %

2.402

-49.00

60

131874

11.90

49.50 %

2.407

-48.50

30

131874

11.90

49.50 %

2.402

-48.00

50

131874

11.90

49.50 %

-

-

51

Failed

Experimental results of communication performance of LoRa device, 433MHz device,
and 915MHz device under both a normal condition and a high dose rate condition are
summarized in Table 10-22, Table 10-23, and Table 10-24, respectively.
Table 10-22: Experimental results of communication performance of LoRa devices
and network used in Experiment Part II
Radiation
condition

Normal
condition

20 K
Rad/h

Duration
(minutes)

Total
packets

Packet
loss

Loss
rate

Packet
error

Error
rate

Frequency

(MHz)

RSSI
(dBm)

30

903

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

433.204

-10.40

60

1804

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

433.204

-18.40

90

2704

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

433.204

-11.90

120

3606

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

433.204

-10.40

30

900

1

0.11%

0

0.00%

431.261

-17.80

60

1801

2

0.11%

0

0.00%

431.261

-18.40

90

2698

4

0.15%

0

0.00%

431.261

-34.80

120

3602

4

0.11%

0

0.00%

-

-

122

Failed
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Table 10-23: Summary of communication performance of 433MHz devices and
network used in Experiment Part II.
Radiation
condition

Normal
condition

20 K
Rad/h

Durtion
(minutes)

Total
packets

Packet
loss

Loss
rate

Packet
error

Error
rate

Frequency

(MHz)

RSSI
(dBm)

30

902

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

433.204

-10.90

60

1802

2

0.11%

0

0.00%

433.204

-18.90

90

2702

3

0.07%

0

0.00%

433.204

-18.90

30

902

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

431.261

-23.80

60

1798

1

0.06%

0

0.00%

431.261

-22.80

78

2332

6

0.26%

0

0.00%

-

-

79

Failed

Table 10-24: Experimental results of communication performances of 915MHz
devices and network used in Experiment Part II.
Radiation
condition

Normal
condition

20 K
Rad/h

Durtion
(minutes)

Total
packets

Packet
loss

Loss
rate

Packet
error

Error
rate

Frequency

(MHz)

RSSI
(dBm)

30

897

0

0.00%

2

0.22%

915.756

-82.41

90

2689

0

0.00%

3

0.11%

915.069

-82.91

150

4481

0

0.00%

6

0.13%

916.168

-82.40

240

7169

0

0.00%

12

0.17%

916.305

-81.90

300

8963

0

0.00%

13

0.14%

916.306

-82.90

30

897

0

0.00%

3

0.33%

912.973

-82.40

90

2686

2

0.07%

19

0.70%

912.973

-80.94

150

4477

4

0.09%

19

0.42%

912.973

-94.44

240

7080

11

0.16%

19

0.26%

913.784

-79.43

300

8610

24

0.28%

19

0.22%

914.730

-85.42

343

Failed
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10.3.4

Discussions

Based on experimental results and studies, the following summaries can be drawn from
the current study:
(a) Radiation resistance: under a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h), all irradiated
samples can only survive several hours. Survival time of Sample-6 (915 MHz
device and network) is higher than that of other samples. Radiation resistance of
Sample-6 is more than 100 K Rad. Hence, its radiation level can reached Class R
in Radiation Hardness Assurance illustrated in Table 1-1. On the other hand,
radiation resistances of WirelesHART and ISA100.11a devices are only 16.7 K
Rad and 20 K Rad, respectively.
(b) Communication performance: packet loss rates of four samples have a little
increase and that of ZigBee device has no obvious increase under a gamma
radiation environment. In addition, packet error rates of all samples have no
significant changes under that condition.
(c) Wireless signal performance: frequencies of all samples have no obvious changes
under a gamma radiation environment. RSSIs of all samples have significant
changes. However, due to many parameters can affect RSSIs, such as distance
between the transmitter and the receiver, physical obstacles, antenna used,
transmitted power, etc. Those changes of RSSIs may be caused by working
condition instead of radiation. Moreover, those changes do not significant effects
on communication performance.
The following conclusions apply to this total dose test:
(a) The performance of wireless communication, e.g., packet loss rate and packet
error rate, has no significant degradation under a high dose rate condition.
(b) The parameters of wireless signal, e.g., frequency and RSSI, also have no
significant effects by gamma radiation.
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(c) Wireless communication systems with a complicate hardware and software
implementation, e.g., WirelessHART, ISA100.11a, may be not good solutions to
be used in high level radiation environments.

10.3.5

Summary

In this Section, total dose tests with 60Co gamma source to investigate radiation
tolerances of six industrial wireless devices and networks have been performed. The
experimental results have shown that both the performance of wireless communication
and the quality of wireless signal have no significant degradation before the device stops
working under a high dose rate condition.
On the other hand, the experimental results have shown that wireless system with a
complicate hardware and software implementation, e.g., WirelessHART, ISA100.11a,
may have no higher radiation resistances in a high dose rate condition. In addition, one
solution of wireless communication system (RF2905 915MHz network) with the high
radiation resistance (at least 100 K Rad) has been reported in this total dose test.
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10.4 Part III: Evaluation of Diversified Wireless Monitoring
Devices in Radiation Environments at both High and
Low Dose Rates
Unlike other industrial accidents, in the event of a severe nuclear accident, a significant
amount of radiation can be released due to failure of protection layers. Moreover,
radiation levels of distinct stages in an accident and radiation condition of various areas
in the plant are different. However, modern monitoring instruments are usually built with
semiconductor-based electronic components, which are susceptive to distinct levels of
radiation. These monitoring instruments have to work well in both high and low dose rate
conditions. The objective of the experiment part III is to investigate behaviors of
diversified non-redundant wireless monitoring devices in both high and low dose rate
conditions. A total dose test has been performed to real-time continually measure the
responses of three non-redundant wireless monitoring devices while they are being
directly irradiated under gamma radiation environments at both high and also low dose
rates separately. Specially, those three devices can independently complete the functions
of both measurement and transmission and are conducted with diversified semiconductortechnologies. Four type parameters are reported in this study to reflect behaviors of
developed wireless monitoring devices under both low and high dose rate conditions: (1)
survival time; (2) measurement accuracy for 4~20 mA current signal; (3) communication
performance, such as loss packets rate, and error packet rate; and (4) wireless signal
parameters, such as frequency shift, received signal strength indicator (RSSI). The results
of those tests will provide guideline to design wireless monitoring systems to be used in
complicate radiation environments, as well as to validate the effectiveness of the
diversified design.
This Section starts with an introduction of irradiated wireless devices used in this test.
Subsequently, an experimental setup is developed to continually evaluate the behavior of
three non-redundant wireless devices under two dose rates: a high dose rate (20 K Rad/h)
and a low dose rate (200 Rad/h). These tests are performed through monitoring of
measurement accuracy for a 4~20 mA signal and analyzing the wireless communication

208

performance. Experimental results are presented, and several technical discussions are
carried out. Some potential limitations are identified.

10.4.1

Introduction of Irradiated Devices

As previously discussed, to implement a typical measurement and transmission unit, even
though there can be many different components and circuits, the common building blocks
are: signal processing circuit, analog-to-digital converter, microcontroller, and
transceiver. However, those subsystems can be still built with different semiconductor
technologies, different components from different manufactures. The understanding of
radiation responses of these devices under different radiation conditions is not only
important but also necessary to design a wireless monitoring system to be used in nuclear
power plants under severe accident conditions.
Referring to radiation test data published by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, a
number of semiconductor components listed in Chapter 4 are selected to build those
functional blocks. Three non-redundant wireless measurement and transmission units are
involved in the test, which are built with diversified semiconductor technologies. The
specifics of three circuit compositions are illustrated in Figure 10-33.

Sample-1:

LT1611, CLC502

AD571

P89V51RC2

RF2905

Sample-2:

MAX660, LM108

AD674

PIC16F77

SX1278

Sample-3:

LM2662, UA741

AD1671

C8051F581

SI4463

Figure 10-33: Block diagram of three diversified single-channel wireless monitoring
units
In this test, through the comparing of parameters of three non-redundant wireless devices
under different radiation conditions, e.g., normal condition, a low dose rate radiation, and
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a high dose rate radiation, the behavior of those irradiated wireless devices can be
analyzed. The parameters include the accuracy of measurement unit, performance of
wireless communication, and survival time. Based on the experimental results, a designer
can choose the most suitable semiconductor technology and system for a specific
radiation environment. The three non-redundant wireless monitoring devices used in
Experiment Part III are summarized in Table 10-25.
Table 10-25: Summary of irradiated monitoring devices used in Experiment Part III
Type

Parameter

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

Wireless
parameter

Frequency

915 MHz

433 MHz

433 MHz

Analog signal
processing circuit

Bipolar

CMOS,
BiCMOS

BiFET,
BiCMOS

Analog-to-digit
converter

Bipolar

CMOS

BiCMOS

Microcontroller

CMOS

CMOS

TTL Logic

Wireless
transceiver

Bipolar

CMOS

TTL Logic

Semiconductor
technology

10.4.2

Experimental Setup

In this test, wireless measurement and transmission devices have been placed in a 6-inch
diameter Co-60 irradiator tube. They have been separated into two parts: measuring
radiation responses while the device is being irradiated with 20 K Rad/h dose rate until
all irradiated devices loss their functions; and measuring radiation responses of the device
under a low dose rate condition (200 Rad/h) for a period of 14 hours. A potentiostat
located outside the irradiator is used as power supply to wireless units using 30 ft wires.
A DC-DC converter is installed over a lead shielding to provide +5V power for the
irradiated devices. A current source is used as sensor input to generate 4~20 mA signal.
A multi-meter is used to measure the generated 4~20mA current signal on-line. A
wireless receiver and a laptop, also located outside the irradiator is used to receive data
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through antennas connected to the irradiated units. A picture of the experimental setup
used in Experiment Part III is shown in Figure 10-34.
DC-DC
Converter
Lead Shielding

Multi-meter for
Current
Measurement

Irradiated Devices

Wireless Receiver

Voltage Source
& Current Source

Figure 10-34: Picture of experimental setup used in Experimental Part III
An overview of the test setup used in Experimental Part III is shown in Figure 10-35.

Voltage Source

Sample-1
Current Source

Sample-2

Wireless
Channel

Wireless
Receiver

Multi-meter
Sample-3
Irradiated Devices

Laptop

Figure 10-35: An overview of experimental setup used in Experimental Part III
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A wireless receiver is developed to collect data from irradiated devices online and also to
transmit to those data to the laptop as the Control Workstation through RS232 protocol.
The developed wireless receiver is built with three wireless channels and three serial
ports. The picture of the developed wireless receiver used in Experiment Part III is shown
in Figure 10-36.

Figure 10-36: Picture of the developed wireless receiver used in Experiment Part III
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A software tool developed in Visual Studio C++ shown in Figure 10-37, which is used to
receive wireless data online and to record history data. The tool is installed at the Control
Workstation. It receives wireless data from the wireless receiver through three RS232
serial ports.

Figure 10-37: Interface of the developed software tool to receive and to record
wireless data used in Experiment Part III.
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Pictures of those three non-redundant wireless devices of before-irradiated and afterirradiated 20 hours under a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h) are shown in Figure 1038.
Before-irradiated

After-irradiated

Figure 10-38: Pictures of the device before-irradiated and after-irradiated

10.4.3
(1)

Experimental Results

Normal condition

The results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-redundant
wireless devices under normal conditions are listed in Table 10-26.
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Table 10-26: Results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for nonredundant wireless devices under a normal condition
Channel

Sample-1

Parameters

0 ~ 60 mins

61 ~ 120
mins

121 ~ 180
mins

181 ~ 240
mins

Input signal

11.50 mA

11.50 mA

11.50 mA

11.50 mA

006C/262

006C/252

006C/244

006C/236

0070/1474

0070/1670

0070/1496

0070/1501

0074/55

0074/45

0074/46

0074/40

1.618539

1.496598

1.550059

1.513845

11.50 mA

11.50 mA

11.50 mA

11.50 mA

0560/1381

0560/1507

0560/1478

0560/1491

0570/424

0570/295

0570/325

0570/308

6.784891

5.921795

6.152103

6.028701

11.50 mA

11.50 mA

11.50 mA

11.50 mA

02E0/1298

02E0/1344

02E0/1394

02E0/1416

02F0/463

02F0/428

02F0/364

02F0/356

0300/10

0300/9

0300/10

0300/10

7.327906

7.118259

6.815247

6.746642

Value-1
/Count
Value-2
/Count
Value-3
/Count
Standard
Deviation
Input signal

Sample-2

Value-1
/Count
Value-2
/Count
Standard
Deviation
Input signal

Sample-3

Value-1
/Count
Value-2
/Count
Value-3
/Count
Standard
Deviation

The results of experiment evaluation of communication performance for non-redundant
wireless devices under a normal condition are listed in Table 10-27.
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Table 10-27: Results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for
non-redundant wireless devices under a normal condition
Channel

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

Parameters

30 mins

60 mins

90 mins 150mins

240mins

300mins

Total
packets

896

1801

2689

4481

6970

7866

Packet loss

0

0

0

0

0

0

Loss rate
(%)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Packet error

2

3

3

6

11

13

Error rate
(%)
Frequency
(MHz)

0.223

0.166

0.112

0.134

0.158

0.165

915.946

916.486

915.75
6

915.069

916.168

916.305

RSSI (dBm)

-80.41

-78.90

-82.41

-82.91

-82.40

-81.90

Total
packets

902

1804

2704

4508

7209

8109

Packet loss

0

0

0

0

1

1

Loss rate
(%)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.014

0.012

Packet error

0

0

0

0

0

0

Error rate
(%)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Frequency
(MHz)

433.135

433.135

433.204

433.204

433.204

RSSI (dBm)

-10.90

-18.40

433.20
4
-10.40

-18.40

-11.90

-10.40

Total
packets

902

1802

2702

4499

6985

8992

Packet loss

0

2

3

7

14

18

Loss rate
(%)

0.000

0.111

0.111

0.155

0.200

0.199

Packet error

0

0

0

0

0

0

Error rate
(%)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Frequency
(MHz)

433.135

433.135

433.20
4

433.204

433.204

433.204

RSSI (dBm)

-21.90

-12.40

-10.90

-18.90

-19.90

-20.90
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(2)

High dose rate

The results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-redundant
wireless devices under the condition with a high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) are listed in
Table 10-28.
Table 10-28: Results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for nonredundant wireless devices under a high dose rate condition
Channel

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

0 ~ 60
mins

61 ~ 120
mins

121 ~ 180
mins

9.365mA

10mA

10mA

0058/144

-

0060/235

005C/1644

0060/1307

0064/62

0060/5

0064/481

Failed at
130mins

1.110921

1.774289

1.628417

9.365mA

10mA

10mA

0530/1801

0540/1795

0540/71
Failed at
128mins

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

9.365mA

10mA

0240/13

0270/11

0250/1758

0280/413

Value-3
/Count

0260/27

0290/4
Failed at
78mins

Standard
Deviation

2.383874

2.987363

Parameters
Input
signal
Value-1
/Count
Value-2
/Count
Value-3
/Count
Standard
Deviation
Input
signal
Value-1
/Count
Standard
Deviation
Input
signal
Value-1
/Count
Value-2
/Count

Failed

181~ 240
mins

241 ~ 360
mins

Failed

Failed

Failed

Failed

Failed

Failed
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The results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for non-redundant
wireless devices under the condition with a high dose rate are listed in Table 10-29.
Table 10-29: Results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for
non-redundant wireless devices under a high dose rate condition
Channel

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

Parameters

30 mins
(30 K
Rad)

60 mins
(60 K
Rad)

90 mins
(90 K
Rad)

150 mins
(150 K
Rad)

240 mins
(240 K
Rad)

300 mins
(100 K
Rad)

Total
packets

897

1793

2686

4477

7080

8610

Packet loss

0

0

2

4

11

24

Loss rate

0.00%

0.00%

0.07%

0.09%

0.16%

0.28%

Packet
error

3

19

19

19

19

19

Error rate

0.33%

1.06%

0.70%

0.42%

0.26%

0.22%

Frequency
(MHz)

912.973

912.973

912.973

912.973

913.784

914.730

RSSI

-82.40

-82.40

-80.94

-94.40

-79.43

-85.42

Total
packets

900

1802

2698

3602

Packet loss

1

2

4

4

Loss rate

0.11%

0.11%

0.15%

0.11%

Packet
error

0

0

0

0

Failed

Failed

Error
rate

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

Frequency
(MHz)

431.261

431.261

431.261

-

RSSI

-17.80

-18.40

-34.80

-

Total
packets

902

1798

Packet loss

0

1

6

Loss rate

0.00%

0.06%

0.26%

Packet
error

0

0

0

Failed

Failed

Error rate

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

Frequency
(MHz)

431.261

431.261

-

RSSI

-23.80

-22.80

-

2332
Failed at 78

Failed
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(3)

Low dose rate

The results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-redundant
wireless devices under the condition with a low dose rate are listed in Table 10-30.
Table 10-30: Results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for nonredundant wireless devices under a low dose rate condition
Channel

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

Parameters

Input
signal
Value-1
/Count
Value-2
/Count
Value-3
/Count
Standard
Deviation
Input
signal
Value-1
/Count
Value-2
/Count
Value-3
/Count
Standard
Deviation
Input
signal
Value-1
/Count
Value-2
/Count
Value-3
/Count
Standard
Deviation

0 ~ 120
mins

121 ~
240
mins

241 ~
360
mins

361 ~
480
mins

481 ~
600
mins

601 ~
720
mins

721 ~
840
mins

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

004C
/141
0050
/3352
0054
/92

004C
/96
0050
/3412
0054
/75

004C
/147
0050
/3366
0054
/69

004C
/80
0050
/2331
0054
/55

Failed

Failed

Failed

1.0184
25

0.8235
71

0.9785
22

0.9352
13

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0530
/3559

0530
/3559

0530
/3559

0530
/3561

0530
/3561

0530
/3561

0530
/3562

0540 /1

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.2681
61

0.0000
00

0.0000
00

0.0000
00

0.0000
00

0.0000
00

0.0000
00

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

10 mA

0240
/42
0250
/2850
0260
/712
6.6875
40

0240
/24
0250
/2928
0260
/651
6.3418
14

0240
/30
0250
/2880
0260
/694
6.5383
05

0240
/28
0250
/2906
0260
/671
6.4424
36

0240
/32
0250
/2912
0260
/659
6.4308
44

0240
/28
0250
/2895
0260
/681
6.4783
68

0250
/3014
0260
/590
5.9209
73
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The results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for non-redundant
wireless devices under the condition with a low dose rate are listed in Table 10-31.
Table 10-31: Results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for
non-redundant wireless devices under a low dose rate condition
Channel

Sample-1

Parameters

120
mins

240
mins

360
mins

480
mins

600
mins

720
mins

840
mins

Total
packets

3580

7201

10801

13228

Packet loss

0

0

0

0

Loss rate
(%)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Failed

Failed

Failed

Packet error

0

0

0

0

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

3560

7119

10681

14242

17803

21364

24926

Packet loss

0

1

2

2

2

2

2

Loss rate
(%)

0.000

0.014

0.019

0.014

0.011

0.009

0.008

Packet error

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

3600

7196

10791

14392

18005

21605

25174

Packet loss

5

14

21

26

34

42

49

Loss rate
(%)

0.138

0.194

0.194

0.180

0.188

0.194

0.194

Packet error

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Error rate
(%)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Error rate
(%)
Total
packets

Sample-2

Error rate
(%)
Total
packets

Sample-3

Based on experiment results listed in Table 10-26 to Table 10-31, comparison of the
measurement accuracy, communication performance, and signal performance of each
wireless device (Sample-1, Sample-2, and Sample-3) under three different radiation
conditions is shown in Figure 10-39 (a), (b), (c), Figure 10-40 (a), (b), (c), Figure 10-41
(a), (b), (c), respectively.
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Standard Deviation

Non-radiation

High dose rate (20 K Rad/h)

Low dose rate (200 Rad/h)

2.000
1.500
1.000
0.500
0.000
0~60 (0~120)

61~120 (121~240)
121~180 (241~360)
Irradiated Time (Minute)

181~240 (361~480)

(a) Sample-1
Non-radiation

High dose rate ( 20 K Rad/h)

Low dose rate (200 Rad/h)

Standard Deviation

8.000
6.000
4.000
2.000
0.000
0~60 (0~120)

61~120 (121~240)
121~180 (241~360)
Irradiated Time (Minute)

181~240 (361~480)

(b) Sample-2
Non-radiation

High dose rate (20 K Rad/h)

Low dose rate (200 Rad/h)

Standard Deviation

8.000
6.000
4.000
2.000
0.000
0~60 (0~120)

61~120 (121~240)
121~180 (241~360)
Irradiated Time (Minute)

181~240 (361~480)

(c) Sample-3
Figure 10-39: Comparison of measurement accuracy of non-redundant wireless
devices under three different radiation conditions
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LossRate(L)

LossRate(H)

ErrorRate(N)

ErrorRate(H)

ErrorRate(L)

0.500

1.500

0.400
1.000

0.300
0.200

0.500

0.100
0.000

0.000
0

30

60

90

120
150
180
210
Irradiated Time (Minute)

240

270

300

Packet Error Rate (%)

Packet Loss Rate (%)

LossRate(N)

(a) Sample-1
LossRate(H)

LossRate(L)

ErrorRate(N)

ErrorRate(H)

ErrorRate(L)

0.200

1.000

0.150

0.800
0.600

0.100

0.400

0.050

0.200

0.000

0.000
0

30

60

90

120
150
180
210
Irradiated Time (Minute)

240

270

300

Packet Error Rate (%)

Paket Loss Rate (%)

LossRate(N)

(b) Sample-2
LossRate(H)

Low dose rate

ErrorRate(N)

ErrorRate(H)

ErrorRate(L)

0.300

1.000
0.800
0.600
0.400
0.200
0.000

0.200
0.100
0.000
0

30

60

90

120
150
180
210
Irradiated Time (Minute)

240

270

300

(c) Sample-3
Figure 10-40: Comparison of communication performance of non-redundant
wireless devices under three different radiation conditions

Packet Error Rate (%)

Packet Loss Rate (%)

LossRate(N)
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Frq(H)

RSSI(N)

RSSI(H)

930.000

-75.00

925.000

-80.00

920.000

-85.00

915.000
-90.00

910.000

-95.00

905.000
900.000

RSSI (dBm)

Frequency shift (MHz)

Frq(N)

-100.00
0

30

60

90
120 150 180 210
Irradiated Time (Minute)

240

270

300

(a) Sample-1
Frq(H)

RSSI(N)

RSSI(H)

Frequency (MHz)

450.000

0.00
-5.00
-10.00
-15.00
-20.00
-25.00
-30.00
-35.00
-40.00

440.000
430.000
420.000
410.000
400.000
0

30
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120
150
180
210
Irradiated Time (Minute)

240

270

RSSI (dBm)

Frq(N)
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(b) Sample-2
Frq(H)

RSSI(N)

RSS(H)

450.000

0.00

440.000

-5.00

430.000

-10.00

420.000

-15.00

410.000

-20.00

400.000

RSSI (dBm)

Frequency (MHz)

Frq(N)

-25.00
0

30

60

90

120
150
180
210
Irradiated Time (Minute)

240

270

300

(c) Sample-3
Figure 10-41: Comparison of wireless signal performance of non-redundant wireless
devices under different radiation conditions
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10.4.4

Discussions

Under radiation conditions with different dose rates, radiation resistances of all irradiated
devices are summarized in Table 10-32.
Table 10-32: Survival times of non-redundant wireless monitoring devices under
both high and low dose rate conditions
Dose Rates

High dose rate
(20 K Rad/h)

Low dose rate
(200 Rad/h)

Irradiated
Device

Parameter Measurement

Wireless Communication

Sample-1

2h37m28s

5h42m53s

Sample-2

Not available when it fails

2h2m18s

Sample-3

Not available when it fails

1h18m

Sample-1

7h20m58s

7h20m58s

Still working after
irradiated 14 hours
Still working after
irradiated 14 hours

Still working after
irradiated 14 hours
Still working after
irradiated 14 hours

Sample-2
Sample-3

The following observations can be made:
(a) For Sample-1, under a high dose rate condition, after irradiated 2 hours 37
minutes 28 seconds, the function of parameter measurement has failed. The
function of wireless communication has failed at 4 hours 12 minutes 20 seconds.
Removing its power and waiting 2-3 minutes, the function of communication will
recover. It then permanently failed after irradiated 5 hours 42 minutes 53 seconds.
On the other hand, under a low dose rate condition, the function of wireless
communication has failed only after irradiated for 7 hours 20 hours 58 seconds.
(b) For Sample-2, under a high dose rate condition, after irradiated 2 hours 2 minutes
18 seconds, the function of wireless communication has failed and the function of
parameter measurement still works. Interesting, under a low dose rate condition,
after irradiated 14 hours 11 minutes 8 seconds, all functions still work as normal.
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(c) For Sample-3, under a high dose rate condition, after irradiated for 1 hour 18
minutes, the function of wireless communication stops working and the function
of parameter measurement still works. Further, under a low dose rate condition,
after irradiated for 14 hours 11 minutes 8 seconds, all functions still work as
expected.
Based on the experimental results under three different radiation conditions: normal
condition, high dose rate condition, and low dose rate condition, the following
conclusions can be drawn about accuracy of parameter measurement and performance of
wireless communication:
(a) For Sample-1, before it fails, the accuracy of parameter measurement does not
suffer from significant degradation. Furthermore, the performance of wireless
communication also has no significant degradation. Under three different
radiation conditions, packet loss rate is and packet error rate is 0.000%, 0.280%,
0.000%, and 0.165%, 0.220%, 0.000% separately.
(b) For Sample-2, before it fails, the accuracy of parameter measurement has no
significant degradation. On the other hand, the performance of wireless
communication also has no significant degradation. Under three different
radiation conditions, packet loss rate is and packet error rate is 0.012%, 0.110%,
0.008%, and 0.000%, 0.000%, 0.000%, separately.
(c) For Sample-3, before it fails, the accuracy of parameter measurement has no
significant degradation. On the other hand, the performance of wireless
communication also has no significant degradation. Under different radiation
conditions, packet loss rate is and packet error rate is 0.199%, 0.260%, 0.194%,
and 0.000%, 0.000%, 0.000% separately.
Based on the results of these total dose tests, the following conclusions are in order:
(a) The experimental results have shown that all irradiated devices will fail without
significant degradation of electrical parameters. All functions are correct when
eventually the total dose is less than the limit. They fail when the accumulated
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total dose reaches their limitations. This observation matches well with the effects
of total ionizing dose.
(b) Sample-1 has the higher radiation-resistance than that of other two samples.
Hence, for a high dose rate condition, the design and component selection are
most appropriate. However, this design is more susceptible to a low dose rate
condition.
(c) For a low dose rate condition, Sample-2 and Sample-3 are the more suitable
solutions. However, they cannot survive for too long under a high dose rate
condition.
(d) According to the experimental results, all wireless devices can only work several
hours under the dose rate 20 K Rad/h. Radiation shielding protection has to be
used to increase their radiation resistances.
(e) Wireless devices built with different semiconductor technologies can be sensitive
to different dose rate conditions. Hence, for a complicate radiation environment,
the method of using diversified hardware can be useful to increase their ultimate
radiation-tolerance.

10.4.5

Summary

In this Section, total dose tests with 60Co gamma source have been performed to
investigate behaviors of diversified non-redundant wireless monitoring devices under
different dose rate conditions. The experimental results have shown that the developed
wireless devices can work for at least 2 hours under the radiation condition with 20 K
Rad/h. It has proved that the method of component selection and the method of radiationtolerance assessment are correct.
On the other hand, the experimental results have shown that both the performance of
wireless communication and the accuracy of parameter measurement have no significant
degradation before the device stops working. The experimental results have also shown
that electronic devices built with different semiconductor technologies can be susceptible
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to different radiation dose rates. For example, under a high dose rate condition, electronic
devices built with bipolar semiconductor technology have the higher radiation resistance
that that of devices built with CMOS technology. However, under a low dose rate
condition with 200 Rad/h, the former is more susceptible than the latter. Hence,
diversified hardware should be necessary for using a complicate radiation environment.
In addition, all wireless devices can only survive several hours under the radiation
condition with 20 K Rad/h. Radiation shielding protection has to be used to extend their
lifespan.
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10.5 Part IV: Evaluation of the Developed Radiation-Tolerant
Wireless Device in a Radiation Environment
In the design for a radiation-hardened electronic system, it is critical to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed methods and techniques. This is usually performed by
exposing the device and/or system to a radiation environment and measuring its
performance parameters. In the previous work, several emulation experiments and
calculation based radiation-tolerance assessment have been completed. However, these
methods just focus on the correctness of those proposed techniques in a perceived
radiation damage scenario.
This Section focuses on the validation of the radiation-tolerant design proposed in this
research experimentally. The investigation is done by exposing the designed wireless
devices to an ionizing radiation environment and measuring their performance
parameters. The validation is achieved through comparison of radiation responses of nonredundant devices with that of the redundant device. Specially, this validation focuses on
the system-level performance instead of component-level. Component damages are
therefore not tested in depth in this part of experiment. Several distinct wireless
measurement and transmission units built with off-the-shelf commercial electronic
components are used: (1) three single-channel wireless devices, which are implemented
by using diversified semiconductor components (bipolar, CMOS, and hybrid); and (2) a
redundant wireless device protected with a radiation shielding layer.
This Section starts with description of experimental approach, irradiated devices, and
investigated parameters. Subsequently, experimental setup is presented in detail. Then,
experimental results of radiation responses of all irradiated devices are presented and
compared. Finally, based on those experimental results, some technical discussions are
provided and potential limitations of the designed experiments are identified.

10.5.1
(1)

Introduction of Irradiated Devices

Samples chosen of irradiated tests
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Several wireless devices with different designs are summarized in Table 10-33. They are
used in this experiment.
Table 10-33: Wireless devices used in Experiment Part IV
Irradiated
Sample
Sample-1
Sample-2
Sample-3
Sample-4

Description
Without using radiation-tolerant design and without any shielding
protection, constructed with Bipolar semiconductor technology
Without using radiation-tolerant design and without any shielding
protection, constructed with CMOS semiconductor technology
Without using radiation-tolerant design and without any shielding
protection, constructed with hybrid semiconductor technology
Using radiation-tolerant design and with a designed shielding protection,
constructed with diversified semiconductor technologies

Sample-1 is made with bipolar components except the microcontroller, Sample-2 is built
with CMOS components, and Sample-3 mainly consists of hybrid components. All three
samples can complete the required functions of parameter measurement and wireless
communication. Semiconductor components used in samples are summarized in Table
10-34.
Table 10-34: Summary of semiconductor components used in irradiated devices in
Experiment Part IV.
Channel

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

Devices
LT1611
CLC502
AD571
RF2905
P89V51RC2
REF03
MAX660
AD674
PIC16F77
SX1278
LM2662
UA741
AD1671
C8051F581
SI4463

Semiconductor
technology
Bipolar
CMOS
Bipolar
CMOS
BiCMOS
Bipolar
BiCMOS
TTL Logic

Manufacture
Linear Technology
National Semiconductor
Analog Devices
RF Micro Devices
NXP
Analog Devices
Texas Instruments
Analog Devices
Microchip
SEMTECH
Texas Instruments
STMicroelectronics
Analog Devices
Silicon Labs
Silicon Labs
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Sample-1, Sample-2, and Sample-3 are selected as 𝐴1 /𝑆1 , 𝐴2 /𝑆2 , 𝐴3 /𝑆3 , separately.
Sample-4 is an implementation of the radiation-tolerant architecture proposed in Chapter
6. In addition, considering gamma radiation source and the limitation of the size of dry
tube, the shielding protection is a single layer of Lead, whose layout and size are
illustrated in Figure 10-42. The radiation source is enclosure around the irradiated
samples, the thinckness of shielding for 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 is about 12.5 mm and that of 𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , 𝑆3
is about 2 mm.

S1

90mm

A1

22mm

45mm
140mm

(a) Top view

(b) Picture

Figure 10-42: Top view of the shielding protection in Experiment Part IV
Picture of those irradiated samples in experiment part IV is shown in Figure 10-43.
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Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

(a) single-channel unit

Sample-4

(b) redundant device

(c) shielding protection
with casing

Figure 10-43: Irradiated samples used in experiment part IV
(2)

Parameters Considered

As previously mentioned, this experiment focuses on system-level instead of component
level. Therefore, the main parameters of interest are the lifespan of the units and the
performance of wireless communication systems. The former refers to as the survival
time. The latter involves of packet loss rate, packet error rate, and shift in wireless
frequency and RSSI. Based on the comparison of those test results for non-redundant
wireless devices and that of the redundant device, radiation tolerance of each device can
be obtained, the effectiveness of the developed defense techniques can also be analyzed,
and any potential limitations are identified.

10.5.2

Experimental Setup

In this study, the gamma irradiator generates a dose rate of 20 K Rad/h on the samples. A
potentiostat located outside the irradiator is used as power supply to the wireless
measurement and transmission units by using a 30 ft wire. A wireless receiver and a
laptop, also located outside the irradiator, are used to capture the data through antennas
connected to the irradiated units. A picture of this experimental setup for non-redundant
devices is shown in Figure 10-44.
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DC-DC
converter
Sample-1

Lead shielding

Sample-3
Sample-2
Irradiated devices
Power supply

Wireless receiver

Figure 10-44: Experimental setup for the non-redundant wireless devices used in
Experiment Part IV
Pictures of this experimental setup for redundant device with a shielding protection are
shown in Figure 10-45.
Irradiated
Sample-4

Power supply

Wireless receiver

Figure 10-45: Experimental setup for the redundant wireless device used in
Experiment Part IV
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10.5.3
(1)

Experimental Results

Survival time

According to the experimental results, survival time and radiation hardness of distinct
irradiated samples are listed in Table 10-35.
Table 10-35: Survival time and radiation hardness of the irradiated wireless devices
Parameters

Sample-1

Sample-2

Sample-3

Sample-4

Survival time (h)

5h 42m 53s

2h 2m 18s

1h 18m

21 without
failure

Radiation hardness
(K Rad)

114

40

26

> 400

Comparison of radiation resistances of irradiated wireless devices used in Experiment
Part IV is shown in Figure 10-46.
Radiation Resistance
450

Radiation Resistance (K Rad)

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Sample-1

Sample-2
Sample-3
Irradiated Wireless Device

Sample-4

Figure 10-46: Radiation resistances of irradiated wireless devices used in
Experiment Part IV
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After irradiated for 21 hours under a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h), the status of
each channel in the developed redundant device is listed in Table-36.
Table 10-36: The status of each channel in the developed redundant device after
irradiated 21 hours under a high dose rate condition
Channel

A1

S1

A2

S2

A3

S3

Status

Functional

Functional

Failed

Failed

Failed

Failed

(2)

Performance of wireless communication

The comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-1 under different
radiation conditions (normal, high dose rate) is listed in Table-37.
Table 10-37: Comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-1
under different exposure and radiation conditions

30mins

896

0

Loss
Packet
Rate
Error
(%)
0.000
2

60mins

1801

0

0.000

3

0.166

916.486

-78.90

90mins

2689

0

0.000

3

0.112

915.756

-82.41

150mins

4481

0

0.000

6

0.134

915.069

-82.91

240mins

6970

0

0.000

11

0.158

916.168

-82.40

300mins

7866

0

0.000

13

0.165

916.305

-81.90

30mins

897

0

0.000

3

0.334

912.973

-82.40

60mins
Without
any
90mins
protections
150mins
in 20 K
Rad/h
240mins
condition
300mins

1793

0

0.000

19

1.059

912.973

-82.40

2686

2

0.074

19

0.707

912.973

-80.94

4477

4

0.089

19

0.424

912.973

-94.40

7080

11

0.155

19

0.268

913.784

-79.43

8610

24

0.278

19

0.221

914.730

-85.42

Condition

Normal
condition

Test
Total
Duration Packets

342mins

Packet
Loss

Failed

Error
Frequency
Rate
(MHz)
(%)
0.223 915.946

RSSI
(dBm)
-80.41
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The comparison of wireless communication performance of Sampe-2 under different
conditions (normal condition, high dose rate condition) is listed in Table-38.
Table 10-38: Comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-2
under different exposure and radiation conditions
Condition

Normal
condtion

High level
radiation
without
the
protection

30mins

902

0

Loss
Packet
Rate
Error
(%)
0.000
0

60mins
90mins

1804
2704

0
0

0.000
0.000

0
0

0.000
0.000

433.135
433.204

-18.40
-10.40

150mins

4508

0

0.000

0

0.000

433.204

-18.40

240mins
300mins
30mins

7209
8109
900

1
1
1

0.014
0.012
0.111

0
0
0

0.000
0.000
0.000

433.204
433.204
431.261

-11.90
-10.40
-17.80

60mins
90mins
120mins

1802
2698
3602

2
4
4

0.111
0.148
0.111

0
0
0

0.000
0.000
0.000

431.261
431.261
-

-18.40
-34.80
-

Test
Total
Duration Packets

122mins

Packet
Loss

Error
Frequency
Rate
(MHz)
(%)
0.000 433.135

RSSI
(dBm)
-10.90

Failed

The comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-3 under different
conditions (normal condition, high dose rate condition) is listed in Table-39.
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Table 10-39: Comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-3
under different exposure and radiation conditions
Condition

Normal
condition

High level
radiation
without
the
protection

30mins

902

0

Loss
Packet
Rate
Error
(%)
0.000
0

60mins
90mins
150mins

1802
2702
4499

2
3
7

0.111
0.111
0.155

0
0
0

0.000
0.000
0.000

433.135
433.204
433.204

-12.40
-10.90
-18.90

240mins

6985

14

0.200

0

0.000

433.204

-19.90

300mins
30mins
60mins
78mins
79mins

8992
902
1798
2332

18
0
1
6

0.199
0.000
0.056
0.257

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

433.204
431.261
431.261
-

-20.90
-23.80
-22.80
-

Test
Total
Duration Packets

Packet
Loss

0
0
0
0
Failed

Error
Frequency
Rate
(MHz)
(%)
0.000 433.135

RSSI
(dBm)
-21.90

The comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-4 under different
conditions is listed in Table-40.
Condition
High dose
rate
condition
at the first
287 mins
(A2 is
primary
channel)
High dose
rate
condition
after
irradiated
21hours(A1
is primary
channel)

30mins

885

0

Loss
Error
Packet
Frequency
Rate
Rate
Error
(MHz)
(%)
(%)
0.000
1
0.113 432.955

60mins
90mins

1773
2662

0
0

0.000
0.000

1
1

0.056
0.036

432.775
433.045

-17.10
-14.90

150mins
240mins

4437
7100

1
1

0.023
0.014

3
3

0.068
0.042

432.865
432.865

-20.10
-25.60

287mins

8491

1

0.012

3

0.035

433.125

-15.90

30mins

901

0

0.000

9

0.999

914.414

-71.42

60mins
90mins
150mins
240mins

1801
2701
4501
7201

0
0
0
0

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

16
23
38
63

0.888
0.852
0.844
0.875

913.243
916.126
914.865
914.775

-85.93
-88.40
-87.42
-88.42

300mins

9001

0

0.000

93

1.033

915.766

-87.91

Test
Total
Duration Packets

Packet
Loss

RSSI
(dBm)
-15.60

Comparison of communication performance of Sample-1(S1) and Sample-4(S4) under a
high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) condition is shown in Figure 10-47.
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LossRate(S4)

ErrorRate(S1)

ErrorRate(S4)

0.300

1.200

0.250

1.000

0.200

0.800

0.150

0.600

0.100

0.400

0.050

0.200

0.000

Packet Error Rate (%)

Packet Loss Rate (%)

LossRate(S1)

0.000
0

30

60

90
120 150 180 210
Irradiated Time (Minute)

240

270

300

Figure 10-47: Comparison of communication performance of Sample-1(S1) and
Sample-4(S4) under a high dose rate condition
Comparison of communication performance of Sample-2(S2) and Sample-4(S4) under a
high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) condition is shown in Figure 10-48.
LossRate(S2)

LossRate(S4)

ErrorRate(S2)

ErrorRate(S4)
0.120

Packet Loss Rate (%)

0.140

0.100

0.120
0.080

0.100
0.080

0.060

0.060

0.040

0.040
0.020

0.020
0.000

Packet Error Rate (%)

0.160

0.000
0

30

60

90
120 150 180 210
Irradiated Time (Minute)

240

270

300

Figure 10-48: Comparison of communication of Sample-2(S2) and Sample-4(S4)
under a high dose rate condition
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10.5.4

Discussions

Based on experimental results, with respect to the effectiveness of the developed defense
techniques, the following discussions apply to this total dose test:
(a) For radiation resistance, under the same radiation condition with a high dose rate
(20 K Rad/h), the lifespan of Sample-2 is increased from 122 minutes to 287
minutes by using the proposed defense techniques. Sample-4 can survive at least
21 hours but Sample-1 only works 342 minutes.
(b) For communication performance, packet loss rate has a significant improvement
by using the proposed defense techniques. On the other hand, packet error rate of
the redundant wireless device has not been improved.
(c) For the performance of wireless signal, both frequency and RSSI have no obvious
improvement by using the proposed defense techniques. However, its
performance is satisfied to the function of the wireless communication.
The proposed total dose test is to identify the performance of the developed wireless
devices for a variety of operating conditions. However, there are a number of limitations
that must be addressed in the future. There limitations include:
(1) Single particle effects test does not involve in this test, the effectiveness of the
developed fault-tolerant techniques has not been identified;
(2) The test does not measure the exact radiation resistance of the developed
redundant wireless device. After irradiated 21 hours, the test is stopped.

10.5.5

Summary

In this Section, total dose tests with 60Co gamma source have been performed to
investigate the effectiveness of the proposed defense techniques. Experimental results
have proved that the system can work effectively under a high dose rate condition.
Radiation resistance has been significantly improved by using the radiation shielding
protection. Moreover, it can be more improved by increasing the thickness of shielding
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protection. It shows that the developed shielding protection can be used to mitigate the
effects of total dose.
On the other side, single event effect test is not involved in this test. Hence, the
effectiveness of fault-tolerant design has not been investigated. It needs to be performed
in the future.
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10.6 Conclusions
In this Chapter, a number of total dose tests for the developed distinct wireless devices
with 60Co gamma source is presented to investigate their radiation tolerances and to
validate the effectiveness of the proposed methods and systems. The following
conclusions can be drawn:
(1) The experimental results have concluded that the proposed method of the
component selection is correct and effective. All selected semiconductor devices
can survive at least 1 hour under the radiation condition with dose rate at 20 K
Rad/h.
(2) The experimental results have proved that the developed wireless monitoring
device can work in a radiation environment with accumulated total dose at least
400 K Rad.
(3) The experimental results have confirmed that the wireless device built with
bipolar semiconductor components has higher radiation resistance than those
devices built with CMOS components. However, they are susceptible to radiation
with low dose rate.
(4) The experimental results have indicated that the complicate solutions for wireless
communication systems may not be suitable for high level radiation
environments.
(5) The experimental results have shown that microcontroller/microprocessor module
may be the most weakness part in a wireless monitoring system for using in high
level of radiation environments.
(6) The experimental results have indicated that RF2905 wireless device has the
highest radiation resistance among all tested wireless devices.

240

(7) The experimental results have demonstrated the proposed defense techniques and
methods are effectively to prolong the life of the COTS-based electronic system
in high level radiation environments.
The results of these tests will provide guidelines to design wireless monitoring systems to
be used in high level radiation environments. These results are significant and important
references to analyze radiation-induced responses of irradiated wireless devices and
circuits. They can also help other researchers and engineers to design and produce more
radiation-hardened monitoring systems using regular commercial off-the-shelf
components.
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Chapter 11

11 Summary, Conclusion, and Future Work
11.1 Summary
In this research, based on the literature survey, the conventional approach to design
electronic systems with high radiation tolerance is to use rad-hardened components,
which are prohibitively expensive and are not available for many new data processing
algorithms and communication technologies. In this research, several methods and
systems have been investigated to deal with different aspects for allowing COTS-based
electronic systems in high level radiation environments. In this research, the investigation
can be divided into five primary components:
(1) A method has been presented to analyze radiation responses of circuits and
electronic systems. The circuit analysis method for post-irradiation developed in
this research can be used to obtain the responses of electronic systems for postirradiation. This method can be also applied to analyze and to design radiationhardened circuits with the robustness of radiation effects.
(2) Several radiation-tolerant techniques have been developed to mitigate radiation
effects on electronic system and to prolong its lifetime. They are:
•

A method of component selection and a multi-layer are developed to allow
COTS-based electronic systems using in high level radiation environments.

•

A radiation-tolerant architecture developed in this research is very useful to
involve all functions in a complete communication system, such as
measurement, source decoder, modulation, transmission, etc. The developed
architecture and the reconfigurator mechanism can be also applied in the faulttolerant system without additional detectors and/or hardware voters. The
diversified architecture and techniques proposed in this research can be used
to avoid the common-damage in the redundant system.
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•

An online detection mechanism developed in this research can be used timely
to detect and to locate the damages in redundant channels.

(3) A wireless monitoring system has been implemented in this research. The
developed wireless monitoring system can be a potential solution for high level
radiation environments in NPP applications. Related methods and techniques
developed in this research can be used to implement similar monitoring systems
for high level radiation environments. It also validates the correctness of the
proposed methods and techniques.
(4) A method has been proposed to evaluate the performance of the developed
methods and systems without repeated destructive physical tests in the design
phase. The emulation method developed in this research through external circuits
to mimic radiation responses can be used to validate the proposed algorithm and
systems. The hardware emulation bench built in this research is very useful to
debug and to validate the proposed methods and systems in the design phase. The
assessment method developed in this research can also be applied to select COTS
components and to evaluate the radiation-tolerance of the whole system in the
design phase.
(5) Several total dose tests have been performed to validate the developed devices
and system.
•

The irradiation experimental scheme proposed in this research can be used to
validate the radiation-tolerance and to evaluate the performance of the
developed system.

•

The experimental results provide the fundament to judge whether the
developed system satisfies the design requirements.

•

The investigation of radiation vulnerable of each module is critical to improve
the radiation-tolerance of the developed wireless device.
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•

The results of radiation responses of different type measurement units and
wireless transceivers can be used in the component selection for applications
with different radiation conditions.

•

The experimental results can be is a reference for other researches in the
design of wireless monitoring applications using in radiation environments.

11.2 Conclusions
The conclusions of this research are listed as follows:
(1) Investigated alternative ways to analyze, to design, and to evaluate rad-hardened
electronic systems.
A method is presented in this research to obtain radiation responses of devices and
circuits and to accurately analyze their behavior under the high level of radiation.
Validation results show that the following objectives have been achieved:
•

Several mathematical models of semiconductor device for post-irradiation can
be investigated from the proposed technique. Those models can be applied to
analyze circuit responses of post-irradiation.

•

The proposed technique can be used to design circuit robust ionizing radiation
effects without repeated physical radiation tests.

A multi-layer radiation protection is developed in this research to mitigate radiation
damages of total ionizing dose and to avoid the common-mode damage in redundant
systems, as well as an evaluation method of radiation shielding protection. Simulation
study results show that the following objectives have been achieved:
•

The developed multi-layer radiation protection can be applied to effectively
mitigate damages of total ionizing dose for redundant systems using in high level
radiation environments.
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•

The evaluation method of radiation protection can be used to calculate the
required shielding thickness.

A radiation-tolerant architecture is proposed in this research to allow COTS-based
electronic system using in high level radiation environments. The following properties of
the architecture are demonstrated by the experimental studies.
•

The proposed scheme can be applied to design redundant systems without
additional detection units and/or hardware voters.

•

The developed diversified protections and enforcing differences can be used to
avoid the common-fault in redundant system.

•

The proposed decision algorithm can effectively generate reconfigurator
suggestions when radiation damages occur in redundant system.

•

The developed reconfigurator scheme is effectively to power-off the device if it
encounters radiation damages.

An online scheme based on build-in-test (BIT) technique is studied in this research to
timely detect radiation faults in redundant systems. The numerical studies support
conclusions that:
•

The proposed fault analysis model can be used to identify radiation damages in
electronic systems.

•

The developed online detection mechanism is effectively to detect radiation
faults in redundant systems.

•

The developed diagnosis mechanism can be used to locate radiation faults in
redundant systems.

The hardware emulation bench has successfully supported the research in several
methods and systems. It is observed that:
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•

The test bench allows independent access to process the tolerant logic, to
implement detection mechanism, and to construct analysis algorithm.

•

Single fault and multiple faults can be effectively simulated and injected by
logical emulation and external circuit emulation.

•

Emulation methods through external circuits to mimic radiation responses can be
used to validate the proposed detection mechanism and algorithm.

An assessment method based on reliability analysis is studied in this research. The
numerical studies support conclusions that:
•

Assessment model developed in this research can be used to analyze the reliability
of redundant systems for post-irradiation.

•

Radiation degradation factor proposed in this research is effectively to describe
the radiation response of an item under the given radiation dose.

•

The developed assessment method can be applied to evaluate the radiationtolerance of the whole electronic system without repeated destructive physical
tests.

(2) Investigated the developed methodologies to design, to implement, and to validate a
wireless monitoring system for post-accident environments in NPPs.
A wireless monitoring system for high level radiation environments in NPPs has
successfully been implemented and constructed. It is observed that:
•

The developed monitoring system can be effectively used to collect the up-to-date
information and to transmit them to remote monitoring station.

•

The developed monitoring system satisfies the design requirements and can be
used in nuclear applications.
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Irradiation experimental validation shows that the investigated scheme has several
desirable features.
•

The proposed irradiation experimental scheme can be used to validate the
investigated methods and systems.

•

The developed monitoring system can work in high level radiation environment
(at least 400 K Rad (Si)).

•

The experimental results have proved that the investigated methods and systems
in this research can be effectively used to increase radiation resistance of
electronic systems.

•

A number of observes in total dose tests provide significant references for other
researches in the design of wireless monitoring applications using in radiation
environments

In other words, the objective of this research is to design rad-hardened systems without
using rad-hardened components for high level radiation environments. The investigated
methods and systems in this research have achieved those objectives.

11.3 Future Work
This research encompassed multiple areas related to radiation-tolerant design without
rad-hardened components. Even though the principles and effectiveness of the several
proposed methods and systems have been demonstrated within the scope, there are
interesting issues that can be further investigated. Some possible topics include:
•

To investigate radiation-hardened design from network-level, such as wireless
frequency, network protocol, etc., to build a diversified wireless network for high
level radiation environments.

•

To investigate radiation-hardened techniques from circuit-level, for example, to
design diversified self-healing circuits to accomplish communication functions of

247

wireless monitoring systems, and to analyze radiation responses on more devices
and related circuits.
•

To investigate more radiation shielding protection for neutron radiation, as well as
simulation studies for various radiation particles with high level energy by using
various simulator.

•

To investigate radiation sensors to accurately measure critical parameters in high
level radiation range, such as neutron sensor, gamma sensor, etc.

•

To investigate radiation resistances of more semiconductor devices and circuits in
the modern digital communication system through physical radiation tests.

•

To investigate other communication techniques for high level of radiation
environments, for example, using optical fiber as the sensor and/or the transceiver
and to build an optical fiber monitoring system for high level radiation
environments.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Hardware Emulation Bench
In this research, a hardware emulation bench, as illustrated in Figure A-1, is developed to
evaluate the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed methods and systems. The
bench houses a combination of fault injection techniques, which consist of two emulation
methods: logic emulation and circuit emulation. Logic emulation is used to mimic
radiation effects on semiconductor devices. It is based on software-implemented fault
injection, and uses injection commands to forcibly control and/or stop system functions.
Circuit emulation is based on hardware-implemented fault injection, using external
circuits to mimic circuit responses under radioactive conditions.
Fault injection unit

Receiver
unit

Hardened system

Bus #1
Bus #2

Figure A-1: The architecture of the developed hardware emulation bench.
The developed hardware emulation bench includes four parts: a redundant wireless
device, a wireless gateway, emulation circuits, and a control tool. The emulation bench is
built with two communication buses: bus #1 (915MHz network) is used to
transmit/receive the normal communication data; and bus #2 (RS485) is used to
transmit/receive commands/reports for fault injection. In addition, the fault injection unit
is connected to the control computer by an Ethernet network. A software tool for fault
injection is installed on the control computer to control, to collect, and to display the
diagnostic information, which is developed in Microsoft Visual C++.
The picture of the hardware emulation bench is illustrated in Figure A-2.
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Redundant wireless devices

Emulation circuit

Power
reconfigurator

Bus
Fault injection
reconfigurator unit

Bus #2

Ethernet
router

Control computer

Wireless gateway

Figure A-2: Picture of the developed hardware emulation bench
The detailed hardware implementation is listed in Table A-1.
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Table A-1: The implementation of the hardware emulation platform
Function

Sub-function

Redundant
system

Analog signal processing
Analog-to-digital converter
Microcontroller
Wireless transceiver
Microprocessor

Receiver

Ethernet
Wireless transceiver
Microprocessor

Fault
injection
unit

Ethernet
RS485

Component

Manufacture

LM741
AD7689
P89C51RC2
RF2905

Texas Instruments
Analog Devices
NXP
RF Micro Devices

i.max 285

NXP

LAN8720A

Microchip

RF2905

RF Micro Devices

i.max 285

NXP

LAN8720A

Microchip

MAX487

MAXIM

EU2-5NU

KEMET

LM741

Texas Instruments

Emulation circuits

The screen shot of the software tool in the control computer is shown in Figure A-3.

Figure A-3: Screen shot of the software tool in the control computer
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